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September 22, 2014 / 27 Elul, 5774
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Posts Tagged ‘biological’

Title: The Biology Of Belief: Unleashing The Power Of Consciousness, Matter, And Miracles

Wednesday, November 14th, 2007

Title: The Biology Of Belief: Unleashing The Power Of Consciousness, Matter, And Miracles


By Bruce Lipton, Ph.D.


Publisher: Mountain Of Love


 


      The Biology of Belief: Unleashing the Power of Consciousness, Matter, and Miracles is a book that can rewire your entire method of thinking. It reveals some of the very dynamics that saves lives.

 

      Bruce Lipton is a cell biologist who questioned basic premises of his scientific discipline. He challenged prevailing opinions that cells are adrift without purpose. Since receiving his first microscope at age seven, then watching a paramecium wend its way across the Petri dish, Lipton has appreciated “biology as a living, breathing, integrated system rather than a collection of individual species sharing a piece of the earth’s turf.”

 

      As an adult, scientist and biology professor, Lipton was puzzled that people diagnosed with the same illnesses and treated with the same medical care did not deteriorate or improve in the same way. Some recovered while others regressed or died.

 

      The author delved into experiments that disproved the life-controlling dogmas of DNA theories, and the central dogma of biological science – that genes control life. Studies of molecular mechanisms, from 1992 onward, supported Lipton’s skepticism about DNA’s primacy. Those studies proved that environment significantly controls gene activity. Mindsets are one of those environments, with thoughts actually affecting outcomes.

 

      Lipton’s folksy prose makes his story both amusing and quite educational. His experience at raising the achievement levels of some college students with absolutely awful self-images and low grades taught him a profound lesson. He had convinced the students that they were intellectually gifted, then set them on a rigorous course of scientific study. The result of the ruse was a lesson for the ages. Lipton learned, as did his now A+ students, that by changing one’s beliefs a person can change their very nature.

 

      The book is filled with clearly understandable photos and diagrams that support, on various levels of biological science, Lipton’s case for belief-changed reality. Our minds can literally redirect our genetic material into far more productive activity than could be expected if we resign ourselves to chance/fate/heredity.

 

      The bottom line is that genes are not destiny. Read the book to find out how to empower yourself, how to heal and how to reach a potential you never before knew how to trigger.

Knowing The Poisoned Heart Of An Islamic ‘Suicide’ Bomber

Wednesday, December 28th, 2005

Science begins with the discovery of regularities. A regular feature of all Islamic “suicide” terrorists is a declared love of death. For us in the West, such declared affections must seem intuitively suspect. After all, they are contrary to everything we normally believe about self-preservation, reason and human behavior.

But a different vantage point is required. We must now begin to see the world through the eyes of our worst enemies. In this adversarial view, an openly necrophilic vision is decidedly pleasing. Regarding suicide bombing that is intended to fulfill the will of allah, nothing could (literally) be more delightful.

In 1936, on the occasion of a speech by the nationalist general Millan Astray at the University of Salamanca in Spain, the hall thundered with the general’s favorite motto: Viva la muerte! “Long live death.” When the speech was over, Miguel de Unamuno, rector of the University, rose and said: “Just now I heard a necrophilous and senseless cry…this outlandish paradox is repellent to me.” Yet, this very same repellent cry is, today, the lurid rallying cry of Islamic “suicide” terrorists. Again and again, we hear from Hamas and Islamic Jihad and al-Qaeda and also Fatah: “We love death.”

Why do we put the word “suicide” in quotation marks? Islamic “lovers of death” certainly do not commit suicide in any ordinary fashion. As they believe that acts of “martyrdom” always assure a blissful immortality, their “suicide” makes a mockery of any morbid affection. Indeed, as they commit suicide only to assure eternal life, their pretended heroism is never really more than a furiously gratifying act of supreme cowardice.

Ironically to be sure, the Islamic suicide terrorist fears death more acutely than all others. In at least one respect, therefore, this murderer is actually less perverse than he or she alleges but also far more craven and dastardly. If anything might ever be born of the Islamic terrorist’s twisted agenda, a shadowy gravedigger would have to wield the forceps.

The self-proclaimed Islamic “lover of death” although untruthful, also fears continuation of his ongoing life on earth. This life is almost always devoid of any felt opportunity to do something rewarding and almost always prohibits, inhibits and disdains the most compelling needs of his inborn human sexuality. Thwarting both meaning and eros, primal elements of Islamic society continue to prod thousands of young males to “martyr” themselves in the killing of “infidels.” Although it ought to be quite obvious by now, the explosive link between suicide terror violence and repressed male sexuality is still widely unrecognized. Regarding female suicide bombers, the jury is still out.

Neither September 11 nor July 7 had anything fundamental to do with politics. These terror attacks were not produced by Islamic anger about certain allegedly objectionable features of American and British foreign policies. Such feeble explanations were merely the predictable venting of certain thoughtless academics and journalists and of the always, viscerally confused Lord Mayor of London. What animated both September 11 and July 7 was the tangibly ecstatic promise of salvation through “sacred” acts of killing.

The suicide killing of American and British men, women and children in New York and London stemmed from the very same sentiments that continue to produce suicide killings of Israeli (Jewish) noncombatants. Consider the ominously characteristic statement by one Jamal Abdel Hamid Yussef, explaining operations of the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades (military wing of Hamas in Gaza): “Our suicide operations are a message…that our people love death. Our goal is to die for the sake of allah, and if we live, we want to humiliate Jews and trample on their necks.” Hamas, which was loudly overjoyed at the murders of both September 11 and July 7 – because American and British “crusaders” are presumably just as evil as Jews – promises all Islamic suicides nothing less than freedom from death.

By dying in the divinely-mandated act of killing Jews or Americans or Britons (it makes no difference that these are not mutually exclusive categories; Islamic terrorists are interested in blood sacrifice, not formal logic), the suicide terrorist conquers death. In his clerically-promised eternal life, there will be rivers of honey and 72 virgins. None of this is mere metaphor. These are the literal rewards for dying in a mandated and glorious fight against the most despised enemies of allah.

With allah on his or her side, the Islamic suicide terrorist sees absolutely nothing suicidal about his willful murder of Jews, Americans or Britons. For him or for her, a coward, immobilized by fear of both death and life, suicide is just a momentary inconvenience on the gloriously fiery trajectory into heaven. Now the insufferable death fear of ego is lessened by sacrifice of the infidel. After September 11 and July 7, it is expressly through the burning, maiming and murder of defenseless men, women and children – called “military operations” in much of the Islamic press – that the perpetrator buys himself free from personal death.

The Islamic suicide terrorist knows full well that after executing his suicidal sacrifice of infidels, literally millions of co-religionist sympathizers will raise their heads proudly over images of the mutilated corpses and reaffirm allah’s greatness to the world. While this particular observation is contrary to all cultivated expectations of political correctness, it is also blatantly true. This should never be forgotten by those who are always ready to sacrifice another slice of Eretz Yisrael for “peace.”

We are left to deal with an apparent paradox. What shall we do about a “suicide” that does not intend to end the murderer’s own life but to extend it forever? For Israel, America and Great Britain, there is little point now to deterring the determined murderers with threats of death. Such threats, after all, would be received not only without apprehension, but also with a delirious cry of joy and a collective moan of fulfillment.

No, to deter the Islamic suicide terrorists, Israel, Britain and America must now offer the prospective murderers a tangible threat of real suicide. Violence and the sacred are presently inseparable for the Islamic suicide terrorist. But Israel, America and Britain must immediately think in terms of “desacralizing” his/her grotesque inversion of holiness.

It must be our prompt task to convince the would-be terrorist shatterer of innocents that divine reward will never follow sacrificial logic and that prayerful murders in the name of allah will lead not to paradise, but to the grave.

LOUIS RENE BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and publishes widely on terrorism and counterterrorism. He is the author of many books and articles on this subject, and is a frequent lecturer in the United States, Europe and the Middle East. Professor Beres has been a consultant to several agencies of government on prevention of chemical, biological and nuclear terrorism. His articles on this subject have appeared in “Special Warfare” and other publications of the Department of Defense. Professor Beres is Strategic and Military Affairs columnist for The Jewish Press.

The Meaning Of ‘Palestine’ For Israeli Security And Regional Nuclear War

Wednesday, January 12th, 2005

A new state of “Palestine” will very likely be carved out of the still-living body of Israel. Supported by the President of the United States, this 23rd Arab state will quickly try to extend, incrementally, even within the “Green Line” boundaries of Israel itself. Strategically, this Palestinian state – tied to many terrorist groups and flanking 70 percent of Israel’s population – will have a widely injurious impact on Israel’s survival options. It will, therefore, strongly affect future war in the Middle East.

Even in the absence of a Palestinian state, Israel’s survival will continue to require purposeful self-reliance in military matters. Such reliance, in turn, would still demand: (1) a comprehensive nuclear strategy involving deterrence, preemption and war fighting capabilities; and (2) a corollary conventional strategy.

Significantly, however, the birth of “Palestine” would affect these strategies in several important ways. Most obviously, of course, a Palestinian state would make Israel’s conventional capabilities more problematic, and would thereby heighten the chances of a regional nuclear war.

Nuclear war could arrive in Israel not only as a “bolt-from-the-blue” surprise missile attack, but also as a result – intended or inadvertent – of escalation. If, for example, certain enemy states were to begin “only” conventional and/or biological attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem might respond, sooner or later, with fully nuclear reprisals. Or if these enemy states were to begin conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem’s conventional reprisals might be met, in the future, with enemy nuclear counterstrikes. For now, this would become possible only if a currently still-nuclearizing Iran were spared any forms of Israeli or American preemptive interference – actions identifiable as “anticipatory self- defense” under international law.

It follows that a persuasive Israeli conventional deterrent, to the extent that it could prevent enemy state conventional and/or biological attacks in the first place, would substantially reduce Israel’s risk of escalatory exposure to a nuclear war.

But why should Israel need a conventional deterrent at all? Even after “Palestine,” won’t enemy states desist from launching conventional and/or biological attacks upon Israel for plausible fear of a nuclear retaliation? Not necessarily. Aware that Israel would cross the nuclear threshold only in very extraordinary circumstances, these enemy states could be convinced – rightly or wrongly – that so long as their attacks remained entirely non-nuclear, Israel would always respond in kind.

The only credible way for Israel to deter large-scale conventional attacks after the creation of “Palestine” would be by maintaining visible and large-scale conventional capabilities. Of course, enemy states contemplating first-strike attacks using chemical and/or biological weapons are apt to take much more seriously Israel’s (newly disclosed or still undisclosed) nuclear deterrent. A strong conventional capability is needed by Israel essentially to deter or to preempt conventional attacks – attacks that could, if they were undertaken, lead quickly via escalation to various forms of unconventional war. Here, Oslo and “Road Map”-related expectations would critically impair Israel’s strategic depth and consequently, that country’s capacity to wage conventional warfare.

It is still not widely understood that “Palestine” would have serious unforseen effects on power and peace in the Middle East. As creation of yet another enemy Arab state would come out of the intentionally dismembered body of Israel, the Jewish state’s strategic depth, militarily, would inevitably diminish. Over time, Israel’s conventional capacity to ward off enemy attacks could be greatly reduced. Paradoxically, if enemy states were to perceive Israel’s own sense of expanding weakness and desperation, this could actually mean a strengthening of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. If, however, pertinent enemy states did not perceive such a “sense” among Israel’s decision-makers (a far more likely scenario), these states, animated by Israel’s conventional force deterioration, could be encouraged to attack.

The result, spawned by Israel’s post-”Palestine” incapacity to maintain strong conventional deterrence, could be: (1) a defeat of Israel in a conventional war; (2) a defeat of Israel in an unconventional chemical/biological/nuclear war; (3) a defeat of Israel in a combined conventional/unconventional war; or (4) a defeat of Arab/Islamic state enemies by Israel in an unconventional war.

For Israel, a country less than half the size of Lake Michigan, even the “successful” fourth possibility could be altogether intolerable. The consequences of a nuclear war or even a chemical/biological war could be calamitous for the victor as well as the vanquished. Indeed, in such exceptional conditions of belligerency, the traditional notions of “victory” and “defeat” would likely lose all serious meaning. Although a meaningful risk of regional nuclear war in the Middle East surely exists independently of a Palestinian state, this risk would be far greater if such a new terror state were allowed to be born.

Copyright © The Jewish Press. All rights reserved.

LOUIS RENE BERES (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) lectures and publishes widely on Israeli security matters. He is Strategic and Military Affairs columnist for The Jewish Press.

Project Daniel: Israel’s Policy Of Nuclear Ambiguity (Part Five)

Wednesday, August 4th, 2004

My prior column dealt with some of the precise ways in which a nuclear war might actually begin between Israel and its enemies. From the standpoint of preventing such a war, it is essential that Israel now protect itself with suitable policies of preemption, defense and deterrence. This last set of policies, moreover, will depend substantially upon whether Israel continues to keep its bomb in the “basement,” or whether it decides to change from a formal nuclear posture of “deliberate ambiguity” to one of selected and partial disclosure.

In one major respect, the issue is already somewhat moot. Shortly after coming to power as Prime Minister, Shimon Peres took the unprecedented step of openly acknowledging Israel’s nuclear capability. Responding to press questions about the Oslo “peace process” and the probable extent of Israeli concessions, Peres remarked that he would be “delighted” to “give up the Atom” if the entire region would only embrace a comprehensive security plan. Although this remark was certainly not an intended expression of changed nuclear policy, it did raise the question of a more tangible Israeli shift away from nuclear ambiguity.

The nuclear disclosure issue is far more than a simple “yes” or “no.” Obviously, the basic question was already answered by Peres’s “offer.” What  needs to be determined soon is the timing of purposeful disclosure and the extent of subtlety and detail with which Israel should communicate its nuclear capabilities and intentions to selected enemy states. This issue is central to the deliberations of Project Daniel, which concluded that Israel’s bomb should remain in the basement as long as possible, but also that it should be revealed in particular contours if enemy circumstances should change in an ominous fashion. In the exact words of our Executive Summary:

Israel should continue with its present policy of ambiguity regarding its own nuclear status. This should help to prevent any legitimization of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) in the Middle East. It is possible, however, that in the future, Israel would be well-advised to proceed beyond nuclear ambiguity to certain limited forms of disclosure. This would be the case only if enemy (state and/or non-state) nuclearization had not been prevented.

In essence, therefore, because the Report stipulates the need for an expanded Israeli doctrine of preemption, this Project Daniel statement on nuclear ambiguity means that Israel should promptly remove the bomb from its basement if – for whatever reason – Israel should have failed to exploit the recommended doctrine of preemption.

The rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure does not lie in expressing the obvious; that is, that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the informed understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel’s security in a number of different ways, and that all of these ways could benefit the Jewish State to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons and associated strategies are disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure would be especially vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence.

For the foreseeable future, some of Israel’s state enemies, including Egypt (with which Israel is officially “at peace”) and non-Arab Iran continue to enlarge and refine both their conventional and unconventional military capabilities. Even if enemy state intentions do not yet fully parallel their capabilities, this could change very quickly. For example, Iranian capabilities could soon determine intentions, occasioning biological and/or nuclear first-strikes against Israel because of presumed tactical advantages.

To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those attacks that could carry existential costs, Israel must exploit every component function of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel’s efforts will depend in large measure not only upon its chosen configuration of “counterforce” (hard-target) and “countervalue” (city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent to which this configuration is made known in advance to enemy states. Before such an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel, or before it is deterred from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough that it simply “knows” that Israel has the Bomb. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks, and that they are aimed at very high-value targets.

In this connection, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommends that “a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East.” This “countervalue” strategy means that Israel’s second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving biological and/or nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations, not at enemy weapons or infrastructures. At the same time, we assert: “The overriding priority of Israel’s nuclear deterrent force must always be that it preserves the country’s security without ever having to be fired against any target. The primary point of Israel’s nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post.”

It may appear, at first glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military installations and troop concentrations (“counterforce targeting”) would be both more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is entirely likely that a nuclear-armed enemy of Israel could conceivably regard any Israeli retaliatory destruction of its armed forces as “acceptable” in certain circumstances. Such an enemy might conclude that the expected benefits of annihilating “the Zionist entity” outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to its military. Here, of course, Israel’s nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences.

It is highly unlikely, however, that any enemy state would ever calculate that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would outweigh the expected costs of its own annihilation. Excluding an irrational enemy state – a prospect that falls by definition outside the logic of nuclear deterrence – state enemies of Israel would assuredly refrain from nuclear and/or biological attacks upon Israel that would presumptively elicit massive countervalue reprisals. This reasoning would hold only to the extent that these enemy states fully believed that Israel would make good on its threats. Israel’s nuclear deterrent, once it were made open and appropriately explicit, would need to make clear to all prospective nuclear enemies the following: “Israel’s nuclear weapons, dispersed, multiplied and hardened, are targeted upon your major cities. These weapons will never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certain WMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck first by nuclear attack or certain levels of biological attack or by combined nuclear/biological attack, we will not harm your cities.”

Some readers will be disturbed by this reasoning, discovering in it perhaps some ominous hint of “Dr. Strangelove.” Yet, the countervalue targeting strategy recommended by Project Daniel represents Israel’s best hope for avoiding a nuclear or biological war. It is, therefore, the most humane strategy available. The Israeli alternative, an expressed counterforce targeting doctrine, would produce a markedly higher probability of nuclear or nuclear/biological war. Such a war, even if all weapons remained targeted on the other side’s military forces and structures (a very optimistic assumption) would entail high levels of “collateral damage.”

“The very best weapons”, Clausewitz wrote, “are those that achieve their objectives without ever actually being used.” This is especially the case with nuclear weapons. Israel’s nuclear weapons can succeed only through nonuse. Recognizing this, Project Daniel makes very clear in its Final Report to Prime Minister Sharon that nuclear warfighting must always be avoided by Israel.

Summing up, the Project Daniel Group recommends that Israel do whatever it must to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including pertinent acts of preemption. Should these measures fail, measures that would be permissible under international law as expressions of “anticipatory self-defense,” the Jewish state should immediately end its posture of nuclear ambiguity with
fully open declarations of countervalue targeting. This, we feel, would be the best way for Israel to prevent catastrophic unconventional war in the always unstable Middle East.

My next column in this special Project Daniel series will deal with the growing anarchy in world affairs and its particular implications for Israel.

LOUIS RENE BERES (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is the author of many books and articles dealing with nuclear strategy and nuclear war. He is Chair of Project Daniel and Strategic and Military Affairs Analyst for The Jewish Press. As early as twenty years ago (1984), his views on the “bomb in the basement” were the subject of three lectures at Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. This series was hosted by Major-General (IDF/Res.) Aharon Yariv, a former Chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch.

Printed from: http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/columns/louis-bene-beres/project-daniel-part-five/2004/08/04/

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