An even more pressing problem than how adoption affects the Law of Return is that over the years the Israeli Supreme Court has been eroding the objective halachic definition of a Jew by widely interpreting the definition of “conversion” so that anyone who converts to Judaism under the auspices of just about anybody can be considered a Jew.
In the case of Pessaro (Goldstein) v. Minister for the Interior (1995), the court recognized a non-Orthodox conversion performed outside Israel as a valid conversion under the Law of Return and awarded the non-Orthodox convert automatic citizenship rights under the Law.
In Pessaro, the court cited the would-be immigrant’s religious rights under the rubric of what the court termed the “freedom of the convert” (a concept which never before existed in Israeli law) as support for its ruling. The court thus awarded the benefits of citizenship (rights) – the very thing at stake in the case – to non-citizens, using circular reasoning and a fantastic tautology: it recognized the petitioner as a valid convert because of his rights due to him as a valid convert.
In reaching its decision, the court rejected the dissenting opinion of Judge Tzevi Tal, who noted that even in the United States immigration law is an area in which laws are constitutionally permitted to be discriminatory and therefore the rights of the would-be immigrant were irrelevant to the case. Tal further wrote that recognizing conversions performed by any Jewish group outside of Israel – regardless of whether the group followed halachic standards for conversion – would have the practical effect of allowing any group to issue immigration visas and citizenship to the State of Israel.
The Supreme Court’s opinion on the adoption case is expected soon. Given the court’s track record, one can hardly wait to see what it does to the Law of Return next.