So the assumption now is that even if there was ambivalence about the creation of a state, it does now appear to be a cornerstone of the Palestinian strategy. Look, the Palestinians don’t even call themselves the Palestinian Authority anymore, and they don’t really call themselves the PLO. They’ve changed their stationery, they’ve changed a lot of their branding, if you will, to that of the state of Palestine.
For those people who want a viable, peaceful Palestinian state free of corruption, what are the prospects of that happening? You write much about a Palestinian reformer, Salam Fayyad, in your book, but his party only received a grand total of two seats out of 132 in the 2006 Palestinian elections.
That is another really important question and one that I think the Palestinians have yet to answer. Right now, it’s fair to say that the Palestinian political landscape is dominated by two parties. I mean, your choices are essentially Abbas or Hamas, and that’s not much of a choice.
If things are going to change, then the Palestinians need to be allowed to, for example, criticize the current leadership, create political parties, set up an independent judiciary, etc. These are all things that Fayyad fought for and, in the end, I believe Fayyad lost.
So is there any hope for a non-corrupt Palestinian state for those who want it?
I think there’s hope in the sense that there is a small but vocal minority of Palestinians that want it. The big problem is, to borrow a line from George W. Bush, “the soft bigotry of low expectations.” If the West continues to fail to hold the Palestinians to account on these issues and we don’t make it clear that this is part of our plan, then I think we’re in a lot of trouble. And I can tell you that while I am aware of the fact that the State Department is looking at these issues, I don’t see any indication that they’re doing anything about it or that they’re holding Abbas to account – that they’re demanding real elections or demanding reforms from within.
That’s why I’m pessimistic. Right now we’re on a trajectory toward failure.
In your book, you refer to Arabs living in Palestine as “Palestinians” even when writing about events in the 1930s, for example. But before 1948, Jews in the area were also called “Palestinians.” Aren’t you misusing the word?
Many people call them Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists, Palestinian Jews. The precursor to the Jerusalem Post [after all] was the Palestine Post. Look, this gets into technicalities, and I know that all these history issues are sensitive ones. But my take is: I don’t deny the existence of Palestinian nationalism in its various forms over the years. What I challenge is the trajectory of it. And I think I’ve shown that Palestinian nationalism still has quite a ways to go if it is to produce a viable state.
