Greece joined the EU in 1981. Over the years, the Brussels Eurocrats must have understood the country’s problems in far greater detail than an outsider like myself. They should have known that Greece was not a suitable candidate to join the Eurozone under any circumstances, and yet it happened in 2001. Had Greece kept the drachme as its currency, its structural problems would have gradually come to the surface over the years, but they would not have led to such a major calamity as is currently the case.
Letting Greece join was a sign of EU incompetence and of its irresponsibility. When the Greek crisis broke out, the EU focused mainly on the financial side of the problem, as if it was not accompanied by a social one. If the EU would have correctly analyzed the situation, they would have gradually eased Greece out of the Euro. The Eurozone members who lent money to keep Greece afloat were aware that the chances of being fully paid back were close to nothing. They knowingly fooled their own citizens, however, by claiming that there would be a return on their investment.
The Greek problem will not disappear easily. It is but one of a variety of huge strategic mistakes the EU has made. The creation of the Euro in a non-uniform economic system took away the major safety valve of devaluation from the weaker countries. Such a setup was only fine for countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, who had maintained a de facto fixed exchange rate between their pre-Euro currencies.
There are other major strategic mistakes made by the EU which are coming home to roost. One was cutting defense expenditures at a time when Europe was wealthy enough to become militarily independent from the United States. Instead of moving forward toward greater power and stability, the European military forces shrunk further and weakened the EU. After the recently renewed tensions with Russia, the EU’s military weakness became even more obvious.
Another substantial strategic mistake was the initially almost uncontrolled flow of millions of immigrants into the EU. Many of these emigrated from anti-Semitic and non-democratic Muslim countries. Although many immigrants integrated successfully, the presence of millions of who remain unintegrated will continue to cause European countries problems for decades to come. The rise in Jihadism in the Middle East has already aggravated them further.
In regard to its policies concerning Israel, it is crucial to understand that the EU has only its own interests at heart. Those who see a moral force in Europe are weakening Israeli society by their lack of insight.
The EU was and is willing to inflict great pain on Greece and its citizens, even though it is a member country. This can help us understand that the EU would care even less about what impact its advice would have on Israel. That alone is a good reason not to place any faith in the EU, but rather to evaluate carefully the advice it offers, and the pressure it exercises which is sometimes contrary to Israel’s most elementary interests.
