Weeks into the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, concern is mounting in Israel that the Trump administration may agree to a deal that fails to prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. The Wall Street Journal reported Friday morning that Israeli officials worry that such an agreement would not only allow Iran to retain its uranium enrichment capabilities but also weaken the prospects for future military action.
The U.S. and Iran are currently negotiating a framework that would establish the key principles of a potential deal. A senior U.S. official revealed that the U.S. is preparing to present Iran with a “term sheet” that would require an end to uranium enrichment. “If they don’t accept these terms, it’s not going to be a good day for the Iranians,” the official warned.
Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly voiced Israel’s concerns this week, warning that a bad deal would be worse than no deal at all. In response, President Trump said, “I told him this would be very inappropriate to do right now because we’re very close to a solution.”
Trump has consistently stated that, unlike Netanyahu, he favors a diplomatic resolution to the standoff, but maintains that military options remain on the table if negotiations fail. In a letter sent to Iran’s supreme leader in March, Trump set a two-month deadline for reaching an agreement, although administration officials have since downplayed the notion of a firm cutoff.
Netanyahu has stated that his government would support a deal that ends Iran’s nuclear fuel enrichment program. However, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman responded to a Reuters report—cited by the Tehran Times—which suggested Iran might consider halting enrichment in exchange for the release of billions of dollars in frozen assets held by the U.S., calling it “simply false and fictitious.” He emphasized, “Enrichment is an integral part of our peaceful nuclear program, which stems from our inalienable right.”
Can Israel carry out an attack without the U.S. knowing? Absolutely. While it’s very challenging, it is possible. The Israeli Air Force maintains full autonomy over its operations involving U.S.-made aircraft and weaponry. Both the Air Force and the broader IDF have the capability to conduct missions with a “low signature,” employing various methods to conceal an airstrike—details that, naturally, cannot be disclosed. However, such an operation is complex, not only because of American detection capabilities.
U.S. personnel are frequently present at IDF bases and maintain personal ties with Israeli military, security, political, and intelligence officials. Moreover, the U.S. has been deeply involved in developing attack plans targeting Iran. It’s also assumed that American reconnaissance aircraft and satellites continuously monitor the region—a practice ongoing for decades. The intelligence gathered through these channels reaches the president as well as senior government and military leaders. So, if a large number of Adir F-35 jets were to suddenly take off, representatives of the American manufacturer would almost certainly notice.
At this stage, President Trump’s policy is fully committed to securing a nuclear agreement with Iran. This approach is influenced by internal considerations and a clear belief that wars are bad for business—especially after Trump announced deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars with Gulf states, countries that would be negatively impacted if Israel were to launch an attack. This tactic of leaking information in order to signal its awareness and downplay the possibility of an Israeli strike is a familiar American strategy.
There is broad consensus in Israel that the country must preserve the right to act independently against Iran, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations. Last year, Israel expanded its options by striking Iranian ally Hezbollah in Lebanon and neutralizing many of Iran’s air defenses during unprecedented direct exchanges of fire between the two nations. These actions have made it more difficult for Iran to defend against or retaliate to an attack.
Meanwhile, Iran has been constructing tunnels deep beneath its main Natanz enrichment site. Insiders familiar with Iran’s program say the work is far from complete, but once finished, these underground facilities could enable Iran to produce nuclear fuel beyond the reach of airstrikes and allow its nuclear program to quickly recover after an attack.
These developments may increase the appeal of striking before the tunnels are fully operational—even if the nuclear talks continue to drag on.
