Shavuos 12
Our Gemara on amud beis discusses the principle that certain sacrifices are rejected due to the non-repentant stance of the sinner, based on the verse in Mishlei (21:27): “The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination.”
The Maharal (Derashas Shabbos HaGadol 9) applies this principle to reinterpret the biblical story of Kayin and Hevel in a surprising way. The simple reading casts Kayin as the villain: He offers a sacrifice begrudgingly, becomes jealous when Hevel’s sacrifice is accepted instead, ignores G-d’s warning about the evil inclination’s seductive power, and ultimately murders his brother, covering up the crime.
The Maharal raises two questions that challenge this narrative. First, since Kayin initiated the idea of offering a sacrifice and Hevel merely copied him, shouldn’t Kayin receive some credit? Second, if Hevel was so righteous, why didn’t he merit Divine protection, as the verse states, “One who does a mitzvah shall see no evil befall him” (Koheles 8:5)?
The Maharal proposes a different perspective on Adam’s children – Kayin, Hevel, and Shes – seeing them as reflecting stages in human development. Kayin, like a person in early life, is driven by impulse and gratification, given over to the yetzer hara. His name, meaning “acquired” or “given over,” hints at this. Hevel, whose name means “vapor” in Hebrew, represents emptiness and aimlessness, not evil. Shes, meaning “established” or “foundation,” embodies productive, meaningful development.
Kayin’s sacrifice stemmed from his propensity for evil, not humble atonement, but rather as a bribe to appease G-d while continuing sinful behavior – a quintessential “sacrifice of the wicked,” deemed abominable. Thus, it was rejected. Hevel, copying Kayin’s idea without much thought, offered a sacrifice that was accepted because it wasn’t abominable, but it lacked significance and offered no protection against Kayin’s purposeful, albeit evil, focus. Only Shes achieves purposeful, godly development.
Fascinatingly, both Kayin and Hevel are flawed in this narrative. Kayin, consumed by lust and evil, has will and determination. Hevel, free of evil, lacks drive or purpose. (One might wonder if Hevel even checked if his sacrifice was accepted. Kayin, competitive, obsessively tracked his status, while Hevel might not have cared.) Only Shes finds drive and motivation, but not out of lust, rather from the desire to be good.
A Jew At Heart And In Action
Shavuos 15
Our Gemara on amud aleph states that quantity doesn’t matter to G-d. The wealthy person’s cattle, the less affluent person’s bird sacrifice, and the indigent’s flour offering are all “a pleasing aroma to G-d.” Whether one increases or decreases his sacrifice, it’s accepted if their heart is directed toward G-d.
Commentaries creatively apply this principle. Ben Yehoyada (Menachos 110a) addresses rewards for negative prohibitions (lo ta’aseh), which involve no action. Per Kiddushin (39b), resisting the urge to sin earns reward as if performing a mitzvah. This is hinted in “Whether one increases or decreases, so long as his heart is directed towards G-d.” One can do mitzvos (increase) or abstain from sin (decrease), and both are valued when serving G-d.
The Gemara (Berachos 17a) applies the principle thus:
The Sages in Yavne said: I who learn Torah am G-d’s creature, as is my counterpart in other labor. My work is in the city, his in the field. I rise early for my work, he for his. He doesn’t presume to do my work, nor I his. Lest you say I study Torah more, so I’m better, it is taught: One who brings a substantial or meager sacrifice has equal merit, if his heart is directed towards Heaven.
The Rav (Reshimos Shiurim, ibid.) notes that, like the Jewish king is warned against arrogance (Devarim 17:20), a sage must avoid intellectual pride. His study and the less learned’s study are equal if both are sincere.
However, this principle is unidirectional. A wealthy person cannot offer a scrawny bird, claiming, “My heart is devoted to G-d.” He must give appropriately (Kerisos 28a). Judaism balances pragmatic observance with ecstatic devotion: Actions without heart are insufficient, but heart without action doesn’t suffice.
Perception vs. Reality in Jerusalem
Shavuos 16
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses a historical halachic scenario highlighting the gap between perceived and actual holiness:
Abba Shaul says: Two ponds existed on Har HaMishcha: a lower pond, consecrated during the First Temple with all procedures, bearing Jerusalem’s sanctity; and an upper pond, consecrated incompletely by Babylonian returnees without a king or Urim VeTummim.
The baraisa explains: At the lower pond, fully consecrated, amei ha’aretz ate offerings of lesser sanctity but not second tithe, acting stringently. Chaverim ate both. At the upper pond, incompletely consecrated, amei ha’aretz ate lesser offerings but not second tithe; chaverim ate neither. The upper pond wasn’t fully consecrated because additions to Jerusalem or the Temple require a king, prophet, Urim VeTummim, Sanhedrin, two thanks-offerings, and a song.
The Gemara asks why the upper pond was consecrated if it couldn’t be done properly, then clarifies: Why was it brought within Jerusalem’s walls? Because it was a weak point, vulnerable to conquest, necessitating inclusion.
Per Rashi, amei ha’aretz were stringent about maaser sheni due to its segulah for wealth and the viduy maasros declaration “before G-d,” but less so about sacrificial meat, though it’s holier. This shows social perceptions of holiness often misalign with halacha. People favor segulos and soteriological rituals over raw prayer or repentance, as Rav Yisrael Salanter quipped about avoiding nuts during the Ten Days of Repentance (because eggoz = gematria of chet): “You might also avoid sin, as chet is also equal in gematria to chet!”
Yet these perceptions can motivate positively. The Sages allowed the upper pond’s inclusion, despite misleading amei ha’aretz into eating sacrifices there, to ensure fierce defense against invasion (Tosafos). The Rabbis sometimes leveraged erroneous perceptions of holiness for necessary motivation.
Slow And Steady
Shavuos 17
Our Gemara on amud aleph addresses accidental sin and what to do next, such as when becoming ritually impure in the Temple courtyard:
If one, unaware of his impurity or location, exits via a longer route when a shorter one was available, he is liable for a sliding-scale offering. If he takes the shortest route, he’s exempt.
Rava clarifies: “Shortest route” doesn’t mean fastest; one is exempt even walking heel-to-toe all day, if it’s the most direct path.
This resonates metaphorically: Slow progress in the right direction trumps swift movement in the wrong one. The Gemara continues:
Rava asks: If one tarries briefly, less than the time to bow down, leaves, then tarries again briefly, do these combine to make him liable if the total equals bowing time?
The Gemara challenges: Doesn’t Rava’s heel-to-toe ruling, implying intermittent tarrying, resolve this? It answers: No, that was continuous motion, albeit slow. Rava’s dilemma concerns stopping entirely, but for brief moments.
The Chasam Sofer explains: The questioner assumed Rava’s slow-walking ruling included pauses, but the response clarified it was continuous motion.
This may relate to Zeno’s Arrow Paradox, per Aristotle (Physics VI:9, 239b5):
If everything is at rest in an instant, and a moving object occupies a space at each instant, the arrow is motionless. If all instants are the same or continuous, motion exists.
According to most scholars, Aristotle rejects Zeno in the following way: He views motion as continuous, not a series of still instants. Halacha too may similarly treat motion or time as a process, not discrete moments, but perhaps the hava amina as described by the Chasam Sofer held more of Zeno’s perspective.
In a related manner, Ritva (Nedarim 87a) suggests time is quantized. The Gemara rules:
If one rends his garment for an ill relative who faints, seeming dead, but dies after the time to say a short phrase, the rending doesn’t count. If within the time of toch k’dei dibbur, it is continuous, fulfilling the obligation.
Ritva holds toch k’dei dibbur (time to greet a rabbi) isn’t just a rabbinic decree but how time is measured. The rending and death occur in the “same time,” even if chronologically sequential. It is as if legally we decided to measure temperatures by rounding off to one decimal. In that case 98.62 and 98.64 would both legally be the same temperature of to 98.6°F.
