In game theory, there is a well-known strategy called the “ticking time bomb”: a threat of destructive action against an adversary that may also harm the threatening player themselves. The purpose of the threat is not necessarily to carry it out, but to generate psychological deterrence—to convey a message that is intimidating enough to make the opponent retreat, fear, or surrender, without requiring actual military action. As long as uncertainty remains about the intentions of the threatening side, and as long as the threat is perceived as credible, the strategy may achieve its aim. Game theory, it is important to remember, assumes rational players—those who act based on a calculated assessment of cost versus benefit.
Iran has consistently adopted the ticking time bomb strategy, establishing its deterrent power through menacing proxy arms such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. One of the key pressure points it has exploited is the threat of attacks on the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—an act that could destabilize the global energy market. Iran’s mere ability to disrupt the flow of oil from the Gulf states granted it strategic leverage over its neighbors and the West. This threat has repeatedly led to the halting of military initiatives by Saudi Arabia and the United States, both of which feared a regional conflagration. For a time, it seemed the strategy was working.
Another central threat is the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a critical maritime artery for global oil flow. Over twenty million barrels of oil pass through this strait daily, accounting for about one-fifth of global consumption. Its closure could cause a sharp rise in energy prices and trigger broad economic repercussions worldwide. Here too, Iran presents itself as capable of “pulling the trigger,” thereby deterring military action against it.
But is the threat still effective?
The core problem is that the realization of these threats would first and foremost harm Iran itself. Attacking oil fields in the Gulf could provoke a joint response from the United States and Britain, together with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, one that could include strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure, ports, and maritime routes, potentially crippling Iran’s economy. Moreover, such a response would likely elicit harsh condemnation and heavy pressure from China and India, two global powers with massive oil demands who rely heavily on a stable energy supply from the region and would not tolerate long-term disruptions.
All this is happening while Iran’s capacity to respond is diminishing. Precision Israeli strikes have damaged missile stockpiles, command systems, and UAV assets. The cumulative damage has significantly reduced Iran’s ability to carry out its threats.
The clearest example of this is the direct U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—an attack that elicited no real response from Tehran. Despite issuing fierce warnings, Iran refrained from any military action against the U.S. or the Gulf states: it did not attack, did not close the straits, and did not escalate—except against Israel. Once again, rhetoric remained without action.
This leads to Iran’s current strategic dilemma:
- If it follows through on its threats, it risks a devastating blow that could undermine its own stability.
- If it continues to threaten without acting, it will lose credibility.
- And if it abandons the threats altogether, it will be perceived as weak in a region where honor and deterrence are critical assets.
Thus, what was once crafted as a clever threat has become a trap.
The ticking time bomb that Iran placed in front of the world is now ticking over its own head.
The author, Dr. Kfir Tshuva, is an expert in game theory and a lecturer in economics at Ramat-Gan Academic College
