In February, Defense Minister Israel Katz announced the establishment of a new emigration administration for the Arabs of the Gaza Strip. The directorate received cabinet approval in March. Colonel (res.) Yaakov Blitstein was appointed to lead it, with a clear mandate: to identify third countries willing to accept Gaza’s residents. Yet, three months later, the emigration directorate barely began operations on the ground.
In May 2024, Diab al-Louh, the Palestinian Authority ambassador to Egypt, estimated that approximately 100,000 Gazans had temporarily relocated to Egypt during the war. He called on Egyptian authorities to issue them residence permits to be valid until their return to Gaza. On March 25, 2025, a group of 100 Gazans left the Strip to work in Indonesia. Reports also indicated that since the start of the war, around 35,000 residents have permanently left Gaza.
These figures fall far short of President Donald Trump’s ambitious proposal to relocate 2.2 million Gazans to host countries worldwide. Moreover, the departures that have occurred were not facilitated by Israel or the United States. Instead, those who managed to leave reportedly did so by bribing Hamas officials and Egyptian border guards at Rafah—paying between five and ten thousand dollars per person.
During a conversation with wounded soldiers on Monday, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that “Israel has internal surveys in Gaza related to the Trump plan, showing that over 50% of Gazans already want to emigrate.” Yet despite this striking figure, the Emigration Directorate is struggling to turn that vision into reality.
Despite Defense Minister Katz’s assurances that the Emigration Directorate would facilitate the safe and orderly relocation of Gaza residents to third countries, the reality on the ground tells a different story. Out of roughly 2 million Gazans, the Directorate has yet to assist more than a few hundred in emigrating. Those who are managing to leave today are primarily dual citizens who require no help from the Directorate, or individuals with serious medical conditions who are permitted to exit without Israeli involvement. This stark gap between promises and outcomes raises serious questions about the Directorate’s effectiveness and purpose.
COULD THE STAGNATION BE FAKE?
In contrast to the grim shape of Israel’s official emigration efforts, last month, the pro-Qatari newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported that international bodies and organizations are actively working to assist Gaza residents in emigrating and resettling in various Arab and European countries—a development that has sparked concern among Palestinian Authority officials and others over the prospect of large-scale displacement.
However, the initiative faces strong opposition from Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab League, whose members fear it could be seen as another “Nakba”—a devastating displacement—and as a relinquishment of the “Palestinians’” right to self-determination. Also, allowing Gazans the freedom to leave would challenge the Palestinian narrative of tsumud—the steadfast attachment to the land—and simultaneously weaken Hamas by draining its manpower and resources.
According to the Al-Quds Al-Arabi report, sources in Gaza and several European countries confirmed that real support is being provided for emigration efforts, with dozens of families having left the Strip in recent weeks. Refugees have reportedly been taken in by countries such as Bosnia and other Balkan states, as well as destinations across Europe and the Middle East. Some of these efforts, the sources said, were carried out in coordination with Western embassies and consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, sometimes via intermediaries operating within Gaza.
The newspaper’s sources claimed that these emigration initiatives are framed under terms such as “humanitarian shelter,” “family reunification,” and similar labels—suggesting a structured, institutional effort possibly intended to promote a quiet and gradual departure of Gaza residents.
For residents who view the initiative favorably and decide to leave the Gaza Strip, it could represent a genuine opportunity to improve their living conditions. Emigrating to countries that offer economic incentives, infrastructure, and services may provide a viable path to a better life for many families.
A survey conducted in 2024 and 2025 by the PSR Institute, led by Dr. Khalil Shekaki, supports this: 44% of Gazans aged 18 to 29 expressed interest in leaving the Strip if given the chance.
According to the PSR polls, while the majority says it does not want to leave the Gaza Strip after the war ends, a large minority wants to do that. Similarly, about half of Gazans are willing to apply to Israel to help them emigrate to other countries via Israeli ports and airports.
Their motivations are varied, including harsh humanitarian conditions, high unemployment, strict Hamas control, and a pervasive sense of hopelessness about improving their circumstances. For many, the prospect of leaving has become a long-held dream amid the ongoing security and economic hardships.
