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Ethnic Politics and the Bombing of Auschwitz
Dr. Rafael Medoff
Posted Sep 02 2009
Conference on Allies' Failure to Bomb Auschwitz
The Wyman Institute's one-day conference on "The Failure to Bomb Auschwitz" will take place Sunday, September 13 at Fordham University Law School, 140 West 62 St. (near 9th Ave.), New York City. Register by calling 202-434-8994 or visit www.WymanInstitute.org.
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Breckinridge Long, the State Department official in charge of refugee matters in the 1940s, did not think much of Jews. He called them "exponents of Communism and chaos."
Long did not think much of Poles, either. In a 1944 diary entry complaining about Polish-American pressure on the Roosevelt administration, he wrote, "by temperament they are not a reasonable race." Yet when it came to U.S. military strategy, the Jews and the Poles were treated very differently. Roosevelt administration officials adamantly rejected the idea of using U.S. planes to stop the mass murder of European Jews. Yet they rushed to send U.S. planes on a hopeless mission to aid the Polish underground. Documents I discovered while researching the American presidential election of 1944 help clarify this disturbing discrepancy and shed light on the role of Jewish and Polish voters in the most enduring question of the Holocaust: why the U.S. refused to bomb Auschwitz. The day after Easter Sunday is a Polish holiday, dating back to medieval times, known as Dyngus Day. On April 10, 1944, Dyngus Day was celebrated by the huge Polish-American community in Buffalo, New York, with parties, polka contests, and an ancient tradition in which young men and women flirtatiously swat each other with willows and sprinkle water on one another. But the swatters and sprinklers of April would also be voters come November, and thus more than a few politicians in search of Polish-American votes took part in the celebrations. The holiday was at once a cultural celebration and a de facto reminder of Polish-American political power. That same day, four thousand miles away, two young Jews staged one of the very few successful escapes from Auschwitz. While hiding in a woodpile on the outskirts of the death camp, Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler heard Allied planes flying overhead. Soon those planes would figure prominently in the fate of both Jews and Poles. Over the course of the next eleven days, Vrba and Wetzler walked eighty miles across southwestern Poland. They crossed into Slovakia, where they met with local Jewish leaders and dictated a thirty-page report that came to be known as the "Auschwitz Protocols." They provided details of the mass-murder process and drew maps pinpointing the location of the gas chambers and crematoria. In response to the Auschwitz Protocols, rescue activists in Slovakia, led by Rabbi Michael Dov Weissmandel, sent a series of letters to Allied officials and Jewish leaders in the Free World, urging the bombing of "the death halls" of Auschwitz and the railway lines leading to the camp. The bombing requests reached the West at a time when the Allies were, in fact, well positioned to carry out such raids. By early 1944, the Allies had established control over the skies of Europe, and throughout the spring U.S. planes flew repeated reconnaissance missions in the area around Auschwitz. Allied military planners were very interested in that region because the Nazis were using its rich coal deposits for the manufacture of synthetic oil for their war effort. Polish-American Fears Polish-Americans, too, were extremely interested in what was happening in Poland, but not for the same reason. As Soviet troops advanced into eastern Poland in early 1944, Polish-Americans grew increasingly concerned that the Russians would permanently occupy part of the country. The Dyngus Day celebrations in Buffalo and other Polish-American communities that spring were tinged with apprehension, especially after a February 22 statement by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill acquiescing in Soviet demands for changes in the Soviet-Polish border. "We Poles are wild as a result of Mr. Churchill's statement," declared Victor Alski, editor of Pittsburczanin, a Pittsburgh Catholic weekly. "It seems to us that Mr. Churchill is ready to sell the Poles down the river." Determined to make sure that President Roosevelt did not follow in Churchill's steps on Poland, the leading Polish-American organizations announced plans to hold the first-ever Polish American Congress, in Buffalo, on the weekend of May 29-30. Nervous Roosevelt administration officials feared that the growing Polish-American agitation could help the Republicans in that November's presidential election. A memo by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) warned that the Buffalo gathering "is expected to draw 5,000 delegates...to demonstrate 'in defense of Poland'.... This is counted upon in a year of presidential election to impel the Administration toward action of some kind favorable to Poland." The OSS staff recognized that the people who had flocked to the Dyngus Day celebrations a few weeks earlier were a potent political force. But the OSS underestimated the depth of Polish-American anger. In the end, 10,000 took part in the Buffalo event - more than 2,600 delegates from 26 states, as well as nearly 7,000 other attendees. The State Department's Breckinridge Long watched these developments with considerable alarm. "This Polish question is a great problem for us here," he wrote in his diary on June 13. "Detroit, Chicago, Buffalo, etc contain great settlements which are especially articulate in an election year.... [T]heir Buffalo convention popped off in a nationalistic direction.... The appeal to former allegiance apparently had a deciding effect on the delegates....[A] solution (or a position) satisfactory to the Poles here seems difficult-and they may hold the balance of power in votes" in key electoral states. President Roosevelt, too, was keenly aware of the important role Polish-American votes might play in the 1944 presidential election. At the Tehran conference the previous autumn, FDR privately told Stalin that while he agreed with Soviet demands for border adjustments that would give Polish territory to the USSR, he was unwilling, because of "internal American politics," to do anything soon on the subject. According to the transcript of the meeting, Roosevelt explained "that there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote[s]." Deportations from Hungary Meanwhile, the mass deportation of Hungary's Jews to Auschwitz was underway. Between May 15 and July 6, the Germans sent some 440,000 Hungarian Jews to the death camp, where most of them were quickly gassed. At its peak, the daily murder rate reached 12,000. In June and July, leaders of the World Jewish Congress, the Jewish Agency, Agudath Israel, the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe (the Bergson Group) and others asked the Roosevelt administration to bomb Auschwitz or the railway lines leading to it. All of these requests were met with essentially the same reply, authored by Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. He claimed the bombing proposal was "impracticable" because it would require "diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations." He also claimed the War Department's opposition to bombing was based on "a study" of the issue. In fact, no such study was ever undertaken. McCloy's position actually was based on the War Department's standing policy that no military resources should be allocated for "rescuing victims of enemy oppression." Yet while the administration was claiming that it could not "divert" planes from the battlefront, U.S. bombers flew close to, and in some cases directly over, Auschwitz on numerous occasions that summer. On August 7, for example, U.S. bombers attacked the Trzebinia oil refineries, just thirteen miles from Auschwitz. A detour to strike the death camp would have taken them just minutes. On August 20, a squadron of 127 U.S. bombers, accompanied by 100 Mustangs piloted by the famous all-African American unit known as the Tuskegee Airmen, struck oil factories less than five miles from the gas chambers. Elie Wiesel, then age 16, was part of a slave labor battalion working on the outskirts of Auschwitz when the planes struck. In his bestselling book Night, Wiesel described how he and his fellow-prisoners reacted: "We were not afraid. And yet, if a bomb had fallen on the blocks [the prisoners' barracks], it alone would have claimed hundreds of victims on the spot. But we were no longer afraid of death; at any rate, not of that death. Every bomb that exploded filled us with joy and gave us new confidence in life. The raid lasted over an hour. If it could only have lasted ten times ten hours!" Diverting Planes - To Warsaw While U.S. officials were insisting they could not "divert" planes to Auschwitz, they found plenty of reasons to divert them to Warsaw. In August 1944, the Polish Home Army rose up against the Germans in Warsaw. Beginning on August 8, Britain's Royal Air Force air-dropped supplies to the Polish rebels. The flight route between the Allied air base in Italy and Warsaw took the planes within a few miles of Auschwitz. They flew that route twenty-two times during the two weeks to follow. The British pressed the U.S. to do its share of air-drops. But an internal Roosevelt administration assessment of the British effort warned that "the [Polish] Partisan fight was a losing one" and "large numbers of planes would be tied up for long periods of time and lost to the main strategic effort against Germany." England's own air force commanders concluded that the air-drops had "achieved practically nothing" because the Germans were intercepting most of the supplies. Nonetheless, President Roosevelt ordered U.S. planes to take part in the mission. The largest air-drop took place on September 18, when a fleet of 107 U.S. bombers dropped more than 1,200 containers of weapons and supplies into Warsaw. Fewer than 300 of the containers reached the Polish fighters; the Germans confiscated the rest. The Roosevelt administration was willing to divert planes from the war effort to aid a revolt that it knew was doomed to defeat - while at the same time falsely claiming it could not spare a few bombs to hit the Auschwitz gas chambers because that would divert resources from the war effort. Developments on the political front may help explain some of the decisions that were made on the battlefront. The presidential election was ninety days away, and the Democrats were worried. The Republicans had scored well in the 1942 midterm congressional elections. If the GOP could hold on to the states it won in the 1940 presidential race, and if the states that went Republican in the 1942 senatorial and gubernatorial races remained Republican in 1944, the GOP candidate would win twenty more electoral votes than the number needed to capture the White House. FDR himself estimated in one private conversation that of the anticipated 50 million voters, 20 million each were solid for the Democrats and the Republicans, and the other ten million were up for grabs. The Republican nominee was Thomas Dewey, the governor of New York, and Democratic Party officials were seriously concerned that Dewey might be able to win his home state, which had the most electoral votes of any state and could be the key to the election. "New York State's electoral votes are by no means certain for the Dem. Party," one party official noted in an internal memo. Another warned that Dewey could carry upstate New York "by 625,000 to 650,000 votes.... I deem it imperative that everything be done to cut this down in order to [e]nsure carrying the state for Roosevelt." He felt the situation was sufficiently dire to warrant FDR making a special campaign trip to New York. As late as October 2, just weeks before election day, one Democratic Party activist warned FDR aide David Niles that "if nothing happens between now and election date, Dewey will carry NY state." During the weeks the president and his aides were discussing the merits of taking part in the Warsaw air-drops, Dewey publicly criticized the administration for not standing up unequivocally for an independent Poland. "The rights of small nations and minorities must not be lost in a cynical peace," the Republican candidate warned. Polish-Americans were not afraid to flex some political muscle. Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit, an important leader of Catholic Polish-Americans, let it be known that he was prepared to endorse Gov. Dewey if Roosevelt failed to air-drop supplies to the Polish fighters in Warsaw. Monsignor Kaczynski, the Polish government-in-exile's liaison to the American Catholic Episcopate relayed Mooney's threat to Joseph Dasher, head of the Polish Section of the OSS. Kaczynski told Dasher that "even token aid to Warsaw would create [a] favorable impression.... Poles would be appeased and possible far-reaching Catholic political actions avoided." Dasher gave the information to the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, John Winant. He, in turn, passed the message to FDR aide Harry Hopkins - with a note saying he himself (Ambassador Winant) had just had a similar conversation with Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York. The White House got the message. The president could not risk being seen by Polish-American voters as abandoning Poland. Abandoning the Jews, however, did not seem to carry with it much political risk. Roosevelt believed, correctly, that he had the Jewish vote in his pocket. The overwhelming majority of Jewish voters supported FDR in 1932, 1936, and 1940, and there was little evidence that would change in 1944. In their book Growing Up Jewish in America, Harvey and Myrna Frommer quote theatrical producer Arthur Cohen saying, "Jewish people are not suppose to worship graven images, but my mother used to kiss this little bust of Franklin Roosevelt that was on top of the big old radio." Thanks to that kind of adoration, the president thus felt no political pressure to bomb the gas chambers or take any other serious steps to rescue Jews from the Holocaust. Timeworn stereotypes denigrate Poles as unsophisticated and Jews as clever political operators. But in 1944, Polish-Americans showed they understood far better than Jewish-Americans how to exercise effective political pressure.
Dr. Rafael Medoff is director of The David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies (www.WymanInstitute.org).
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Only partly right
Date 12:09, 09-3, 09 Dr. Raphael Medoff's article on Ethnic Politics and the Bombing of Auschwitz makes an interesting and potentially useful comparison but misses some key points. The most important is that the Jewish community itself did not lobby for bombing Auschwitz. In fact, there was a reluctance to ask American leaders to commit U.S. troops for operations that would be perceived as being "for the Jews." Many Jewish leaders feared (with justice) a potential anti-Semitic backlash if the war became a "war for the Jews." The Roosevelt Administration itself had already refused to take major actions to assist Jews long before 1944. To the end of his life the legendary Polish courier Jan Karski was very bitter about FDR's cavalier attitude toward the horrific information he had conveyed to the president about the massacre of Jews in German-occupied Poland. The Dyngus Day celebrations Dr. Medoff mentions are interesting but a bit of a red herring. They were simply part of a larger organizing effort that resulted in the formation of the Polish-American Congress in May 1944. The Allied response to the Warsaw Uprising deserves more space than I can use here. However, it was not nearly as enthusiastic as Dr. Medoff implies. For the first three days, American and British leaders refused to believe it had even happened and put more credence in Nazi propaganda (that the Uprising had been defeated without incident in less than a day) than in the reports of their own Polish allies. When the Poles rescued a British POW in Warsaw put him on the radio, new bulletins given in the king's English finally brought the London press around. One critical difference that Dr. Medoff overlooks is that the Uprising was a military operation being conducted by the legal (though secret) armed forces of a sovereign Allied power in a critical war zone. They were fighting for a major European capital that held strategic significance as a road, rail, and administrative hub. The Polish insurgents, mostly teenagers armed with captured and homemade weapons, had librated from Hitler's grasp the first European capital city to be subjugated by Nazi forces and were holding a substantial part of that city in defiance of some of Germany's most elite troops. (It should also be remembered that the insurgents liberated the first death camp in Nazi-occupied Europe--albeit small--when they smashed a captured German tank through the wall of the Gesia Street camp, routed the SS guards, and freed 600 Jewish inmates.) The Uprising was hardly as pointless as Dr. Medoff seems to think. It failed because Soviet forces halted outside the city on Stalin's orders and he refused to provide so that the Nazis could slaughter without hindrance the future leaders of a free Poland. Polish government and Polish-American lobbying failed to get the U.S. government to anything about this. Roosevelt's cynical manipulation of Polish Americans over the issue of Polish-Soviet relations is well documented and the airdrop--executed with great heroism by American air crews--was part of that manipulation rather than bowing to some inexorable lobbying pressure from American Polonia. The result was that German forces massacred nearly a quarter million Varsovians in less than two months and systematically leveled nearly every building in Poland's capital city. This hardly bespeaks the results of some awesomely powerful Polish-American lobby. In truth, neither Polish nor Jewish Americans could have prevented the tragedies that befell their European compatriots. John Radzilowski Department of History University of Alaska Southeast
Aliens
Date 07:09, 09-9, 09 When the war in Europe began in Sept. 1939, most American Jews were either foreign-born or the children of foreign-born parents. The most assimilated American Jews were generally Reform and wanted to be seen as Americans first and foremost. American Jews felt too intimidated to speak up and the one major demonstration in Washington , by hundreds of Orthodox Rabbis, was very much the exception. Polish-Americans may have also felt like aliens -- BUT they were part of the Catholic Church which had a strong structure and large numbers of voters. Although NYC is often seen as a 'Jewish city' there were two Catholics for every Jew. Joseph Feld
FDR and the Bombing of Auschwitz
Date 02:09, 09-11, 09 At each opportunity that becomes available, Mr. Medoff, who has a long history of hating Franklin Roosevelt, puts together another wildly ridiculous conclusion. Obviously he makes a living denigrating FDR through the Wyman Institute and his manipulation of events. According to Martin Gilbert, (1936- ) the renowned British historian, and greatest living expert on the Holocaust, even though the Allies knew that Jews were being killed and that there were "death camps' that were facilitating that effort, the location of the main terminus at Auschwitz-Birkenau was never identified until mid 1944. After an incredible effort staged by volunteers of the Jewish Agency to penetrate the transportation cattle cars, evidence reached the World Jewish Congress. With this evidence, the Jewish Congress was able to warn the Allies about the Nazi's intentions to deport the 400,000 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz. This was the last large remaining group of Jews to be deported. Warnings went out by President Roosevelt and with simultaneous and coincidental bombings of Budapest and many of their public buildings, the Hungarian Fascist government did attempt to slow down the deportation. But later on, after a hiatus of a few months, and under pressure from the German authorities, and the overthrow of the Hungarian Regent Admiral Horthy (1868-1957, Regent of Hungary until 1944), deportations began with earnest. With regard to the issue of possible Allied bombing of "death camps," in retrospect, there is no evidence that either the bombing of Auschwitz would have ended the killing or even retarded it. Mainstream Jewish opinion was against the bombing of the those facilities even after they were identified as "death camps' rather than as "work camps." Only President Roosevelt or General Eisenhower could have ordered the bombing and there is no record of any kind that indicates that either one was ever asked to issue such an order, even though Jewish leaders of all persuasion had clear access to them both. In a similar vein, the bombing raids on the IG Farben/Monowitz production plants succeeded in hitting only 2.2% of the targeted buildings. Martin Gilbert points out that the details and the secret nature of Auschwitz and even its name were not confirmed until the escape of two prisoners in April 1944, two years after the murderous process had begun. It would be folly to believe that FDR was besieged by Jewish leaders led by Secretary Morgenthau urging him to bomb Auschwitz. In fact no mainstream Jewish leader or organization made that request. On August 9, 1944, the first such request came to John McCloy, (1895-1989) the Assistant Secretary of War (1941-5), regarding the bombing of Auschwitz, by Leon Kubowitzki, head of the Rescue Committee of the World Jewish Congress, in which he forwarded, without endorsement, a request from Mr. Ernest Frischer of the Czechoslovak State Council (in London exile.) Ironically Mr. Kubowitzki argued against the bombing of Auschwitz because "the first victims will be Jews." With regard to whether John McCloy ever actually asked FDR about the bombing, there is no evidence of any meeting and no evidence in any of his extensive interviews or in his personal papers that the subject was brought up. But, in a recent book, The Conquerors by Michael Beschloss, he asserts that John McCloy had told Henry Morgenthau III, that he had asked FDR about bombing the camps. "By early June, when over one-third of the remaining Hungarian Jewish community had been deported to Auschwitz, Jacob Rosenheim, a leader of the world's orthodox Jews, and others wrote Morgenthau, the War Department and Joseph Pehle of the War Refugee Board imploring them to bomb the railway lines from Hungary to the death camp at Auschwitz." Joseph Pehle, who was a great advocate for the Jews, wrote McCloy expressing his doubts about the about bombing of Auschwitz. The War Refugee Board determined that the bombing of the tracks would do little to stop the killing, because they would be swiftly repaired. Later McCloy used about the same language and rationale to veto any further requests to bomb Auschwitz itself. (The Conquerors, by Michael Beschloss, page 64.) For decades after World War II, McCloy insisted that he had never talked to the President on that subject. He told Washington Post reporter Morton Mintz in 1983 that he never talked with FDR about the subject. Even David Wyman, of whom Medoff owes his job, in his 1984 book, The "Abandonment of the Jews," wrote that the bombing requests "almost certainly" did not reach Roosevelt. Later McCloy, in an interview in 1986, three years before his death, had an unpublished exchange with Henry Morgenthau III, who was researching his book, Mostly Morganthaus, claimed that he had spoken to FDR about the bombing of Auschwitz, Supposedly FDR "made it very clear" to him that the bombing would do no good, and "we would have been accused of destroying Auschwitz by bombing these innocent people." Of course McCloy was telling this to Morgenthau's son, decades after his father, Henry Jr. had referred to him as an "oppressor of the Jews." Maybe McCloy's true feelings were exposed when he also stated to Morganthau's son, "I didn't want to bomb Auschwitz It seemed to be a bunch of fanatic Jews who deemed that if you didn't bomb, it was an indication of lack of venom against Hitler " (The Conquerors, Michael Beschloss, page 65-7.) Of course the reading of the aforementioned transcript of the McCloy-Morgenthau interview nowhere mentions any conversation regarding the request to bomb Auschwitz! (Comments on Michael Beschloss' "The Conquerors," by William vanden Heuval) The exact quote was the following Henry Morgenthau III: "But didn't he 'Morgenthau' get involved in the bombing of Auschwitz that was all ex post facto. John McCloy: "They came to me and wanted me to order the bombing of Auschwitz. He 'Morgenthau' wasn't involved in that nor was the President " Auschwitz was raised peripherally as the conversation with Mr. McCloy was about to end. He was 88 years old -never in all of the extensive interviews he gave in his life, nor in his papers, is there any indication of his ever discussing the bombing question with the President. Henry Morgenthau III never cited the interview in the family memoir nor in his frequent public appearances in discussions relating to the Holocaust." (Comments on the Michael Beschloss' The Conquerors, by William vanden Heuval.) David Ben-Guriun, (1886-1973, Prime Minister of Israel 1949-63) the Chairman of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, and later the first Prime Minister of Israel, in June of 1944, responded to a proposal that the Allies be asked to bomb the extermination camps. At a meeting presided over by Ben-Gurion, the Jewish Agency voted eleven to one against the bombing proposal. There is no doubt that according to intelligent reports, "It is clear from this analysis that nothing was known by those (Allied Combined Intelligence Unit who prepared a Top Secret report on the principal sites of German synthetic oil production. At Auschwitz-Monowitz. It was clear, 'progress has been made with the construction' of the Buna plant.") who made it of the purpose, or role of Birkenau and it's sidings." (Auschwitz and the Allies, by Martin Gilbert, Henry Holt, 1981, page 331.) In other words there were many air reconnaissance photos taken over the area that included Auschwitz, and there were also numerous raids, late in 1944, directed at the various known industrial plants in the near vicinity, like the synthetic oil production plant at Monowitz. But unfortunately when Allied long-range bombers were able to make flights from our airbase in Foggia, Italy, with log-range fighter support, they were unaware of what was going on down below in the "death camps." Could they then have bombed the marshalling yards at Birkenau? Yes, they could have, but by that time all activity had really ceased and the Germans by November 29, 1944 were dismantling the crematoria at Auschwitz, and making efforts to re-locate, or kill the balance of the Jews that remained. By the December 27th roll call, 18,751 Jews remained. In fact during some of those late December days when the crematoria was being dismantled, errant bombs dropped by Allied raiders did hit Auschwitz killing some German guards. Also, with regard to the bombing of railroad tracks, leading to any of the known "death camps," no Axis trains were able to run during daylight, for fear of destruction from the air. Tracks were virtually impossible to hit from high-level strategic bombing. Even when individual tracks were hit and destroyed they were almost immediately repaired. Low-level medium bomber and fighters had a greater effect on rail lines but they did not have the range to hit rail targets in Poland. Most of the important railroad destruction came with massive continual strategic daylight bombing of marshaling yards near railroad stations. The effect on this type of bombing was worthwhile, but German work crews, numbering thousands, would spend the nights repairing these yards. Remember, as Martin Gilbert points out, "the details and even the name of Auschwitz were not confirmed until the escape of two prisoners in April, 1944. The Nazis treated the Auschwitz, like every other extermination camp, as a top-secret project. Franklin Roosevelt was a confirmed "German-hater." He told the NY Times in August 1944 "if I had my way, I would keep Germany on a breadline for 25 years!" He wrote Cordell Hull, (1871-1955, US Secretary of State 1933-44) "Every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation and that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decency of modern civilization." It was FDR who advocated, against the wishes of Winston Churchill (1874-1965) the policy of "unconditional surrender" and a tough peace. He said that Germany should be dismembered and their leaders punished. Roosevelt never rejected the "Morgenthau Plan" that called for the economic destruction of post-war Germany, authored by Henry M. Morgenthau. Even when Secretary of War Stimson (1867-1950, US Secretary of War 1940-45) took a softer line and complained about its brutality to the President, he found FDR unwavering in its support, for the concept of a destroyed industrial state, surviving only on agriculture. Whether the plan was sensible or not, or whether the plan was even viable, Truman scrapped the plan and accused Morgenthau of Jewish vindictiveness. This continued vindictiveness by Medoff to FDR and his courageous leadership during WWII serves no purpose but to divide the Jewish community over issues long settled. The Holocaust was the fault of the Nazis, and with the prevailing anti-Semitic opinions of Europeans of that era, and their relatives in the United States, any ability to prevent it short of world war was impossible. Ironically, with all that Hitlerism stood for, a large majority of Jews escaped or were chased out of pre-WWII Germany. The thought that a war of extermination against the Jews would ensue once hostilities existed was beyond anyone's thinking. In fact, until the Wansee Conference, January 20, 1942, there was no established plane regarding the "Final Solution." Yes, the Nazis had murdered many Jews in Poland, the Baltic States and through their rampage into the Soviet Union, but it wasn't until millions of Jews became under their control that their plans for Jewish annihilation was set. Therefore, again, who knew their plans in 1937 though the invasion of Poland and onward? FDR allowed Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau to attend the Quebec Conference, and to promote his idea, the Morgenthau Plan, for the dismantling and dismemberment of Germany and turning it into a collection of agricultural states. Of course whether that really would have happened is pure conjecture. FDR did listen to Morgenthau and his ideas on Germany. FDR was the sole author and original advocate of the "unconditional surrender" edict, against Churchill's wishes. When the news of the Quebec Conference was revealed to the world, Joseph Goebbels, (1897-1945) the Propaganda Minister of Nazi Germany, exploited the news from Quebec and the revelation of the Morgenthau Plan and Churchill's endorsement. No matter how it was accomplished, Churchill initialed the Morgenthau Plan for post-war Germany. Goebbels claimed, "Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to the Jewish murder plan." German radio announced that Roosevelt's "bosom" friend Henry Morgenthau, the "spokesman of world Judaism" was singing the same song as the Jews in the Kremlin,"- dismember Germany, destroy its industry and "exterminate forty-three million Germans." (The Conquerors, by Michael Beschloss, page 144.) With regards to the claim that FDR did not identify Jews specifically in the repeated Allied war warnings that the Nazis, collectively and individually, would be held accountable for their barbaric crimes. There was a time earlier in the war when it was thought best not to identify the Jews specifically in the reporting of Nazi crimes. Interestingly it was Churchill who started this practice of not drawing attention to the Jews, for fear it would be seen as special pleading and would fuel Nazi propaganda. "In 1942 FDR made it clear through governmental statements and messages to the mass rallies organized in those years that Nazis would be held collectively and individually accountable for their crimes against the Jews." Even with this strong statement Rabbi Stephen Wise, head of the American Jewish Congress, prevailed upon Felix Frankfurter to visit with FDR in September of 1942 and to remonstrate with the President. According to Frankfurter the President had assured him that most of the deportations of Jews was for forced labor. The decision to exterminate every Jew in Europe, and millions of others was only taken at Wannsee in January 1942, when all doors had been closed (Franklin D. Roosevelt, Champion of Freedom, Conrad Black, page 815). (I have no idea over the veracity of this account. FDR certainly knew this was not true as indicated by his June 1942 statement, and by the various news reports. Also Frankfurter knew it was not true that there were mostly deportations for the purpose of forced labor.) In 1944 FDR, in his statement to the people of the United States and of Europe, March 24th, said, "In one of the blackest crimes of all history-begun by the Nazis in the days of peace and multiplied by them a hundred times in time of war- the wholesale systematic murder of the Jews of Europe goes unabated every hour it is therefore fitting that we should proclaim our determination that none who participate in these acts of savagery shall go unpunished That warning applies not only to the leaders but also to their functionaries and subordinates in Germany and in the satellite countries. All who knowingly take part in the deportation of Jews to their death in Poland or Norwegians and French to their death in Germany are equally guilty with the executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the punishment." (Comments on Michael Beschloss' The Conquerors, by William vanden Heauval. In summation, with all we know today, could the Holocaust been avoided? Could many more Jews have been saved? Who bares responsibility for this chain of events that destroyed not only 6 million Jews, but also 61 million others? Was the West partially at fault? Only the early destruction of Hitler and his Nazi brigands could have prevented most, if not the entire Holocaust. How that could have been accomplished will be debated forever. Could the West have saved more Jews? Yes! Could the West have saved more of the eastern Jewish community? In most cases very little of the eastern European Jewish community could have been saved. Would massive bombing of the "death camps" saved Jews? In retrospect the destruction of Auschwitz would have backed up the timetable of death quite a bit. Would that have helped? Probably so! But, all in all, Lucy Dawidowicz states that "killing the Jews" was a war aim of the Nazis and nothing but destroying the Nazis would have put a halt to that effort. Certainly once the war was begun, and Europe was overrun little could be done. But French complicity in the hunting down, and deportation of Jews is a great stain on the West. Also the fact that the French hid behind their so-called vaunted Maginot Line, when Germany attacked Poland contributed to the success of Germany and sealed the fate of Europe's Jews. In retrospect there some obvious conclusions that can be drawn regarding the above questions. More Jews could have been rescued by a greater effort by the United States. Every extra Jew saved would have been a "blessing," but attitudes in America, from all quarters, were against immigration, certainly not pro-Jewish and certainly against a unilateral effort by the President to get us into the war, especially on behalf of the Jews. Divided Jewish thinking in this country also hindered the effort to change public opinion to force a greater and more overt effort to rescue Jews. Unfortunately there were very, very few Jews who had the opportunity to be rescued after the beginning of hostilities in September of 1939. Could more Jews have been rescued by an easing of immigration laws from Eastern Europe? Probably not! They had no access to freedom, they were overrun quickly in Poland, and they had little help from unfriendly fascist allied governments in the neighboring countries. In the Soviet Union they had no thoughts or ability to leave Russia or the Ukraine even if they wanted to. Was the President complicit in a "secret" conspiracy to keep Jews out of the United States? Assuredly no! FDR was again much more focused on the problem of keeping England in the war against Germany. All of his efforts were to keep the Congress and the military supplying Britain with the "tools of war." He knew that he must make America "The Arsenal of Democracy" first. Were the Jews a victim of domestic American politics? There is no doubt that FDR, under the pressure from the America First xenophobes, who were loosely aligned with the Liberty Lobby, and other anti-interventionist groups, understood the problem facing the future of the United States. He also knew that to make an issue out of Jewish immigration, or to be seen as leaning over to help non-English speaking foreigners was political suicide. He felt that he needed to be able to build an argument based on American self-interest. Would an effort by him to ease Jewish or other refugee immigration restrictions hurt his re-election bid in 1940? Probably yes! Even later in the war when the effort was made to bring Jewish children into the country on a humanitarian basis, the Congress balked. On the other hand, the Congress never balked when it came to British children. Roosevelt only ran for a third term with the idea of being the only one who could eventually save this country from eventually falling under the "boot" of fascist oppression. In retrospect none of the contenders for the nomination of the presidency in 1940 had shown any proclivity, in their careers, to be pro-Jewish or certainly pro-interventionist. Whether his successor would have been Taft, Willkie, Garner, Farley, or someone else, there was no indication that anyone of them would have even continued support for Britain, no less worked to ease immigration quotas. Roosevelt took great risks opposing the "neutrality" laws, backing "Lend-Lease," arming our freighters and sending out our fleet into the Atlantic to fight an undeclared naval war against Germany. But until Pearl Harbor the America public stood wholeheartedly against going to war, no matter how great the potential threat. After Pearl Harbor all things changed. The United States, under the inspirational leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt was able to mobilize and unite the country into a mighty force. The newly published book, "Refugees and Rescue, the diary and papers of James G. McDonald, 1935-1945," goes a long way to explain FDR's secret and behind the scenes efforts to save Jews in the period before the start of WWII," I suggest many read it! Richard J. Garfunkel Host of the Advocates WVOX RADIO 1460 am New Rochelle, NY
Even Pearl Harbour didn't convince some Americans
Date 04:09, 09-24, 09 Richard Garfunkel's comments are brilliant. I would only add that even after Pearl Harbour, it was only because Hitler declared war on the USA that the USA declared war on Germany as well as Japan. Many Americans said Britain will fight until the last American soldier -- and many German Americans openly supported Hitler ! FDR and Churchill didn't want to be seen to be accepting Hitler's view that they were fighting a 'Jewish war.' Things may look different in retrospect. Joseph Feld
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