Avodah Zarah, Daf 55
Our Gemara on amud aleph records a polemical discussion with Rabbi Akiva:
Zunin said to Rabbi Akiva: “Both my heart and your heart know that there is no substance to idol worship. Nevertheless, don’t we see people who are lame go to worship idols and come back with restored function? What is the reason for this?”
Rabbi Akiva said to Zunin: “I will relate a parable to you. To what is this matter comparable? It is comparable to a trusted person who lived in a certain city, and all the residents of the city would deposit items and money with him, even without witnesses present.
“One man, however, did not trust him, and specifically deposited money only in the presence of witnesses. On one occasion, that same man forgot and deposited money without witnesses. The trusted man’s wife said to him: ‘Come, let us teach him a lesson for not trusting you, and deny that he deposited the money with us, as this time there were no witnesses.’
The man replied: ‘Should we lose our credibility and act deceitfully just because this fool acted improperly and did not require witnesses?’”
The bottom line is that the pagan, whose illness was destined to lift for whatever reason, will still recover according to the original decree – even if the optics are bad and, by coincidence, this reinforces a heretical belief. Looking deeper, whether this disability came about through natural causes or by Divine decree, Hashem is not going to change His plan, so to speak, because of a momentary event. Even if this person is now committing a greater sin, G-d’s original decree that the illness last for a certain amount of time remains in place. Hashem punishes, but He is also patient and operates within a system that is not always comprehensible to us.
We can derive from here an interesting lesson in chinuch. If a parent or teacher sees fit to administer a punishment to a child, even if the child misbehaves further, that particular punishment should not be extended. Any additional offense should be addressed in a new way, based on the pedagogical circumstances. The same punishment should not be prolonged merely because it is “technically fair,” as this undermines predictability and follow-through. It is much better to show integrity and keep one’s word – even if, in the moment, the optics are not ideal.
Brilliant But Not Yet Bar Mitzvah
Daf 56
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the case of a child prodigy who, at a young age, mastered the entire tractate of Avodah Zarah. The simple reading implies that the rabbis even relied on his halachic rulings. This raises a halachic question: Can one rely on a learned minor?
Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein (Peninei Chashukei Chemed, Va’era, 5779; see also Shulchan Aruch CM 7:3) notes that while Tosafos here understands they were actually asking the child for halachic guidance, the Rashba interprets the story as implying merely testing him, not relying on him. Rav Zilberstein also cites the aggadah in Berachos (31b) which relates that Shmuel the prophet made halachic pronouncements at age three, when his mother entrusted him to Eli the Kohen, fulfilling her pledge.
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C. IV:62) discusses whether an exceptionally bright child might become obligated in mitzvos earlier than bar mitzvah age. He rules no, explaining that bar mitzvah is a Torah standard, not based on subjective maturity.
Part of the issue is that intellectual prowess does not necessarily equal emotional maturity, impulse control, or relational wisdom. The Torah may require more than raw intellect before imposing full spiritual liability. In fact, the story of Shmuel is illustrative: The Gemara in Berachos tells us he was impetuous, issuing a halachic ruling in front of his master, Eli the Kohen. Shmuel, at three, was brilliant – but not yet wise.
Research on child prodigies supports this distinction. While they tend to be more mature than their peers, their gifts often come from superior memory and focus on detail – excellent for early academic success but only one component of wisdom.
I will close with a story about Rav Yaakov Emden as a boy. Known as a brilliant prodigy, he gave a shiur in his town at a young age. Once, the children were having fun riding a donkey and he joined in. His ba’ale batim were displeased, saying this was not dignified behavior for their rebbe. Rav Emden replied: “I may be your rebbe, but I am also a seven-year-old boy who likes to ride donkeys.” Whether the story is factual or apocryphal, it expresses an essential truth.
Twelve Months to Forget
Daf 57
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses one who buys a slave from an idolatrous gentile household. As per Jewish law, the servant now becomes obligated in mitzvos. The question is: When can we safely allow him to touch wine without fear of yayin nesech?
Rav Nachman said in the name of Shmuel: Even if the slaves were circumcised and immersed, they still render the wine forbidden, as they are accustomed to idolatry, until reference to idol worship disappears from their mouths.
How long does this take? Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: Twelve months.
This twelve-month period appears in other areas of halacha and human experience as the time it takes to forget or transition. For example, Gemara Berachos (58b) teaches: “Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: One who sees a friend after thirty days recites Shehecheyanu. One who sees his friend after twelve months recites Mechaye HaMeisim.” Rav explains: “A dead person is only forgotten from the heart after twelve months” (Tehillim 31:13). The Rashash adds that lost objects are also considered fully despaired of after twelve months.
Secular research also supports a typical grief cycle of up to twelve months before a person regains normal function, though sadness may persist. Psychologists distinguish several forms of grief:
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Grief – the emotional expression of loss
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Mourning – the psychological adjustment to the loss
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Anticipatory grief – grieving before an expected loss
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Disenfranchised grief – when the loss is socially unacknowledged (e.g., suicide stigma, early miscarriage)
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Prolonged complex grief – when grief is extended by unresolved circumstances (e.g., a missing person, prolonged coma).
A Biblical example of prolonged grief is Yaakov’s inability to be comforted after Yosef’s disappearance (Bereishis 37:35, Rashi). The Midrash explains that he could not accept full mourning because he had an intuition that Yosef was still alive.
Disenfranchised and prolonged grief often require additional support, as they involve barriers – emotional, social, or both – to normal mourning. The barriers may involve unresolved, anger, shame, or guilt related to aspects of the loss, thereby interfering with the full acceptance and processing of the loss. Sensitivity and non-judgmental validation from loved ones are essential, as is the mourner’s courage to face the full range of feelings, both rational and irrational.
