The Tosafot claim that if one person gives another chicken and milk to eat (a rabbinic prohibition), he only transgresses lifnei iveir on a rabbinic level. At first glance, this opinion is very difficult to maintain; wouldn’t this be classified at least as bad advice – and thus lifnei iveir on the Torah level? The Acharonim are forced to say Tosafot are dealing with a situation in which the sinner wants to transgress, and so lifnei iveir is limited by the nature of the halakhic transgression; in this case, lifnei iveir is on the rabbinic level, since it refers to a prohibition that is itself rabbinic. Encouraging another to transgress a rabbinic commandment could fall under the biblical lifnei iveir only if the other person does not want to sin; it then would be of the nature of ‘misleading advice.’
It is easier to apply Rav Shlomo Zalman’s ruling to a case of misleading advice, where the prohibition stems from the perspective of the individual (i.e. he subjectively does not desire the outcome). However, in the case of causing a sin, it is more difficult to enter the individual’s “big picture” into the equation, since, in the end, Halakha is being transgressed.
2. Whether to adopt Rav Shlomo Zalman’s approach might also be dependent on which side one takes in a dispute between the Ba’al Ha-ma’or and the Ramban. They take opposing positions about how independent lifnei iveir is from the sin that is eventually committed. They ask: is lifnei iveir a transgression in itself, or is it a lesser form of the sin one is causing the other to commit? Rav Shlomo Zalman’s question, whether one can substitute bringing about a minor sin for bringing about a major one, might be a practical ramification of their dispute. If lifnei iveir is an independent prohibition, it is possible that we should take into account the long-term spiritual outlook for the person. If, however, lifnei iveir is a facet of the sin being committed, then the nature of lifnei iveir is focused more on the specific transgression and less on the person. Rav Shlomo Zalman’s approach is then less plausible.
THE CHAZON ISH VS. RAV SHLOMO ZALMAN
In the footnotes to the Minchat Shlomo, the Chazon Ish is quoted as permitting only bringing about another’s DOUBTFUL sin in order to avoid a DEFINITE sin. The mishna in masekhet Shevi’it records that it is prohibited to sell utensils whose only use is prohibited work to those who do not follow the laws of the Shemitta year. However, it is permissible to sell them utensils which have BOTH permitted and prohibited uses. The Chazon Ish explains the distinction; it is doubtful whether one transgresses lifnei iveir through selling such a utensil and therefore, in order to prevent the am ha-aretz from coming to hate the shemitta-observant storekeeper (thereby definitely transgressing “You should not hate your brother in your heart”), it is permitted to sell it. Being stringent in order to avoid a situation where he MIGHT sin would bring about another DEFINITE sin.
The footnote in the Minchat Shlomo claims that the Chazon Ish disagrees with Rav Shlomo Zalman’s ruling in a case where one definite prohibition is substituted for another definite one. It should be pointed out that there might be a relevant distinction between the different cases that the Chazon Ish and the Minchat Shlomo are speaking about, which would minimize the disagreement between them. Rav Shlomo Zalman rules that one can harm a person spiritually in order to help him spiritually (i.e. you can cause him to eat without a berakha in order to prevent him from severing his connections to Torah). Both the harm to the person and the good caused him are on the same plane. The Chazon Ish, on the other hand, rules that it is permitted to sell an “am ha-aretz” a doubtful shemitta-work utensil if not selling it will bring a state of hatred and general ill-will. For social reasons, the mishna rules that it is permissible to possibly (but not definitely) harm another spiritually. In other words, the Chazon Ish is addressing a case where the potential harm is on the spiritual level and the benefit is on the social level. Thus, although Rav Shlomo Zalman says that we must look at whether in the overall view we are harming or helping another spiritually, he might agree that it is not permitted to cause another to commit a definite sin in order to avoid a negative social mood. Similarly, the Chazon Ish might agree that in defining a “stumbling block,” one must take into account the total picture – whether you are essentially helping or harming the person.
