MEISIT: INCITING ANOTHER TO SIN
Rav Moshe Feinstein (OC vol.I, #99) not only disagrees with Rav Shlomo Zalman’s lenient ruling, but claims that one who invites another to do something that involves sinning falls under the category of a meisit, one who incites another to sin. He claims that meisit applies not only to idolatry but to all sins. [His proof for this from the snake in the Garden of Eden (who incited Chava to eat of the tree, which was not idolatry) might raise the objection, since that was the only sin existent at the time. However, the Rambam in Moreh Nevukhim supports Rav Moshe’s contention about meisit.]
Rav Moshe distinguishes between meisit and lifnei iveir. If a non-observant Jew lives within walking distance of a synagogue, encouraging him to come to services, even though it is likely he will drive, does not fall under the category of meisit; however, it is still lifnei iveir. Offering prizes to children in order to encourage participation in an informal educational program also is not meisit, but could possibly involve lifnei iveir. Rav Moshe therefore says that the organizers should make it clear that prizes are available only to children who will not arrive by car. Meisit applies when the only way to achieve the suggested activity is through a transgression, whereas lifnei iveir applies even if there is a permissible way of accomplishing it.
Practically, especially in our modern context, Rav Moshe’s responsum is very difficult to apply. Putting it into effect would have far-reaching and deleterious effects on many synagogues in the diaspora.
Even if one is not willing to accept Rav Shlomo Zalman’s leniency with regard to lifnei iveir, it is much more plausible to apply it to meisit. The meisit is guilty of trying to force another to stray from the proper path in life. It is difficult to call one who is basically interested in someone else’s spiritual betterment a meisit. Here, it is sensible to take into account the larger picture when assessing whether incitement to sin has taken place.
LIFNEI IVEIR DE-RABBANAN
Even though Rav Shlomo Zalman’s ruling is quite innovative and radical with regard to biblical-level lifnei iveir, there is more room to be lenient when, because of the “one side of the river” clause, it is only a rabbinic prohibition. We must examine this in light of the three possibilities quoted earlier:
1. If there is a rabbinic-level lifnei iveir, our question remains – can Rav Shlomo Zalman’s ruling be applied on a rabbinic level?
2. A rabbinic-level prohibition against participating in another’s sin (“mesayei’a”) only applies at the time the sin is committed.
3. If the commandment to rebuke entails preventing another from sinning, the overall picture definitely should be taken into account. Even though with regard to lifnei iveir one might say, against Rav Shlomo Zalman, that it is never permissible to facilitate any sin, nevertheless, calculating whether a particular act contributes to another’s overall spiritual life should be acceptable with regard to rebuke. The Torah says, “Surely rebuke your friend and do not bear sin on his account.” As the Sages say, it is just as much of a mitzva not to say an unheeded word of rebuke as it is to say a heeded one. The results of rebuke are crucial to determining whether the mitzva applies. Rav Shlomo Zalman’s leniency is certainly applicable here.
[The Ritva’s comments in Avoda Zara may also contribute to formulating a lenient ruling in our case. According to the Ritva, lifnei iveir does not apply to someone who in any case transgresses repeatedly. Facilitating one more sin for a person who does it time and again is not considered lifnei iveir. Even though the poskim do not quote this Ritva, it can be added to the weight of one side of the argument.]