Mr. and Mrs. Neuman went out to eat. The took advantage of the fair autumn weather and chose a table outside, set with fancy dishes and a flower arrangement in a glass vase.
While the couple was talking, they heard a dog barking ferociously not far away.
“What’s that barking?” Mrs. Neuman asked her husband with concern.
A big dog was running toward them, with the leash dragging wildly behind it. A man was running after the dog.
“That dog got loose from its owner!” exclaimed Mrs. Neuman. “It’s heading straight toward us!”
The barking got louder and louder as the dog approached.
“Help!” Mrs. Neuman cried out. She jumped up to run away, upsetting the table. The dishes, food, and vase of flowers all crashed to the floor and shattered.
The owner finally caught the dog, who had stopped to eat the meat strewn on the ground, and grabbed hold of the leash.
“I apologize for the scare,” the owner said to Mr. and Mrs. Neuman, who had managed to calm down and come back. “The dog pulled the leash out of my hand and ran off.”
The restaurant manager came out and looked at the damage. “Who’s paying for all this?” he asked.
Mrs. Neuman and the dog owner looked at each other. “It’s your fault,” said Mrs. Neuman. “Your dog scared me. You should have held on to the leash.”
“You could have been careful when you got up,” replied the dog’s owner. “You didn’t have to knock the table over.”
“I was running for my life!” said Mrs. Neuman.
“I suggest we discuss the issue with Rabbi Dayan,” said Mr. Neuman. The dog’s owner and the restaurant manager agreed.
The four came before Rabbi Dayan. “Who is liable for the damage?” asked the restaurant manager.
“There are a few issues to consider here,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “First, a person who damages a third party to escape danger is liable. Although he can damage property to save his life, it should not be at the expense of the third party; he has to reimburse him.”
“Why shouldn’t he be exempt, though, based on ones, uncontrollable circumstances?” asked Mr. Neuman.
“Indeed, there is a dispute among the Rishonim as to whether a person who damaged through oness is liable,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Nonetheless, the Shach explains that if someone knowingly damaged something while escaping, despite the oness he is liable.” (C.M. 378:1; Shach 378:2)
“I didn’t knowingly damage,” pointed out Mrs. Neuman. “I didn’t intend to upset the table.”
“Then you are exempt, at least according to the Rishonim who exempt oness,” said Rabbi Dayan. (Pischei Choshen, Nezikin 1:21, 12:36)
“What about the owner of the dog?” asked the restaurant manager.
“The dog did not damage directly,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “He scared Mrs. Neuman, who upset the table. Damage through scaring is considered only grama, indirect damage, for which one is not halachically liable. This case is even more indirect, since the dog scared Mrs. Neuman, who upset the table.” (C.M. 420:32)
“Isn’t there at least a moral obligation for grama?” asked the restaurant owner.
“There is when there is intention to damage through grama or at least negligence, such as if the owner set the dog on someone or allowed it to run loose,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “However, if the dog escaped unintended, the owner would not carry even a moral obligation for indirect damage caused by the dog.” (Pischei Choshen, Nezikin 3:38-39)
“So neither the dog’s owner nor Mrs. Neuman is liable for the damage?” asked the restaurant owner.
“That is correct, unless they want to chip in of their own accord,” answered Rabbi Dayan. “It is an unfortunate incident. Chazal discourage keeping dogs, unless properly chained, since they can scare others and cause damage, which is not always reparable.” (B.K. 83a; C.M. 409:3)
