The election of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian president has engendered much optimism and even euphoria.
Initially The New York Times seemed to highlight the convicted terrorist Barghouti as someone with the style, leadership and vision necessary to helping bring about an end to the conflict, if only the Israelis would release him from his confinement. With his recusal, the mantle of hope and moderation has been passed along to Mr. Abbas. Despite his rhetoric during the end of the campaign (when he called Israel the “Zionist enemy”) and his embrace of armed thugs, his western dress and calls for peace have captured the imagination of not only the usual cast of characters, but also of President Bush.
Even though it’s disconcerting to hear Mr. Abbas promise not to disarm terrorists, the desire by people of good will for peace is so strong that they are prepared to delude themselves, hoping against hope that Mr. Abbas is really not Arafat. If only Mr. Abbas would stay on message, and utter a few chosen words on American TV, he could bring the region back to the “road map” (with Israel, of course, having to make the concessions – removing roadblocks,.freeing prisoners, stopping construction of the security fence and, above all else, turning a blind eye as rockets hit Israeli towns and Hamas keeps up its attacks).
The Question of the Hour is why Prime Minister Sharon, the architect of the settlement movement, would agree to disengage, either unilaterally or in tandem, with the Palestinian Authority.
I believe it is a combination of factors – in addition to arrogance and ego – that has brought Mr. Sharon to the conclusion that he alone can save Israel. Time is not on the side of Israel, goes his logic.
The international community – especially old Europe, the UN and the Arab states – is going to place unbearable pressure on President Bush to rein in Mr. Sharon. Their goal, no matter what Mr. Sharon does, is total Israeli withdrawal back to pre-1967 lines.
Demographics weigh on the prime minister as well – even if the Palestinians were to shelve their goal of a Palestinian state (which of course they never will) they would demand at a minimum a “one man-one vote” scenario as Israeli citizens. Which would amount to the last election conducted by Israel as a Jewish state.
The prime minister believes his relationship with President Bush is such that his disengagement plan will be allowed to proceed not as the first but as the final stage of withdrawal. Under his plan, which he apparently believes has President Bush’s approval, 180-195,000 Israelis in the Gush, Ariel and Maale Adumim area will never be threatened. With American support, the security fence, and an easier-to-defend area for the IDF, the disengagement becomes, in Mr. Sharon’s eyes, a strategically worthwhile albeit painful gambit.
All this despite his knowledge that Kassam rocket attacks will surely increase after disengagement. Nevertheless, Mr. Sharon’s goal is to gain the few weeks of relative quiet that would give him the political cover to proceed either unilaterally or together with Mr. Abbas. To date, unfortunately for Mr Sharon, Hamas has not cooperated.
But what will be Israel’s response after disengagement, when the rockets not only increase in intensity but in closer proximity to Ashdod and Ashkelon? During the past year or so I attended a number of briefings on disengagement and always asked the speaker that precise question. The typical answer is one that I received from defense Minister Mofaz. “We will know what we will have to do,” he said, implying a massive incursion into Gaza for a few months to wipe out terrorist bases, then withdrawal until the next round.