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Daf Yomi

Wednesday, December 19th, 2012

Sow The Seeds Of Repentance
‘This Potted Plant’
(Shabbos 81b)

The minhag to shlag kapparos before Yom Kippur is an old and accepted in many communities. The Mechaber (Orach Chayim 605:1) dismissed this custom and urged that it be abolished. The Rema (ibid.), on the other hand, encouraged it, writing: “Some Geonim and many Achronim cited this custom. It is practiced in all these countries [Ashkenaz], and it should not be abandoned since it is the custom of the pious.”

The earliest known source for this minhag is a Rashi on our sugya. The Gemara discusses a potted plant called parpisa. To define this term, Rashi (s.v. “hai parpisa”) writes, based on teshuvos of the Geonim, that in Talmudic times people customarily made wicker baskets and filled them with earth and fertilizer – one basket for each member of the household. The baskets were called parpisa. Grains or legumes were planted in the baskets 22 or 15 days before Rosh Hashanah, which sprouted by the time Rosh Hashanah arrived. On erev Rosh Hashanah, each person would take his or her designated basket, circle it around his or her head, while reciting, “This is in place of that. This is my redemption, this is my substitute,” and then throw the basket in the river.

What was the significance of this custom? The Chasam Sofer (ibid.) explains that the seeds planted in the parpisa baskets represented a person’s children. People prayed that if a Heavenly decree had been passed against their seed, it should fall it upon the parpisa seeds and not upon their children. This concern was especially prevalent in the time of the Gemara when an epidemic of ascara, a fatal breathing disorder (tuberculosis?), claimed the lives of many children.

People would cast these parpisa baskets into the river because when beis din is unable to carry out the punishment of death by strangulation, Hashem brings about the guilty party’s death by drowning or ascara. They thus prayed that the “drowning” of the plant take the place of the drowning or ascara that might afflict their children, G-d forbid.

Kapparos With A Chicken

Many years later, the custom changed, and people performed kapparos with chickens instead. The Rosh (8:23) cites this custom, and asks why specifically a chicken is used and not a different animal. He offers a simple explanation: chickens were the most common animals to among the impoverished Jewish communities of Europe. Indeed, in more affluent communities, horned animals were used in order to recall the merit of the horned ram that was sacrificed in place of Yitzchak Avinu. Another reason why a chicken was used is because the Hebrew word for rooster is gever, just like the Hebrew word for man. Therefore, a chicken is the most appropriate substitute for man.

Additionally, the Acharonim write that one must never use an animal for kapparos that would be kosher as a sacrifice on the mizbe’ach (such as a dove, sheep, goat or cow) in order to avoid the mistaken impression that one intends to sanctify the animal as a korban (Mishnah Berurah ibid. s.k. 4).

Objections

The Aruch Hashulchan (O.C. 605:1) suggests that the sources for the Mechaber’s negative assessment of kapparos are the Ramban and Rashba who sensed a tinge of “darkei Amori – Amorite custom” in this practice (as cited by the Mechaber himself in his longer Beis Yosef commentary to the Tur, O.C. 605).

Widespread Acceptance

Nevertheless, the minhag of kapparos is prevalent today among both Ashkenazic and Sephardic communities. Although Sephardim generally follow the rulings of the Mechaber, who opposed the custom of kapparos, in this case they follow the Rema since the Arizal also attached great importance to kapparos (Kaf Hachayyim 604, s.k. 5)

Interestingly, R’ Yaakov Emden (Shaar Shomayim 112b) writes that even today, if someone does not have chickens or money with which to perform kapparos, he should follow the custom of parpisa and perform kapparos with seeds.

Kapparos On Erev Rosh Hashanah

We conclude with the following interesting note. Although the prevalent custom today is to perform kapparos on, or before, erev Yom Kippur, Rashi writes that it was customarily performed on erev Rosh Hashanah.

Daf Yomi

Thursday, December 6th, 2012

For Whom The Bell Tolls
‘Royal Children May Go Out With Bells’
(Shabbos 66b)

Our mishnah states that princes may go out on Shabbos with ornamental bells on their clothing. Since nobility often wear such bells, the Sages were not concerned that princes would remove them to show their friends and then accidentally carry them in the street.

The Gemara elsewhere states that the Sages prohibited playing musical instruments on Shabbos lest one mistakenly fix them when they break. The Rema (Orach Chayim 338:1) rules that included in this prohibition, referred to as hashma’as kol, is the use of any device which is designed to make noise, such as a door knocker.

Noise, Melody, Or Ornament

The Shiltei Gibborim (to the Rif on 30b, also cited by Rema, O.C. 301:23) comments that a person may not wear bells on his clothing unless the clappers are removed because bells are designed to make noise. The Magen Avraham (O.C. 301:35) distinguishes between children and adults. He asserts that the Shiltei Gibborim only requires the removal of clappers from bells on children’s clothing because children shake bells to produce a melodious sound. Adults, however, who are not interested in the sound of bells and only wear them for ornamental purposes, are permitted to wear them with their clappers.

Eliyahu Rabba (O.C. ad loc. and cited by Biur Halacha ad loc.) takes issue with the Magen Avraham’s leniency, and asserts that regardless of intent, one may not produce sounds with a bell because it is an instrument that is designed to make a melodious sound.

The Taz (O.C. 338:1, Y.D. 282:2) maintains that bells attached to a paroches or crown of a sefer Torah must have their clappers removed since the intent of those bells is to produce noise to signal to the congregation to rise when the Aron Hakodesh is opened and when the sefer Torah is carried.

The Magen Avraham (ad loc. sk5), however, claims there is no need to remove the clappers since these bells are not made with the intent to emit a melodious sound, and the individual who opens the Aron Hakodesh does not have any intention to shake the bells and make noise.

Mitzvah Purposes

The Shach (Y.D. 282 sk4, citing Rabbenu Manoach found in the Beis Yosef’s commentary to the Tur, Y.D. ad loc. s.v. “e’kasav”) also permits carrying a sefer Torah with bells and clappers on Shabbos, but on different grounds. He states that the rabbinic issur against making music was lifted for mitzvah purposes. The bells on a sefer Torah serve an important function, that is, to signal to all that the sefer Torah is passing by and that all should rise in its honor. Rabbenu Manoach derives this from R. Yosef (Kiddushin 31b) who, when he heard the footsteps of his mother, would say “Let me rise before the Shechina.”

The Mishnah Berurah (O.C. 338:6) rules that one should conduct himself in accordance with the Taz and remove the clappers from the bells of sifrei Torah before Shabbos or stuff the bells with cotton. However, if for some reason this is not possible, or one forgot to do so, the Mishnah Berurah rules that we may rely on the lenient view.

Let Us See What People Do

The Shulchan Aruch Harav (O.C. 338:1) and Aruch Hashulchan (ad loc. sk3) maintain there is no problem and no need to act stringently. To the contrary, they say. An important purpose is served by these bells – that is, they signal to the members of the congregation that a sefer Torah is being carried. They therefore know to stand up and show honor to it. The Aruch Hashulchan states that leaving the clappers in the bells is the common custom throughout the world.

Daf Yomi

Friday, November 30th, 2012

Do Not Add To Them! ‘Shabbos is not a Time for Tefillin’ (Shabbos 61a)

The Gemara cites a machlokes about wearing tefillin on Shabbos. As we all know, the accepted custom is not to wear tefillin on Shabbos. However, what is not clear is whether it is simply unnecessary to wear tefillin on Shabbos or actually forbidden.

Elsewhere, the Gemara cites two reasons for why tefillin are not worn on Shabbos (Eruvin 96a; Menachos 36b). One reason is based on the pasuk in parshas Bo, “They shall be for you as a sign upon your arm” (Shemos 13:9). The Gemara explains that tefillin must be worn as a sign on weekdays. Shabbos, however, is also referred to as a “sign” in the Torah; therefore tefillin are not worn as they are not necessary.

The Maharsha explains that according to all opinions this is the primary reason (see Aruch Hashulchan 30:3). The Rishonim (Smag, positive commandment 3; Rabbeinu Bachaye, parshas Lech Lecha) add that on weekdays, we have two “witnesses” who testify that we are servants of Hashem: bris milah, the sign of the covenant that Hashem made with us, as well as tefillin, which serve as a sign of our servitude to Hashem. Shabbos is also a sign of the unity of Hashem and the Jewish people, as the pasuk says, “It is a sign between Me and you,” (Shemos, 31:13).

No Bris Milah, No Tefillin On Shabbos

The Terumas Hadeshen (Teshuvos 2:108, cited in Birkei Yosef 31) asks whether an uncircumcised Jew must wear tefillin on Shabbos. Halacha dictates that if two brothers die as a result of bris milah, it is forbidden to circumcise a third brother. On a regular weekday, this third brother has only one “witness,” that of tefillin. On Shabbos, he would have an opportunity to have two: Shabbos and tefillin.

The Terumas Hadeshen states that this Jew should nevertheless not wear tefillin on Shabbos. He explains that the Smag drew the metaphor of two witnesses as an aggadah. He never intended it to be the basis for halachic conclusions. Therefore, an uncircumcised Jew is also exempt from tefillin on Shabbos.

The Radvaz (Teshuvos 2:334) adds that even according to the metaphor of the two witnesses, an uncircumcised Jew is exempt from tefillin on Shabbos. Why? The Gemara (Nedarim 31b) states that if a person makes a neder not to let uncircumcised people benefit from his possessions, he is forbidden to allow benefit to a gentile but he may allow benefit to an uncircumcised Jew. This is because the very mitzvah to perform bris milah, even if one is unable to, is a sign of the covenant between Hashem and the Jewish people.

Interestingly, the Rokeach (30, cited in Aruch HaShulchan) explains that bris milah alone is an insufficient sign since it testifies only to the covenant Hashem forged with us. Tefillin testify also to yetzias Mitzraim, as does Shabbos. Therefore, the sign of Shabbos can take the place of tefillin.

The Mechaber And The Zohar

The Mechaber (O.C. 31:1) rules quite clearly that it is forbidden to wear tefillin on Shabbos. “Shabbos is itself a sign,” the Mechaber explains. “By wearing a different sign, one denigrates the sign of Shabbos.” The Vilna Gaon (ibid.) points out that there is no source for this ruling in the Rambam or Tur. Rather, the Mechaber draws this ruling from the Midrash Ne’elam, the Zohar’s commentary on Shir HaShirim, which is cited at length in the Beis Yosef. This is one of the very few halachos that the Mechaber draws from the Zohar rather than Shas.

Tefillin On Shabbos Is Bal Tosif

According to the Mechaber’s explanation, wearing tefillin on Shabbos is not a Torah prohibition (see Aruch Hashulchan; Levush, ibid). However, the Magen Avraham (ibid.) cites the Rashba that wearing tefillin on Shabbos is a violation of bal tosif, the prohibition against adding mitzvos.

The Magen Avraham adds that this applies only if a person wears tefillin with the intention to fulfill a mitzvah. If he puts them on without this intention, he is not violating bal tosif (see Eruvin 96a). Nor is he demeaning the sign of Shabbos since he does not intend to wear them as a sign.

Daf Yomi

Thursday, November 22nd, 2012

Ball And Bat Substitutes ‘Cut Palm Branches’ (Shabbos 50a)

Children find amusement in simple, valueless objects such, as cardboard boxes, popsicle sticks, and colored pebbles – articles that have no value to an adult. Are these muktzah on Shabbos? Valueless objects are usually muktzah since they are not designated (muchan) for a Shabbos use. Our sugya states, however, that an adult may prepare them for Shabbos use and thus render them non-muktzah. For example, palm branches are muktzah. Yet, Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel in our Gemara states that if a person appropriates them for a use that is permitted on Shabbos, such as sitting upon them, the prohibition of muktzah falls aside. The halacha follows Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel.

The Rishonim note that the Gemara elsewhere (Shabbos 142b) states that a rock is muktzah even if it is used to cover a barrel. Indeed, the barrel too becomes muktzah since it serves as a base for the rock. That Gemara seems to contradict our own. If a person designates a rock as a barrel cover, the rock should cease being muktzah. Why does it retain its muktzah status?

The Rishonim offer two answers. The Rashba (Teshuvos 5:225) explains that preparing muktzah objects for a specific use before Shabbos is only effective if one intends to permanently use them for that purpose. Rabban Shimon b, Gamliel, for instance, designated the palm branches for continuous use. The Gemara regarding the rock, on the other hand, concerns a rock that someone intended to use as a barrel cover for just one Shabbos. That’s why it remains muktzah.

The Ran (23) writes that designating an object for a function for just one Shabbos is enough to render it non-muktzah so long as that function is commonly performed with that object. In the time of the Gemara, for example, it was common to use palm branches as seats, which is why Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel’s was allowed to designate them as such, but it was uncommon to use a rock for a barrel cover, which is why, in the Ran’s opinion, doing so did not change the rock’s muktzah status.

The Mechaber (Orach Chayim 308:22) cites the opinion of both the Rashba and the Ran, and the Mishnah Berurah (s.k. 97) rules that one may rely on the Ran if necessary. Note that everyone would agree that if one designates a rock as a permanent toy, the rock ceases to be muktzah.

The Intent of a Child

What about a child? Is his intention to use an item as a toy sufficient to make that item non-muktzah? Or must an adult designate the item as a toy on his behalf? Tosfos Shabbos (end of introduction to 308) rules that although a child’s deeds are effective, his thoughts are halachically insignificant (see Pri Megadim, general introduction to Hilchos Yom Tov 2:1:6). Thus, the child must perform a physical act to an item – such as coloring it – to render it non-muktzah. Some suggest that even the act of gathering items together is sufficient to designate them as toys (see Halachah Aruchah p. 118).

The Mechaber’s Opinion

The Mechaber (O.C. ibid, 308:45) rules that a muktzah object designated for play remains muktzah. “It is forbidden to play with a ball on Shabbos and Yom Tov,” he writes. The Rema, on the other hand, rules that we may follow those who are lenient in this matter. The Mishnah Berurah (s.k. 157) explains that the Mechaber maintains that an item’s muktzah status is only lifted if one intends to use it for a significant function; intending to play with it is insufficient. Sephardim follow this opinion and generally instruct their children not to play with muktzah objects even if they had been designated as toys before Shabbos. Ashkenazim, who follow the rulings of the Rema, allow children to play with muktzah objects designated as toys as long as the children performed a specific act to prepare the object for play or an adult so designated it (Halacha Arucha, ibid 114).

It is important to note that when the Mechaber rules that balls are muktzah, he refers only to muktzah objects that were designated to be used as balls before Shabbos. Balls that were originally manufactured, and sold as, toys are not muktzah, even according to the Mechaber.

Daf Yomi

Wednesday, November 14th, 2012

Children And Corpses
‘A Body Lying In The Sun…’
(Shabbos 43b)

As a general rule, functionless items (i.e., non-utensils which are not designated for any use), such as stones and broken utensils, are muktzah on Shabbos and may not be moved. These types of items belong to a category of muktzah called “muktzah machmas gufo” – inherently muktzah. A human corpse is included in this category and may not be moved on Shabbos except under certain conditions.

A Loaf Of Bread And Kavod Ha’mes

The Gemara on our daf states that if a dead person is lying in the sun on Shabbos and in danger of decaying, it is permissible to move him or her via means of a loaf of bread or a child. That is, one should place either the loaf of bread or child on top of the corpse. Doing so permits one to carry the corpse (since there is a non-muktzah item on top of it). Our sages permitted this action only because they were concerned for kavod ha’mes, the dignity of the deceased.

A Moment’s Interruption

The source for this leniency is, as the Gemara explains (supra 30b), the story of David Hamelech’s death. David knew he would die on a Shabbos and therefore engaged in Torah study ceaselessly every Shabbos in order to keep the Angel of Death at bay. However, one Shabbos, as he was sitting in his garden studying, the Angel of Death caused the trees to stir, whereupon David ascended a ladder to investigate the source of the noise. As he was ascending, the ladder broke causing him to fall to his death. Shlomo Hamelech, seeing his father lying out in the sun and worried his corpse would begin to decay, sent for the Sages, asking them what to do. They replied that he may move the corpse, albeit only after placing either a loaf of bread or child upon it.

The Ran (novella, ad loc.) explains that the Sages did not mean that only a loaf of bread or child may be utilized in a case like this. Rather, any non-muktzah object is acceptable.

What About The Bed?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (novella, ad loc.) reasons that if all non-muktzah objects are acceptable, the bed of the deceased should suffice. Why, then, does the Gemara state that a child or loaf of bread is necessary? The Rashash answers that a corpse’s bed is not sufficient because it is considered tafel – a subordinate object to the deceased.

His Clothing?

Interestingly, the Mordechai (siman 312 and cited by the Mechaber, Orach Chayim 311:4) opines that in the event that the corpse is clothed, there is no need for any other non-muktzah object since the clothing serves the same purpose that a child or loaf of bread would.

The Beis Yosef (to the Tur, O.C. 311), however, argues that a corpse’s clothing is subordinate to the deceased and can never be considered a substitute for a child or loaf of bread.

The She’lah (cited by Ba’er Heitev, Orach Chayim 311, sk11) adduces proof for the Beis Yosef’s position from the incident concerning David Hamelech’s death (as cited above). The Gemara relates that he collapsed on Shabbos when he momentarily interrupted his Torah study. Clearly he was dressed at the time. Nevertheless, Shlomo was instructed to place either a loaf of bread oa child on his father’s body before moving it out of the sun. According to the Mordechai, placing a child or loaf of bread should not have been required since David was clothed at that moment.

Rules For Royalty

In defense of the Mordechai, the Magen Avraham (Orach Chayim 311, sk16) argues that David Ha’Melech’s situation was different in light of the Gemara in Sanhedrin 52b which states that a king’s clothing and personal effects are burned after his death (because it would be considered disrespectful to the king if they were subsequently used by ordinary people). Since the king’s clothing was prohibited for use by others, they were muktzah. Therefore, the fact that David was clothed was not sufficient, and it was necessary to place a loaf of bread or child on him.

Daf Yomi

Thursday, November 8th, 2012

Enjoying A Hot Dish
‘What Was Really Meant Was Replacing It…’
(Shabbos 37a)

The Gemara states that even though Chananya would permit shehiyah (leaving partially cooked food on an open flame on Shabbos), he would prohibit chazarah unless the coals are garuf ve’katum (swept or covered).

Appearances’ Sake

Rashi (36b sv “aval lo tavshil”) indicates that chazarah is prohibited because it gives the impression to anyone watching that one wishes to cook the food further. Thus, he only permits doing so if the coals (or flame) are covered.

Stoking The Coals

The Ran (ad loc.) explains that Chananya’s concern with chazarah is similar to the rabbanan’s concern with shehiyah: namely, that one may to stoke the coals. (Nowadays, the equivalent would be moving a pot closer to the flame or raising the flame.) Chananya fears that when returning a pot to the flame, he may find that the pot has cooled off and will desire to stir the coals to help reheat it.

Thus, even if one accepts the lenient ruling of the Rema (Orach Chayim 253:2) who rules in accordance with Chananya, it is important to perform grifah and ketimah (covering or sweeping the coals) because many times pots have to be adjusted and moved closer to the fire. Also, occasionally one needs to lift a pot to remove some food and then replace it on the stove. Since such an act is considered chazarah, Chananya would only permit if the coals are garuf ve’katum.

The Blech

The Maharil (cited by Magen Avraham, Orach Chayim ad loc. sk31) maintains that placing a blech on a stove is the equivalent of ketumah (and gerufah) and thus permits leaving food on a blech-covered stove on Shabbos. This is the widely accepted minhag today (see Chayyei Adam 20:12; also Kisvei Rav Henkin, page 21, who rule accordingly).

What To Cover?

Rabbi Shimon Eider (Sefer Hilchos Shabbos note 961) cites Rabbi Aaron Kotler who says that covering the knobs on a stove or oven constitutes ketumah since it serves as a reminder not to raise the flame.

Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Orach Chayim vol. 1, responsum 93) disagrees and asserts that the essence of ketumah is accomplished today by covering the flame, not the knobs controlling the flame. Why? Because, as the Ran explains, the whole point of ketumah is to make a hekker – a recognizable sign that one is only interested in letting the food simmer on its own but is uninterested in stoking the coals. Thus, only covering the flames constitutes ketumah, not covering the knobs. Nevertheless, Rabbi Feinstein advises people to cover the knobs as well. While using a blech demonstrates that one does not wish to cook, covering the knobs ensures that one does not do so.

This week’s Daf Yomi Highlights is based upon Al Hadaf, published by Cong. Al Hadaf, 17N Rigaud Rd., Spring Valley, NY 10977-2533. Al Hadaf published, semi-monthly, is available by subscription: U.S. – $40 per year; Canada – $54 per year; overseas – $65 per year. For dedication information, contact Rabbi Zev Dickstein, editor, at 845-356-9114 or visit Alhadafyomi.org.

Daf Yomi

Friday, November 2nd, 2012

For Appearance’s Sake
‘Moving Forward At The Word Of G-d’
(Shabbos 31a)

When the umbrella was invented, poskim debated at length whether it may be used on Shabbos. The core of their debate was whether opening an umbrella is considered making an ohel for protection from the rain or sun. In practice, the prohibition against using umbrellas has been universally accepted among all Jewish communities. As the Chafetz Chaim, zt”l, writes, “One who guards his soul should utterly refrain from their use” (Biur Halacha 315, s.v. tefach).

However, when the Chasam Sofer was first informed that a great posek considered opening an umbrella to be an issur d’oraisa, he pointed to our sugya as proof to the contrary (Teshuvos O.C. 72).

As is well-known, the 39 melachos are defined and characterized by the activities that were necessary to construct the Mishkan. For example, because curtains were sewn for the Mishkan, sewing is forbidden on Shabbos. Because rams were slaughtered for their leather to cover the Mishkan, slaughtering is forbidden on Shabbos. Because building was necessary in constructing the Mishkan, building is forbidden on Shabbos.

In Talmud Yerushalmi, amora’im debate whether one may construct a temporary building. In other words, may one build a structure on Shabbos that one intends to soon demolish?

On the one hand, one can argue that doing so should be forbidden. After all, the Mishkan itself was a temporary building. When Bnei Yisrael camped, they assembled its parts. Before they traveled, they dismantled it. Since the issur of meleches boneh is based on what happened in constructing the Mishkan, temporary building should be forbidden on Shabbos.

Temporary Building

On the other hand, though, one can argue that temporary building does not fall under the category of meleches boneh since it is unimportant, and unimportant building is not considered real “building” when it comes to the laws of Shabbos. It’s true that the building of the Mishkan was also temporary, but that was by no means a sign of its unimportance. Bnei Yisrael assembled and disassembled it by Hashem’s command. Even if the Mishkan only sometimes stood for a short period of time, the command of Hashem made it as important as any permanent building.

A Permanent Umbrella?

An umbrella is a temporary structure. As such, it is subject to the debate in Yerushalmi. Though the Yerushalmi does not resolve this debate, the Chasam Sofer argues that our sugya reaches a clear conclusion on our question.

Demolishing is one of the 39 melachos if done in a constructive fashion. In other words, one may not destroy for the sake of building. For example, one may not demolish an old building to build a new one in its place. Our Gemara wonders whether one may demolish for the sake of building in a different locale. One can argue that doing so does not fall under the category of forbidden demolishing since there seemingly is no connection between the act of demolishing and the act of building.

The Gemara suggests a proof that doing so is forbidden based on what happened in constructing the Mishkan. When the Jews dismantled the Mishkan, they did so for the sake of building it in another locale. Since the construction of the Mishkan is the very source of the 39 melachos, demolishing for the sake of building elsewhere should therefore be forbidden.

The Gemara rejects this reasoning. It states that the dismantling of the Mishkan was done at Hashem’s command, thus making the dismantling extremely significant. It cannot be compared to the demolition of mundane buildings in order to build them in a different place.

The Gemara accepts this argument. Demolishing on Shabbos in order to rebuild in a different place is not the biblical melachah of demolishing even though it was performed in the Mishkan.

The Chasam Sofer and the Umbrella

We can extend this line of reasoning to temporary building. This act was also done in constructing the Mishkan but cannot be compared to ordinary temporary building. In the Mishkan, temporary building was important because it was done at the special command of Hashem for the purpose of traveling in the desert. The same cannot be said of ordinary temporary building.

Daf Yomi

Wednesday, October 24th, 2012

Triple Pray?
‘If He Did Not Say He Must Repeat’
(Shabbos 24a)

Our sugya is the source for some of the most well-known laws in hilchos tefillah: those dictating what a person should do if he forgets to say ya’aleh v’yavo in Shemoneh Esreh on Rosh Chodesh or Chol Hamoed (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 422:1).

If he notices his mistake before beginning Modim, he should recite ya’aleh v’yavo immediately. If he notices any time between the beginning of Modim and the end of Shemoneh Esreh, he must return to Retzeh and proceed from there. If he is accustomed to reciting petitions such as “Elokai netzor” at the end of Shemoneh Esreh, this is considered part of his Shemoneh Esreh and he may still return to Retzeh. If he only realizes after completing the entire Shemoneh Esreh (even if he has not yet taken three steps back), he must return to the beginning of Shemoneh Esreh.

A Different Mistake Each Time

What about a doubly forgetful person – someone who repeats Shemoneh Esreh because he forgot to say ya’aleh v’yavo and then realizes after his second Shemoneh Esreh that he accidentally said “morid hagesehem” in place of “morid hatal”? Does he need to say Shemoneh Esreh yet a third time?

Did He Or Did He Not?

At the heart of this question lies another one: How do our Sages view a tefillah that lacked ya’aleh v’yavo or any of the other insertions whose omission requires one to repeat Shemoneh Esreh? Do they see it as almost “non-existent” – as if the person had not davened at all? Or perhaps they do consider it a tefillah, but nonetheless, the person must repeat Shemoneh Esreh in order to recite the omitted insertion.

If we take the view that the tefillah is essentially “non-existent” or “worthless” (as if he had not davened), then the person who forgot ya’aleh v’yavo and confused morid hagesehem with morid hatal must daven a third time. However, if we take the view that the Shemoneh Esreh without ya’aleh v’yavo, for example, is still a tefillah, then the person need not daven a third time since each tefillah completed what the other one lacked. (The person did not confuse morid hagesehem with morid hatal in the first tefillah and did say ya’aleh v’yavo in the second tefillah.)

Leading poskim throughout the generations have debated this issue. Many rule that the person in our case need not daven again (Gur Aryeh Yehudah O.C. 17; Mekor Chaim 108; Birkas Habayis 17:29) while others rule that he must (Mateh Efraim 582:21, Magen Giborim 104, Elef Hamagen s.k. 9; Resp. Likutei Tzvi 10; Resp. Maharshag O.C. 1:52; et. al.).

Will This Time Be Any Better?

The author of Yagel Yaakov (O.C. 23) presents a different argument. Even if we were to consider both tefillos invalid, he writes, we should still not instruct this person to daven a third time since if he erred twice, he will most likely err a third time. Only if he is confident that he will certainly not err this time should he daven again.

Contemporary poskim (Levushei Mordechai Tinyana, O.C. 12; Resp. Har Tzvi O.C. 1:54; Minchas Yitzchak 10:40) suggest that a person should daven a third time and make a condition that if he is required to daven again, this Shemoneh Esreh should fulfill his obligation, and if he is not required to daven again, his tefillah should be considered a voluntary tefillas nedavah. All opinions are thereby satisfied.

Meoros Hadaf Hayomi Newsletters are published by the Sochachover Kollel of Bnei Brak, led by Rabbi Chaim Dovid Kovalsky. Meoros Hadaf Hayomi Newsletters, in Hebrew and/or English, are available for simcha and memorial dedications and are distributed by e-mail, dafyomi@hadaf-yomi.com.

Printed from: http://www.jewishpress.com/judaism/halacha-hashkafa/daf-yomi-48/2012/10/24/

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