Despite all of the hoopla from the Obama administration, the best that can really be said of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 is that there was an understanding of sorts to try to work out a definitive agreement by the end of June. Despite all of the talk of frameworks and parameters, the bottom line of an actual agreement is still to be achieved and the critical fine print has yet to be adopted. But there are early lessons that have been learned. And the picture is not a pretty one.
It would be a fool’s errand at this point to try to parse and opine on what has been made public about the terms of an agreement. Indeed, to listen to their pronouncements, despite the announcement of tentative significant breakthroughs, the U.S.-led P5+1 and Iran still have fundamental differences on such key issues as the duration of the agreement, how many centrifuges Iran will be able to retain, what the centrifuges will be able to produce, what will happen to the nuclear material already produced, the nature and scope of the inspection and monitoring regime, and the schedule for the suspension of the economic sanction regime.
What is apparent, however, is that the perception of the United States as the world’s sole superpower has been vastly diminished – sadly, perhaps to paper tiger status – and Iran’s aspirations for regional hegemony in the greater Gulf area have been enormously enhanced by virtue of its standing up to the Great Satan. There is no disputing that the American military and economic colossus was not up to the task of forcing a third-rate military power and economically desperate nation like Iran to knuckle under at the negotiating table.
Indeed, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear capacity, which initially were contemplated as a forum for the P5+1 to dictate nuclear neutralization terms, have evolved to the point where Iranians are celebrating their leaders’ performance in the negotiating arena against the U.S. and its allies. President Obama’s oft-repeated claim that the U.S. had no choice but to accept what he said was the best deal possible, if our goal was to restrain Iran, is a sad commentary on these negotiations that took place on his watch.
In practical terms, there already is great significance in how Iran emerged from the nuclear talks. For one thing, there was no mention during the negotiations about countering or even restraining Iran’s efforts to support insurgencies and terrorist organizations in the Middle East and the Gulf. Thus Iran, even if by default, has effectively attained internationally accepted spheres of influence that recall post-World War II Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe.
Indeed, Iran could conceivably, and persuasively, argue that any future Western move to impose new sanctions against it for promoting terrorism and insurrection in Arab states would violate the agreement respecting nuclear weapons that calls for the ending of sanctions.
Equally significant, though there is some question as to the precise number of years to the term of an eventual agreement, after a period of time – apparently between ten and fifteen years – Iran will be free to pursue a nuclear weapons capacity. The message to other Middle East and Gulf countries is clear. If they wish to maintain their security vis-a-vis Iran, they will need to develop nuclear capabilities of their own. The seeds of a regional nuclear arms race are being planted even as we contemplate the tentative agreement between Iran and the P5+1.
Early on in his presidency, Mr. Obama talked a lot about reaching out to Iran and other countries viewed as adversarial to the United States with a view to fixing the relationship. Many commentators had taken this to mean that the president was seeking to enlist certain states to serve as anchors in different parts of the world in order to deter disruptions by insurgent groups and obviate the need for the U.S. to intervene. Iran was viewed as a key part of this scenario.
But to take Iran’s leadership at its word – and that word, or phrase, is “Death to America” – the plan has gone awry. The Obama years have been witness to political disintegration in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Tunisia – everywhere a challenge presented itself to the U.S.
Only exacerbating matters was the administration’s insistence on raising Palestinian expectations to unreasonable levels, which served to foreclose the possibility of a settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. All of this is essentially traceable to the administration’s eagerness to reset U.S. Mideast policy – an eagerness all too painfully on display in the negotiations with Iran.
