“I’m going away for a month,” Ari said to his neighbor, Shmuel. “Would you be able to watch my bike while I’m gone?”
“No problem,” said Shmuel. “Bring it over in the afternoon.”
When Ari brought the bike, Shmuel leaned it against a tree in his backyard. “I’ll put it away later,” he said. “I want to straighten the basement today. Enjoy your trip!”
Shmuel later got involved with other matters, and forgot to put Ari’s bike away. The following day was windy, and Shmuel returned home from work to find that a large branch had broken off the tree and smashed the bike.
Ari returned from his trip a month later. “I’d like to pick up my bike,” he said to Shmuel.
“You’ll never believe what happened!” exclaimed Shmuel. “I didn’t get around to putting away your bike, and a large branch broke and smashed it. There was nothing I could do about it.”
“Why was the bike out, though?” asked Ari. “It could have easily been stolen. It was negligent of you to leave it there unlocked!”
“I was busy and forgot about it,” said Shmuel. “In any case, the bike wasn’t stolen. It was smashed due to circumstances beyond my control. I had no idea the branch was weak.”
“That’s true,” acknowledged Ari. “However, had you put the bike away in your basement, it would be fine now.”
The two came before Rabbi Dayan. After hearing both sides, Rabbi Dayan said, “The Gemara [Bava Metzia 42a] states: “Techilaso b’peshia v’sofo b’oness – chayav. If the guardian was initially negligent with the entrusted item, he is liable for it even if it was ultimately lost through circumstances beyond control.”
“For example,” continued Rabbi Dayan, “if a person hid money in a place where it was at risk of being stolen and it was ultimately lost in a fire, the guardian is liable. Had he placed the money in a properly secure place, such as a safe, it would have been protected; the oness might not have occurred.” [Choshen Mishpat 291:6, 14]
“Still,” asked Shmuel, “ultimately, the money was lost through oness?”
“We view the oness that ultimately occurred as a continuation of the initial negligence, even if there is only a remote connection,” explained Rabbi Dayan. [Sma 291:10,23; 303:15]
“What if the oness was completely unrelated to the initial negligence?” asked Ari.
“This is disputed in the Gemara [Bava Metzia 36b],” replied Rabbi Dayan. “For example, let’s say someone left an animal where it could be easily stolen, and it then died naturally. It would have died even had it been in a safe place; this oness is completely unrelated to the initial negligence. Rava exempts the guardian whereas Abaye holds him liable. The halacha is according to Rava.” [Choshen Mishpat 291:9; Sma 291:15]
“In the case at hand,” concluded Rabbi Dayan, “since the oness relates to the initial negligence, Shmuel is liable.”