Rabbi Tuvia Goldstein, zt”l (Responsa Emek Halacha, vol. 1:26), quotes the Ben Ish Hai’s ruling permitting the use of a non-motorized bicycle on Shabbat in an area with an eruv. The Ben Ish Hai rejects the argument that riding a bike should be prohibited due to mar’it ha’ayin since mar’it ha’ayin only applies to cases where the action appears like a biblically prohibited act (e.g., eating meat with almond milk). Riding a bike, however, is not such an act since it is clear that the person is moving via peddling, not via a motor. Regarding the concern that the bicycle may break and the rider will be tempted to fix it, the Ben Ish Hai writes that it is not a common occurrence. Yet, many others disagree with the Ben Ish Hai’s ruling.
Responsa Keren David (Orach Chayyim 96) disagrees with those who prohibit wheeling baby carriages in an area with an eruv because of metaken kli shir or uvdin d’chol. Although Tractate Beza (25b) prohibits a blind man walking with a stick and a disabled person being carried on the holidays for long distances, baby carriages are not used for distant transport. Rather, they are used to stroll in public places. The Machtzit Hashekel (Orach Chayim 522:1) cites numerous authorities who permit using a cane if there is concern that the person will fall.
Rabbi Goldstein concludes that wheeling baby carriages is permitted on Shabbat within an eruv, but riding bikes isn’t (because bikes are used for long distances and, therefore, riding one is an uvdin d’chol). He notes, though, that those who opt for leniency have authorities upon whom to rely.
Kaf HaChayim (Orach Chayim 404:8) notes that many who ride bicycles on Shabbat are not b’nei Torah and, if given permission to ride within the town limits, will likely travel beyond them since one can traverse numerous amot quickly. He also writes that a flat tire may cause the rider to violate the labor of metaken manah and notes that the custom in Israel is not to ride bikes on Shabbat or holidays.
Rabbi Ben Zion Hai Uziel, zt”l (Responsa Piskei Uziel 16:7), cites the Mechaber (Orach Chayim 276:2), who permits a Jew to benefit from a candle lit by a gentile if the majority of those present are not Jewish or if the gentile lit the candle for his own use. From this ruling, Rabbi Uziel derives that a Jew may ride on an elevator on Shabbat together with a gentile as long as he doesn’t specifically ask the gentile to accompany him.
We discussed Shabbos elevators, which stop automatically at every floor. Many authorities permit the elderly and infirm to use them, while some, like Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, maintain that everyone may use them.
I alluded to an “invisibility factor” that may be key to resolving our halachic dilemma. A recent letter to the editor of The Jewish Press from Dr. Joshua Canter cautioned people to be careful whom they ask for help on Shabbat since not everyone who appears to be not Jewish is, in fact, not Jewish. One may not ask a Jew to sin for you.
Last week, we asked if we are duty-bound to inquire as to whether an individual transgressing Shabbat on our behalf is in fact Jewish. Regarding riding on an elevator, we differentiated between piggybacking with another individual, who most likely is a resident of the building, and an elevator operator. If the majority of the city is not Jewish but the majority of the building is Jewish, then one must assume that a random individual pushing the button is Jewish, but one may assume – according to some authorities – that the elevator operator is not Jewish. These very same authorities, though, would not permit a Jew to ride on a shuttle in the very same city. Why not?
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Hagaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, zt”l (Igrot Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:44) was asked about riding on a free shuttle on Shabbat. He answered that even if the shuttle only travels within the city (and thus there is no problem of Techum Shabbat) and even if the shuttle does not specifically stop for a Jew, “Heaven forbid that we should permit such a thing even for a d’var mitzvah.” He rules this way even though he acknowledges that “according to the strictest sense of the law there should be no prohibition.”