Latest update: January 10th, 2013
Already from its imperiled beginnings in May 1948 – indeed, even before statehood – Israel has sought desperately to negotiate with its enemies. Always, always – it has preferred peace to war. Nonetheless, challenged by interminable Arab aggression and subversion, diplomacy has almost always failed Israel. This sad point is altogether incontestable. What real chance is there that, somehow, things can now be different?
Now, of course, Prime Minister Olmert continues to seek Israel’s basic security in diplomacy. Although there is assuredly nothing wrong with such a conciliatory posture on its face, especially as Israel remains under constant pressure from Washington to negotiate, there is very good reason for skepticism. From Oslo to the so-called “Road Map,” diplomacy over Israel’s rights and obligations has always been a determinably asymmetrical process. “Land for nothing!” This manifestly pathetic phrase pretty much says it all.
Ironically, Israel’s principal enemies remain candid. On some things they do not lie. On their intention to annihilate the Jewish state, they are sworn to truth.
The disputing Palestinian elements (Fatah or Hamas, it makes little effective difference) and Iran – will never accept anything less than Israel’s destruction. They say this every day, either openly or obliquely. Moreover, in a corroborating bit of cartography, every PA or Iranian map of “Palestine” already includes all of Israel.
Recently, Prime Minister Olmert released several hundred Palestinian terrorists as a “goodwill gesture.” Together with the US, he is now aiding Fatah against Hamas with outright transfers of weapons and information. Ultimately, as my readers in The Jewish Press well know, the American and Israeli guns and bombs will be turned against Israelis. As for Mr. Olmert’s graciously extended “goodwill,” it shall only elicit the next intifadah. Matters are certainly not helped at all by Washington’s corollary support for a Palestinian state, support that can only endanger both Israel and the United States.
Regarding formal diplomacy, the more things change, the more they remain the same. There is an obvious and persisting inequality of objectives between Israel and its principal enemies rooted deeply in Jihadist interpretations of Islam. For both Palestinian insurgents and Iran’s president, conflict with Israel is always an all or nothing proposition. In this starkly polarizing view of incessant strife between “the world of war” and “the world of Islam,” there can be absolutely no place for authentic treaties or settlements with the Jewish State, save as a temporary tactical expedient. For Israel, on the other hand, a negotiated peace with its Arab “neighbors” and Iran persists as an elusive but serious hope. This is true even when the prospect of Islamic reciprocity is thoroughly preposterous and unimaginable.
A fundamental inequality is evident in all expressions of the Middle East Peace Process. On the Palestinian and Iranian side, Oslo and “Road Map” expectations have never been seen as anything more than a cost-effective method of dismantling Israel. On the Israeli side, these expectations are taken, quite differently, as an indispensable way of averting further war and terror.
The core problem of Israel’s life or death vulnerability lies in the Jewish State’s ongoing assumptions on war and peace. While certain of Israel’s regional enemies, state and non-state, believe that any power gains for Israel represent a power loss for them – that is, that they coexist with Israel in a condition of pure conflict – Israel assumes something else. For Mr. Olmert, like his several immediate predecessors, relations with certain Arab states, the Palestinian Authority/Hamas and Iran are not pure “zero-sum,” but rather a mutual-dependence connection. In this view, conflict is mixed with cooperation.
For no identifiable reason, Israel still believes that certain of its Arab enemies and Iran reject zero-sum assumptions about the strategy of conflict. Israel’s enemies, however, do not make such erroneous judgments about conformance with Israeli calculations. These enemies know that Israel is wrong in its belief that certain Arab states, Iran and the Palestinians also reject the zero-sum assumption, but they pretend otherwise. There is, therefore, a dramatic and consequential strategic disparity between Israel and certain of its frontline Islamic enemies.
Israel’s strategy of conflict is founded upon multiple miscalculations and upon an incomprehensible indifference to flagrant enemy manipulations. The barbarous policies of Israel’s enemies, on the other hand, are founded upon correct calculations and assumptions, and upon an astute awareness of Israel’s strategic naiveté. This means that Israel should now make far-reaching changes in the way that it conceptualizes the continuum of cooperation and conflict. Israel, ridding itself of injurious wishful thinking, must finally acknowledge the zero-sum calculations of its enemies and begin to accept that the struggle must still be fought largely at the conflict end of the spectrum. Right now, this means, especially, attention to assorted preemption imperatives.
Left unchallenged, Israel’s mistaken assumptions, and the combining of these assumptions with correct premises of its enemies, will undermine Israel’s very survival. These still-remediable Israeli errors have the additional effect of creating an odd “alliance” between Israel and its enemies. This is surely not the sort of coalition that can help the Jewish State, but is rather a one-sided and unreciprocated pact in which Israel serves only its enemies.
Mr. Olmert should not become the best ally that Israel’s Arab enemies and Iran could ever hope to have. Instead, he should now seek to serve Israel, supplanting the false assumptions that stem from misguided hopes with correct premises based upon sound reasoning. In the language of formal logic, invalid forms of argument are fallacies. The basic problem with Israel’s continuous search for “peace” through negotiated surrenders (“land for nothing”) is its persistent commission of fallacies. Unlike simple instances of falsity, these particular arguments are especially insidious because they could involve a devastating policy outcome. Distinguishable from singular mistakes, these deviations from correct thinking ensure that all subsequent calculations will also result in error. This means that it is in the very process of strategic thinking, and not in the assessment of particular facts and issues, that Israeli policy changes are now most sorely needed.
Copyright The Jewish Press ©, August 31, 2007. All rights reserved.
LOUIS RENE BERES, Professor of International Law at Purdue, was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). Strategic and Military Affairs columnist for The Jewish Press, he has lectured and published widely in Israel, Europe and the United States on war, terrorism and strategies of conflict.
About the Author: Louis René Beres, strategic and military affairs columnist for The Jewish Press, is professor of Political Science at Purdue University. Educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971), he lectures and publishes widely on international relations and international law and is the author of ten major books in the field. In Israel, Professor Beres was chair of Project Daniel.
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