The Plucked Apple
‘…Which Cannot Become Permitted’
(Nedarim 58a)
It is forbidden to derive any benefit from an act of Shabbos desecration. Strictly speaking, when it is permitted to desecrate Shabbos for the sake of a dangerously ill person this should not apply, since the act was permitted. Nonetheless, our Sages ruled that a healthy person may not eat the leftovers of food cooked for a sick person on Shabbos. They feared that one might come to cook extra for the healthy person next time. When this concern does not apply, a healthy person may eat the leftovers. For example, if an animal is slaughtered on Shabbos to feed a sick person, a healthy person may eat the leftover meat raw. There is no concern that one might come to shecht extra next time, since the meat of one animal is sufficient for several meals (Shulchan Aruch, O.C. 318:1,2).
Muktza Fruit
The Rema (ibid) adds that if a fruit is plucked on Shabbos for a sick person, a healthy person may not eat the leftovers. Fruit that are attached to the tree when Shabbos begins remain muktza for the entire Shabbos. Even if the relatives of the sick person planned to pluck the fruit for him on Shabbos, and thus removed from it the status of muktza, this is not sufficient, since the fruit continues to grow on Shabbos. Although their intention is enough to remove the muktza status from the part of the fruit that existed before Shabbos, it cannot remove the muktza status from the part of the fruit that did not yet exist.
In this case, the fruit that was plucked on Shabbos is partially muktza (the part that grew on Shabbos), and partially permitted (the part that was prepared before Shabbos). Since the forbidden part is clearly the minority, why is it not batel b’rov (nullified in the majority of permitted fruit)?
Redeemed Revai Fruit
Our daf discusses the disposition of orlah fruit [the first three years of a new tree’s fruit are forbidden as orlah its fruit only become permissible in the fourth year] which was mixed with non-orlah fruit. Elsewhere (Tractate Ma’aser Sheni 5:2) our Sages teach that this fruit is permitted, but it may only be eaten in Yerushalayim. If one wishes, he may redeem the revai fruit – replacing it with money, which will be used to purchase other food to be eaten in Yerushalayim. Tosafos (Bava Kama 69a s.v. kol hanilkat) write that if a farmer redeems his revai fruit while they are still attached to the tree, the part of the fruit that continues to grow afterwards still has the sanctity of revai. Therefore, the fruit must be redeemed again after it is plucked. Tosafos notes that the principle of batel b’rov does not apply here. Since the fruit can be made permitted by redeeming it again, it is considered a davar she’yaish lo matirin, a substance or matter which can become permitted, which is never batel.
Immediately Permitted
The Rema bases his ruling regarding muktza fruit on this Tosafos, since muktza is also davar she’yaish lo matirin – it becomes permitted after Shabbos. Therefore, the forbidden part does not become batel in the permitted part. However, the Magen Avraham argues against the Rema, noting that although the Ran agrees with Tosafos, many other Rishonim argue (Mordechai, Shabbos 8:259; Shita Mekubetzes, Bava Kama 68b, citing R’ Shmaya; Issur V’Heter, 25:20). These Rishonim hold that the prohibition of davar she’yaish lo matirin applies only when the forbidden substance existed by itself, before it was mixed together with the permitted majority. If the forbidden substance when it first came into existence was immediately mixed together with the permitted, then it is batel even if it is a davar she’yaish lo matirin. This is because the forbidden substance never had its own identity, which we could label as forbidden. As soon as it came into existence, it had already become permitted. This is true regarding the revai and muktza parts of a fruit, that grow into the permitted parts. They immediately become mixed with the permitted, and therefore they are batel, even though they are davar she’yaish lo matirin. Therefore, the fruit are permitted.
The Reason for the Debate
Rabbi Akiva Eiger, zt”l, (Teshuvos 189) writes that this debate between Tosafos and the other Rishonim is based on the debate over the reason for davar she’yaish lo matirin. According to Rashi, the reason for davar she’yaish lo matirin is: “Rather than eating it while it is forbidden it, eat it when it is permitted.” This is true only when there was a forbidden food to consider. In this case, the food was never forbidden. As soon as it came into existence, it was already nullified in the majority of permitted food. This is the opinion of the Rishonim upon whom the Magen Avraham relies to permit the apple that was plucked on Shabbos.
According to the Ran, the reason for davar she’yaish lo matirin is that a substance which will ultimately become permitted is not really considered forbidden at all. It is in essence identical to the permitted substance, and the laws of bitul do not apply with two identical substances. This is true even if the forbidden substance was immediately mixed together with the permitted as soon as it came into existence. This is the opinion of Tosafos and the Ran, upon whom the Rema relies to forbid the apple that was plucked on Shabbos.
