JD Vance’s Ukraine Doctrine Comes for Israel

JD Vance has spent the last several years telling us that Ukraine must learn to live with an unfavorable peace. Now he appears to be suggesting that Israel must learn to live with permanent vulnerability.

In a recent BBC appearance defending President Donald Trump’s new framework for dealing with Iran, the Vice President admonished Israel that “you can’t just kill your way out of solving every single national security problem that you have.”

That isn’t the language of a staunch ally arguing over tactics. It’s the language of a Washington official preparing the ground for a settlement with a formidable foe that a smaller ally may be expected to accept regardless of whether it believes its security concerns have been addressed.

For anyone who has followed Vance’s rise as the intellectual standard-bearer of the neo-isolationist right, none of this should be surprising. His target used to be Kyiv. Increasingly, it’s Jerusalem.

Look closely, and you can see Vance recycling his Ukraine script almost line-by-line into the Israeli theater.

With Ukraine, Vance repeatedly argued that maximalist goals – expelling Russia from all occupied territory, extracting reparations, and securing eventual NATO membership – were unrealistic and dangerous. The logical conclusion was that Kyiv would have to accept an ugly peace because Washington was unwilling to continue paying for the pursuit of total victory.

With Israel, he now appears to suggest that the goal of neutralizing Iran’s regional proxy network and permanently degrading Tehran’s ability to arm and direct those forces is similarly unattainable. A small country, in this view, must ultimately accept a negotiated framework crafted by its superpower patron, even if that framework leaves unresolved threats it considers existential.

In both cases, the doctrine follows a familiar pattern:

1. Cap an ally’s war aims at a level compatible with American political patience rather than the ally’s threat perception.

2. Impose a settlement timetable aligned with Washington’s domestic priorities – elections, markets, and energy prices – rather than battlefield realities.

3. Use public pressure when necessary to compel compliance with a preferred diplomatic outcome.

This isn’t isolationism in the traditional sense. The United States still mediates, still deploys military power, and still brokers agreements. But allies are treated as clients whose primary role is to ratify solutions designed elsewhere.

Vance entered national politics as a fierce critic of the post-9/11 foreign-policy consensus. He condemned “forever wars,” questioned NATO’s expansion, and built his political identity around the argument that European nations have failed to meet their defense spending obligations and that the U.S. cannot indefinitely underwrite the security of distant partners.

Ukraine became his principal case study.

He famously stated that he didn’t “really care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other.” He led efforts to reduce or block aid packages for Kyiv and consistently argued that the objectives articulated by Ukraine and its Western supporters were unrealistic. Russia, he maintained, was not going away. Therefore, Washington should force negotiations and bring the war to a close, even if that meant accepting Russian territorial gains.

Underlying this position was a broader hierarchy of priorities. Vance argued that the U.S. could not simultaneously support Ukraine, Israel, and its own defense requirements at the levels demanded by the foreign-policy establishment. His solution was to downgrade Ukraine to a European responsibility, reduce commitments to other allies, and conserve resources for dealing with China and domestic concerns.

He now appears willing to apply the same logic to Israel.

What makes this evolution particularly revealing is that it extends beyond questions of military strategy.

Earlier this year, Vance’s International Holocaust Remembrance Day statement omitted any reference to Jews, antisemitism, Nazis, Hitler, or the six million Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Such omissions transform a specifically Jewish genocide into a generic lesson about human suffering, obscuring the central historical fact that the Holocaust was an organized effort to exterminate the Jewish people.

Vance has publicly condemned antisemitism and rejected anti-Jewish hatred. To be fair, this distinguishes him from figures on both the far right and far left who have openly trafficked in anti-Jewish rhetoric. Yet he has often appeared remarkably tolerant of antisemitic and anti-Israel voices when they emerge from the populist right.

Political leaders are judged not only by what they believe but also by the company they keep and the behavior they are willing to excuse among their allies. Vance has generally been reluctant to confront some of the same right-wing media personalities and activists who portray Israel as a malign force in American politics, traffic in conspiracy theories about Jewish influence, or provide platforms to overt antisemites.

His longstanding association with Tucker Carlson is also noteworthy. Carlson has spent years portraying Israel and its supporters as drivers of American foreign-policy mistakes while providing platforms to figures associated with antisemitic ideas and vile historical revisionism – like arguing that Winston Churchill was the real villain of World War II. Vance isn’t responsible for Carlson’s views, but his comfort within that media ecosystem raises legitimate questions about judgment and priorities.

Taken together, these tendencies suggest that the Vice President increasingly views Israel as another foreign partner whose concerns must yield to Washington’s broader strategic calculations.

Vance has generally described himself as supportive of Israel’s war against Hamas. But after Trump unveiled his Iran “deal” – essentially, an agreement to talk about a possible agreement – Vance’s tone shifted noticeably.

Israel rightfully views Iran’s nuclear ambitions, ballistic missile program, and regional proxy network as existential threats. Most Israelis fear that any agreement that significantly strengthens Iran economically before resolving those issues risks increasing, rather than reducing, the long-term danger.

Vance’s response was not primarily to reassure Israel that those concerns would be addressed. Instead, he publicly emphasized the limits of military solutions.

“The Israelis – just like everybody else – have to respect this peace process that is fundamentally good for them and good for the entire region,” he declared.

He then added: “If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world.”

He further reminded Israelis that “two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected your homeland have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.”

No serious Israeli would dispute that American support has been indispensable. But Vance frames that support as leverage. The underlying message is that Israel’s security dependence should translate into political deference.

That is precisely the logic Vance has long applied to Ukraine: Washington supplies the weapons, therefore Washington should determine the acceptable terms of peace.

Recall the February 2025 Oval Office ambush of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky. Vance played a leading role in the extraordinary public humiliation of the democratically elected leader of an ally fighting for its life against one of America’s two superpower adversaries. He interrupted Zelensky to scold and challenge him on questions of gratitude, realism, and the limits of American support.

Trump joined the verbal assault, warning Zelensky that he was “gambling with World War Three,” and saying that Ukraine was in a “very bad position to negotiate.”

The episode, which ended with Zelensky being told to leave the White House without any agreements being signed and with the cancellation of a planned joint press conference, was striking not simply because it occurred in front of cameras, but because it reflected the same philosophy that has defined Vance’s approach from the beginning: Washington ultimately decides how much support an ally receives and therefore has the right to define the acceptable terms of settlement.

The resemblance to his recent comments about Israel is unmistakable. In both cases, Vance’s message is that military objectives must be subordinated to a diplomatic process designed in Washington. In both cases, allies are reminded of their dependence on American assistance. And in both cases, public pressure becomes a legitimate instrument for shaping their behavior.

Vance’s increasingly prominent role in the administration’s diplomacy is far from conventional. Traditionally, one would expect the Secretary of State to serve as the principal public advocate for a major initiative involving Iran and Israel. Yet it was Vance, not Marco Rubio, who was dispatched to Switzerland to lead the negotiations with Iran’s representatives, and much of the public defense of the administration’s approach has fallen to the Vice President. Whether by design or circumstance, Vance has emerged as one of its most visible spokesmen.

Some observers speculate that Vance is being positioned to absorb criticism if the effort fails. The evidence points in the opposite direction. The Vice President appears to be building a political record as the Republican Party’s leading advocate of negotiated settlements, strategic restraint, and the recalibration of America’s alliances. If the administration succeeds in ending conflicts that many Americans have grown weary of supporting, Vance will not be blamed for the outcome. He will claim credit for it.

That matters because the debate is no longer simply about Ukraine or Israel. It is increasingly about the future direction of the Republican Party itself. Vance has become the intellectual leader of a movement that seeks to replace the interventionist consensus that dominated Republican foreign policy for decades. A successful settlement with Iran would strengthen his argument that America’s allies must learn to accept limits, that military victories are often unattainable, and that Washington’s primary task is avoiding and, if need be, managing conflicts rather than helping allies prevail.

Israel is therefore confronting more than a diplomatic disagreement. It is confronting the next stage of a broader ideological project whose first major test case was Ukraine.

The broader implications extend beyond the Middle East.

Defenders of Vance frequently point to his supposed toughness on China. He has repeatedly described Beijing as America’s greatest strategic challenge and warned about the dangers of economic dependence on Chinese manufacturing and technology.

Yet his approach to Taiwan often emphasizes economics and deterrence rather than explicit commitments. He correctly notes that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is vital to the global economy and argues that previous American commitments elsewhere have weakened deterrence in Asia.

What remains less clear is whether the U.S. under a Vance-led foreign policy would ultimately be willing to incur the risks necessary to defend Taiwan militarily should deterrence fail.

Japan faces a similar uncertainty.

Official administration statements continue to affirm the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Yet Vance’s own rhetoric focuses far more on trade deficits, tariffs, supply chains, and domestic economic concerns than on alliance obligations or the strategic and moral importance of defending fellow democracies.

As a result, commentators in Asia increasingly wonder whether traditional American security guarantees are becoming conditional rather than absolute.

If allies are repeatedly told that their security objectives must yield to Washington’s political calendar, economic concerns, or desire for strategic retrenchment, they will inevitably begin questioning the durability of American commitments.

For Israelis and pro-Israel Americans, this moment should be clarifying.

Few expect Vance to join the radical left in denouncing Zionism. A more realistic concern is that, under the banner of “America First realism,” he will help lock Israel into a strategic environment that entrenches Iran’s power, constrains Israel’s freedom of action, and leaves Israelis facing the consequences.

Vance has become one of the most influential voices shaping Republican foreign-policy thinking. His ideas have become central to a movement that views longstanding alliances as transactional, military commitments as negotiable, and American support as leverage.

The debate is no longer simply about Ukraine or Israel. It is about whether America’s allies will be encouraged to prevail against adversaries or pressured to accommodate them. Ukraine was the first major test for Vance’s doctrine. Israel may be the second – with more to come.

Jonathan Braun is a former managing editor of the NY Jewish Week newspaper and former associate editor of Parade Magazine who reported from Iran before the 1979 Revolution.