The programs about Iran, for their part, exposed secret government protocols documenting disagreements among top Israeli decision-makers on the topic. In the meantime, Ehud Olmert took advantage of the air time he was given to bolster his public image by disclosing publicly for the first time that he and his administration were behind the attack on a Syrian nuclear facility in 2007.
An Assignment for the State Comptroller
Now we arrive at the big questions. Granted, Ilana Dayan has an interest in exposing state secrets in order to boost her ratings. But why are security officers and politicians playing her game of exchanging exposure in the media for exposure of classified information?
The same goes for former Chief-of-Staff Dan Halutz, who used used an interview when he was abroad to say that the only way to stop the Iranian nuclear project is with a nuclear bomb, and that he hopes the prime minister won’t choose to go that way? Why does a chief of staff have to hand out secret information about what the Israel Air Force can or cannot do?
And finally, where is the censor? The cases described here as well as others in recent months in which secret information was exposed show that the military censor has stopped functioning.
This was equally evident while Hamas was bombing Israel a few weeks ago, when broadcasters got smart with the censor and only hinted at where bombs had fallen. “We can tell you that the missiles fired toward Tel Aviv did not fall on the ground this time.” Thanks, said the terrorists in Gaza—next time we’ll aim a bit further right and make sure our missiles won’t fall in the sea.
The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and the state comptroller should perform a thorough investigation of the censor’s performance. In the meantime, she should be sent home. There’s no point in paying her a salary.
Originally published in Makor Rishon, December 7th 2012. Translated from Hebrew by David B. Greenberg.