*Editor’s Note: This is part IX in a series from Dr. Grobman. You can read Part VIII, here
In light of America’s decision to restrict the number of Jews entering the US, alternative options like the Philippines, Alaska, the Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic were discussed in a number of publications: Survey Graphic; Jewish Social Studies, The Jewish Monthly, Jewish Frontier, Newsweek, Time, The American Mercury and The New Republic. Historian Henry Feingold added British Guiana, Africa, Latin America, and Brazil. Except for the Dominican Republic, hardly any went beyond the discussion stage.
Although the Zionists supported these colonization projects, even when they viewed them as acts of desperation, they gained their endorsement as long as Jews could be saved. Typical of this principle is seen in “Refugee Colonization in San Domingo,” in the April 1940 issue of the Jewish Frontier: “If it were possible to save 100,000 Jewish refugees from the European hell to San Domingo and provide them with civil rights even without any other perspectives of a national-historical character, it would still be a great achievement under present conditions…. We have no grounds to be very enthusiastic over this new attempt which will make Jewish dispersion even more extensive than heretofore…. Nevertheless, we cannot but wish success to this enterprise since, whatever its limitations, it is concerned with the salvation of men, women, and children who are faced with physical annihilation.”
Other articles conveying this position are found in the Congress Bulletin (February 23.1940), The New Palestine (February 21, 1941), and the Jewish Outlook (February, 1940 and January 1941).
Despite Zionist backing of colonization schemes, Feingold responds to the often-asked question about what might have happened if the Zionists had transferred their fervor, drive and pioneering skill to resettle Jews elsewhere. This is a moot question he asserted. For a mass rescue attempt to have succeeded, “the effort in Palestine would have had to be supplemented by other resettlement ventures but also by mass infiltration into established states.” This would have required a monumental undertaking. Neither the Jews nor the countries involved “seemed able to muster” the necessary determination.
Hayim Greenberg, editor of the Jewish Frontier, offered his response to this question in the magazine in April, 1942. Transferring enthusiasm from Palestine to other colonizing projects would not work, he proclaimed. “The desire for a homeland in itself,” he said, “was not strong enough in Jews to beget the energy required for the persistent and systematic acquisition of a new country. Only the nostalgia for Palestine was strong enough to beget that energy.”
Greenberg did not believe that “a territory existed that could be used for large-scale Jewish colonization that would lead to the establishment of a Jewish homeland. But even assuming that such a place could be found, how fast could Jewish colonization proceed in a still undeveloped country? The experience in Palestine had demonstrated that absorptive capacity of any new country during the first decades is very low and that many years of hard work and tremendous investment were needed to build up this absorptive capacity.
Under the most favorable conditions, he said, “at least a generation was needed to settle a few hundred thousand Jews in British Guiana or in any other areas. With half a million Jews already established in Palestine, it would take far less time to settle another half million. Forfeiting the opportunity of colonizing Palestine, would result in relinquishing the opportunity of settling thousands of Jews in order to settle tens or at the most hundreds.
Greenberg dismissed the idea that Zionists should have continued their work in Palestine while initiating other colonization ventures elsewhere. He feared that a diversion of Zionist energy might have endangered the support of the Gentile and other supporters whose cooperation was needed to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine. “We may not be able to secure even the minimum of favorable political conditions for our efforts in Palestine because we would be told we have another homeland.” He concluded that only after Palestine had reached its “maturation point,” would they consider any another homeland.
Palestine
Feingold and Greenberg’s response explains why the American Jewish Congress and the Zionists focused on Palestine as a safe haven, even when confronted with incredible obstacles. In response to the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, the government of Neville Chamberlain issued the British White Paper in May 1939, limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years. At the conclusion of this five-year period, the Arabs would decide whether to allow further Jewish immigration.
To prevent Jews from acquiring significant parcels of land, the British issued the land law on February 27, 1940. Jews were prohibited from purchasing land in parts of Palestine where they had not bought land before; and were permitted to buy in areas only where most of the land was already owned by Jews. At the same time, severe measures were instituted to stem illegal immigration. These restrictions precluded Palestine from becoming a realistic haven for European Jews and to establishing a separate Jewish state.
Historian Yehuda Bauer notes that British policy reflected a number of their concerns: fear of Axis powers using Arabs to disrupt their lines of communication in the Middle East; the continuing need for access to Arab oil; apprehension about British military vulnerability in 1938-1939, having had only a mere six infantry divisions available to them; and a need to align themselves with the ascending Arab nations, instead of the Jews who were on the descent.