Suppose, therefore, that we were to design a manual for democratic negotiators based on very different but generally more realistic assumptions about dictators. It might read like this:
“The nature of autocratic political systems makes it inherently easy for rulers of such regimes to compromise. Successful autocrats are above all things calculating, possessed of a shrewd grasp of facts operative in the negotiating arena. They have no difficulty envisioning the kind of settlement that would be equitable or that would at least temporarily terminate disputes with other powers; and ruling over a society resting on coercion rather than consent, they have no difficulty imposing such a settlement, should they deem it necessary.
“Negotiating problems arise exactly because the autocrat understands the propensities of democratic statesmen and the political system they represent. He knows that to the democratic mind compromise is often seen as a good in itself; that completed negotiations are frequently taken as successful negotiations serving to secure personal or domestic political advantage. The autocrat also knows that democratic politicians are impatient for results, especially during election years, in consequence of which he need only bide his time, remain obdurate, or threaten to break off negotiations in order to elicit gratuitous concessions intended to hasten and conclude the negotiating process.
“He is particularly well attuned to the fact that democratic governments are greatly influenced by public opinion, that opinion is usually divided on all issues, and that opinions in democracies can be manipulated to his own advantage. He is also aware of the democratic antipathy to violence and therefore sees the threat of conflict working in his favor. If his democratic counterparts regard him as irrational or ideologically disinclined to compromise, or if they view his system of government as one that by its nature is unable to make significant concessions, he will know this too and take manifest advantage of it.
“The democratic statesman must in no way encourage the dictator on any of these points or negotiations will degenerate into a tedious, counterproductive exercise in making unilateral concessions. He must know from the very outset what he wants out of the negotiations. He must let the dictator take the first step toward compromise and under no circumstances be willing to give more than he gets or give the slightest indication that this might be the case. It must never be forgotten that the autocrat will view all efforts to be ‘reasonable’ – as this term is understood by democrats – as confirmation of his own understanding of democratic negotiating weakness, and he will press his claims unremittingly thereafter.”
Would Israel’s use of this type of diplomacy be effective with Arab-Islamic dictatorships like the PA? Perhaps, but it would not be distinctively Jewish. Some Principles of a Jewish Foreign Policy
1. Israel, the nation that represents God and God’s ways, is supposed to set an example to mankind. Whereas the individual Jew is to be humble, the nation itself is to be proud. Accordingly, Israel will not establish diplomatic relations with any tyrannical regime. To do so is to dignify tyrants and perpetuate their unjust rule over their people. To hobnob with wicked regimes cannot but lower the moral standards of the Jewish people. The Torah makes distinctions between good and bad regimes, and warns against seeking relations with those that are wicked. (See Numbers 25:1-3, 17-18; Jeremiah 10:23.) To seek the recognition of Arab states only arouses their contempt for Israel; and to offer Arab despots “land for peace” not only makes them more contemptuous of Jews, but encourages them to make war. By not seeking relations with hostile Arab regimes, Israel will cease to be diplomatically dependent on the United States.
