Shavuos 26
Our Gemara on amud aleph discusses the concept of intention and oaths. Specifically, if a person believed he was telling the truth and made an oath, even if the facts were actually different, this is not considered a violation of his oath. Shulchan Aruch (YD 232:6) offers other examples, such as making an oath under false pretenses, like forswearing giving a benefit to a person one thought betrayed him but in fact did not. In those cases, the oath may not be binding because it was not made with full intent.
The proof text comes from the verse that states “a man (adam) in an oath” (Vayikra 5:4). How does this imply intention? Torah Temimah (ibid.) explains that the choice of the word “man,” or in this usage, “human,” implies something different than the Hebrew word for person, “ish.” The implication is a full human, meaning what makes a person human, which is full awareness and free will.
Free will is a fundamental principle of our religion, and it would be hard to understand any morality-based system that did not believe in free will. After all, how would accountability, reward, and punishment make sense if the actions committed or avoided are not a product of choice? Mishna Avos (3:15) states: “All is foreseen by G-d, and [yet] free choice is given.” The Rambam elaborates in Hilchos Teshuva (5:1):
Free will is granted to all men. If one desires to turn himself to the path of good and be righteous, the choice is his. Should he desire to turn to the path of evil and be wicked, the choice is his. This is [the intent of] the Torah’s statement (Genesis 3:22): “Behold, man has become unique as ourselves, knowing good and evil,” i.e., the human species became singular in the world, with no other species resembling it in the following quality: that man can, on his own initiative, with his knowledge and thought, know good and evil, and do what he desires. There is no one who can prevent him from doing good or bad.
However, free choice and free will are not as simple as they seem. How many times do we make up our minds not to have that extra piece of chocolate cake, lose our temper, or let our eyes or thoughts wander after our desires instead of our morals? On the other hand, it could be argued that in fact you didn’t want to keep off the weight more than you wanted the chocolate cake, or that you wanted the badge of being a good, kind person rather than caring about controlling your anger. This analysis, however, is somewhat circular. After all, if you made that choice, then by definition you must have done it freely. But does it always feel that way subjectively?
This is where modern psychology has made important inroads in understanding the complexity of the human psyche, particularly the notion that there is a subconscious mind or at least varying degrees of consciousness. If inside us we have different components, this accounts for why we might sincerely express a desire to behave one way and then, at different times, behave in a contrary way. In addition, if certain painful truths are difficult to bear, we might suppress our awareness of what we really think and believe. The conflict between different parts of our mind and the denial of certain thoughts provide a tidy explanation for the contradictory ways in which people behave. This could explain why someone can sincerely want to lose weight, yet when seeing a certain food, be overcome with the desire to eat it. It’s too painful to admit other possible realities, such as wanting immediate gratification over the long term or, perhaps even more deeply, being afraid of the attention that looking slimmer might bring.
Returning to the example of the person who has difficulty controlling his impulses, he might express a genuine wish to behave in a less lustful manner, but he might not be ready to admit to himself how much he uses gratifications to quell his anger or soothe certain frustrations that he may not even feel safe facing.
Even if we don’t go as deep as psychoanalytic conjectures about the unconscious, everyday life shows us that we operate with varying degrees of self-awareness. Clearly, there are times when our thinking is much more mindful, focused, and rational, and other times we might be dissociating or barely paying attention to what we are doing or saying. It is fair to say that free choice might be a fundamental religious belief, but that does not mean we exercise it freely all the time.
Additionally, when we say a person has free choice, what do we mean by “the person”? Do we mean the most conscious and expressive part of the person, or do we mean all parts, even unconscious aspects that are powerful but, as we pointed out, difficult to face honestly within oneself?
Modern brain research has uncovered fascinating empirical evidence of how the mind works in real time. The research of Benjamin Libet used EEGs to measure neural impulses, showing how there is a part of the mind that stimulates the will to act, then an awareness of the act before it occurs, and then the action itself. This is an interesting idea because it indicates that our unconscious mind may make the initial choice, and then we have veto power, if you will, to catch or modify what we are doing, if we are focused and concentrating.
Other researchers have shown that a person’s brain seems to commit to certain decisions before the person becomes aware of having made them. Researchers have found a delay of about half a second or more between these steps. With contemporary brain-scanning technology, scientists in 2008 were able to predict with 60% accuracy whether 12 subjects would press a button with their left or right hand up to 10 seconds before the subject became aware of having made that choice.
One can conduct a personal observation of their behavior and quickly realize that, unless they are being extremely thoughtful and methodical, then in ordinary, everyday conversation and speech, the words being spoken have already been composed without conscious thought. Similar to the experiment above, you will notice the words as they’re coming out or, perhaps, possibly right before they come out.
However, none of this contradicts free will if we understand that the person and the mind are a totality. So it might be true that I am not consciously generating my speech; however, another part of my mind, which is an accumulated collection of my experiences and wisdom, is assembling the speech. Furthermore, I am observing myself, possibly making last-minute modifications and also learning from my mistakes, which will influence the next words I choose, albeit with less than conscious awareness.
The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim (III:17) also discusses free will, but, as is his style, drops a subtle bomb for us to pick up on if we’re paying close attention:
The theory of man’s perfectly free will is one of the fundamental principles of the Law of our Teacher Moses, and of those who follow the Law. According to this principle, man does what is in his power to do, by his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to any faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals likewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is to say, it is due to the eternal Divine Will that all living beings should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to his will or choice within the limits of his capacity.
How did the Rambam go from speaking about the free will of man to the free will of animals? What do animals have to do with the theological issues of free will? In Hilchos Teshuva that we saw earlier, he is clear that Man alone has the intellectual and moral capacity to decide good or evil. It may be true that even an animal is making “choices,” that is to say, there is no other agency controlling it, and G-d allows this entity to operate on its own volition. Indeed, the Gemara also speaks of animals making “choices,” such as the ox that “intends” to cause damage when it gores, as opposed to inadvertently eating produce out of instinct (see Bava Kama 4a). However, this volition is not likely the product of moral choice or thought, but rather some type of instinctive autonomous operation. In that sense, we could argue that a robot also has free will, as it autonomously follows its programming.
What was the Rambam driving at here, and why did he include animals in the discussion when, in Hilchos Teshuva, he made a clear point about human beings being different and the sole possessors of free choice? I believe this was exactly his point. G-d does not ordinarily interfere in the activities of any of His creations, man or beast. However, moral choice is something above mere volition. For man to elevate himself above the simple ability to control his life, which even animals share with him, he must use his intellect and be mindful of what he does and why he does it. Free, moral choice, like consciousness itself, operates on a continuum.
