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July 2, 2015 / 15 Tammuz, 5775
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Posts Tagged ‘Foreign Policy’

Elliott Abrams on Sharon’s English, Saudi Suspicions, and Mideast Peace

Wednesday, April 24th, 2013

The world of politics is divided between insiders and outsiders – those who know and those who don’t, those who make policy and those who react to it, those who observe directly and those who peer from beyond a curtain.

From December 2002 to January 2009, Elliott Abrams was an insider. As deputy assistant to the president and later deputy national security adviser – with the Middle East as his focus – Abrams interacted daily with such figures as President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Israeli Prime Ministers Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert.

In his new book, Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Cambridge University Press), Abrams shares his insider vantage point. Educated at Harvard University and the London School of Economics, Abrams also served as assistant secretary of state in the Reagan administration and today is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Jewish Press: You begin Tested by Zion with Bill Clinton warning Bush about Yasir Arafat. Can you elaborate?

Abrams: Every new presidential administration starts off with the old president and new president meeting in the Oval Office for a kind of handshake before everybody goes up to Capitol Hill for the inauguration. It’s just a formality. But on January 20, 2001, when Clinton handed over to Bush, it was not a formality. Clinton had a message he wanted to deliver, which was basically, “Don’t trust Arafat” – and he said it repeatedly. “He lied to me, he’ll lie to you. Don’t trust him.”

The Bush administration, as you write, eventually adopted this position, but then decided to invest its efforts in Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) – a man who spent 40 years in Arafat’s PLO and argued in his Ph.D. thesis that the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust was inflated by Zionists for their own ends. Why would the Bush administration trust someone like him?

In June 2003, Abbas did exactly what we hoped he would do. He met with Ariel Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan and said the armed intifada is over. He said there’s no justification for using violence against Israelis anywhere. That made a big impression on Bush. We saw no evidence – ever – in eight years that Abbas was involved in terrorism.

But even today you read occasional media reports of Abbas attending ceremonies at which Palestinian schools or streets are named after notorious terrorists.

This is a terrible problem. There is a culture of violence there, and one of Abbas’s weaknesses is that he’s not a violent person. He’s never held a gun, and he’s never been to an Israeli prison. The guys who are viewed as heroes by the Palestinians are people who have committed acts of violence.

Now, what do you do about that? What you ought to do is try to change the culture. Instead, what Fatah and Abbas have done is feed it – by glorifying the mothers of terrorists, glorifying terrorists themselves, and naming schools, streets, or squares after them.

We in the U.S. have never taken this seriously enough, and frankly, neither have the Israelis. We all say, “Oh, you should stop doing this,” but we never insist on it. No one has ever said, for example, “U.S. support for the PA is going to stop on the first of the month unless that kind of stuff is eliminated.”

And yet, the Bush administration – particularly Condoleezza Rice, as your book makes clear – pushed Israel to sign some sort of peace deal with Abbas. Why?

Condi thought a comprehensive peace agreement was possible. She, and Olmert, thought that if offered a sufficiently generous package by Israel, Abbas would sign.

I thought it was impossible – first, because the problems between the Israelis and the Palestinians are very deep – just think of Jerusalem, for example – and second, because I never thought Abbas had the courage to sign an agreement since he would be immediately accused of treason [by many of his own people].

Did Condoleezza Rice and President Bush know your views on the matter?

They both knew. In fact, whenever I would go to Israel – which was very frequently – I would come back and the president would say, “What’s up? Olmert is very optimistic,” and I would say to the president, “Well, I know Olmert tells you he’s optimistic, but I’m telling you there’s never going to be a deal here.”

So the president knew, and he would say to people, “Condi’s optimistic, Olmert’s optimistic, but Elliott’s not optimistic.”

How often would you speak with the president about the Middle East?

If we were both in Washington, probably on average twice a week.

Were these five-minute conversations? Half-hour conversations?

It would vary. I mean sometimes it was because a foreign leader was visiting the president, so if you count the time I spent briefing the president, the actual meeting, and then the discussion afterwards – that would be a couple of hours.

Sometimes it would be for a phone call. Let’s say he was calling Sharon or Mubarak. So that would be more like 45 minutes. And sometimes it would just be a question. That would be 15 minutes.

Why would you be present during a phone call between Bush and a foreign leader?

The way business was done was… let’s say we scheduled a call at 7:00 in the morning with the president of Egypt. I would go in about 10 minutes before and we would talk about why we were doing the call. I would also tell the president anything new that had happened in the last, let’s say, 12 hours that might be important for the call.

For instance, if it was Mubarak’s birthday, I would say, “You should wish him a happy birthday.” It was a kind of an update briefing. Then we would do the call – I would be in the room listening – and then at the end of the call we would chat about it and discuss the follow-up. [The president might say something like], “That was interesting, but I need to talk to the Saudis now” or “I need to talk to Sharon now.”

Many of Bush’s critics portray him as something of a bumbling Texas idiot. You make it clear in the book that you disagree.

He was very smart. I mean, all you had to do was be in a meeting with him to see how smart he was – both about the issues and about the people.

He paid very close attention to his personal relations with foreign leaders. In this he was very much like Clinton, and not at all like Obama who seems to dislike spending time with foreign leaders. Bush liked it and thought it was important. He thought that if a relationship of confidence was established you could get more from these guys.

You write that Bush’s Texas English threw foreign leaders off sometimes.

Bush talked in one way to everybody – to his wife, to you and me, to the American people, and to foreign leaders. He had one way of speaking, which I would call “Texan.” And it was funny because very often there were foreigners who didn’t really follow completely. Ariel Sharon was one of them. Sometimes he would get lost in a meeting, and he would turn to his chief of staff, Dubi Weissglass, and say, “Mah?”

The president would use lots of colloquial expressions. For example, if he was asking someone whether he was going to join the United States in some action, he might say, “You know, the question is whether you’re going to saddle up with us.” Now, if you haven’t watched a lot of Westerns and you’re not an American, you don’t know what that means.

Talking about Sharon, you quote Condoleezza Rice as saying: “[H]e’s one of the very few people I know who spoke English better than he understood it.”

She was right. Sharon seemed to have better English than he did because on most subjects you might want to talk to him about – Egypt, Syria, settlements, the IDF, Iran – he kind of had talking points in his head. He had the words ready. He used them a thousand times. But that didn’t mean his comprehension was great. So often he would lose track of what was being said to him.

Of all the major figures in the White House during your tenure, who would you say was the most sympathetic to Israel?

I would say the president, first of all, and Cheney. They had a really deep appreciation for Israel, which I think was a great surprise for a lot of Israelis, particularly about Cheney because he had worked in the Arab world for so long. I would say Rumsfeld was also a very strong supporter of Israel. Bob Gates, his successor, was not.

I think Condi was very sympathetic in the first term. After the Lebanon War in the summer of 2006, though, she was less sympathetic. I think she felt the Israelis had lost their way – that they had made a mistake in that war and had prosecuted it poorly – and that she was now going to have to take a much stronger hand in pushing them into an agreement with the Palestinians. She lost faith in Olmert, but also in the IDF.

How about Powell?

I think Powell was not sympathetic right from the start. Powell adopted, what I would call, the State Department view of Israel, which is basically that Israel is making trouble for us in the Middle East with our Arab friends and that it ought to be pressured harder. This is the traditional State Department view, and I think Powell had that view right from the beginning.

In the book you refer to “the apparent American obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” Why is the U.S. government generally so obsessed? Why doesn’t it take a more hands-off policy (as it arguably is doing now)?

I think it’s partly because there is a mistaken view – and this has been held at the State Department for a very long time – that the central issue in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and if you were able to solve that conflict, all of our other problems would go away or be much easier to resolve. If you believe that, you’re going to spend a lot of time on this issue.

I think it’s ridiculous, though. Do you think that if you resolved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran would stop trying to get a nuclear weapon? Do you think the Syrians would stop killing each other? Do you think Egypt or Libya would become stable all of a sudden?

Did you ever get a sense while working in the White House that you were suspected as taking a more pro-Israel stance because you’re a Jew?

Not from the president or the vice president or anybody else in the administration. Not from most of the Arabs either. I would say the exception was the Saudis, where I did have the feeling that they believed I was a kind of Israeli agent – that I was not working for the interests of the United States but for the interests of Israel.

Understanding Israel’s National-Security Policy

Wednesday, April 17th, 2013

Most of my Jewish Press columns deal with Israel’s most urgent national security problems, especially those that have, or have had, a real or prospective nuclear component. What I have never dealt with on these pages, however, are the important and corollary issues of how Israel actually makes its national security policy.

Now, auspiciously, Charles D. Freilich, a senior fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard and a professor at Tel Aviv University, has written Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Cornell University Press), an authoritative and authentically magisterial answer to this vital question. There is much here for the reader to learn.

Let me start with the author’s conclusion, because, paradoxically, it represents an ideal place for me to begin. “The Lord is my shepherd,” quotes Freilich from the Book of Psalms, “and fortunate this is, for the decision-making process in Israel is deeply flawed.” Following 256 pages of meticulous and systematic investigation – an investigation that proceeds with all of the best architecture of modern social science, including appropriately careful delineations of “‘independent” and “dependent” variables – Freilich is intent to call all things by their correct names.

This is no narrowly partisan exegesis. This is no attempt to present a uniformly positive or contrived picture of Israel’s national security establishment. To the contrary, the author offers an entirely honest and open consideration that is often conspicuously less than visceral praise. To be sure, there is also a good deal of praise in Freilich’s book for the Israeli DMP, or decision-making process, but it is correctly based on a dispassionate and detached assessment.

What we learn is that needed changes in the DMP have simply not kept up with the growing complexities and synergies of Israel’s always-hostile external environment:

“Nearly sixty-five years after independence, the same basic political processes, which so successfully gave rise to the nation in its formative years, are still largely intact.”

Especially troubling to the author, the reader will discover, is that Israel’s DMP is more “chaotic” and “politicized” than in other countries, not by any means an intrinsically fatal disadvantage, but one, nonetheless, that has still managed to generate injurious “pathologies.”

Worth noting, at this point, is that Freilich has served as a senior analyst in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and also as Israel’s deputy national security adviser. His assessments, therefore, are not simply an expression of outstanding academic scholarship, but the well-reasoned product of a distinguished and astute observer, one who has already had an important seat at the government table.

As a political scientist, I can admire the graceful way the author moves effortlessly between fashioning general theory and tendering elucidations of pertinent history. Combining the perceptual strengths of Isaiah Berlin’s “hedgehog” and “fox,” Freilich helps us see both one big decisional canvas and also many smaller, constituent elements.

Shaping a consciously nuanced model of national security decision-making in Israel, he applies it to assorted and carefully selected events of the past thirty years, ranging from Camp David I to the “disengagement” from Gaza in 2005 to the Second Lebanon War one year later.

The result is plainly disconcerting, as these seven cases reveal many critically lost opportunities, flagrantly unpardonable decisional errors, and an always highly politicized decisional context. While Freilich underscores the liabilities of Israel’s too-informal planning process, he also notes that this flawed process has allowed a relatively high degree of latitude or flexible response, as well as a gainfully self-serving sensitivity to pragmatic solutions.

Particularly helpful to the serious reader is the author’s continuous emphasis on “existential decision-making” as a critical component of Israel’s national security environment. Undoubtedly, this particular component is indispensable to understanding what drives the country’s DMP at its very core. In this connection, however, I would have liked to see greater attention paid to important details of Menachem Begin’s decision to attack Iraq’s nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981.

Of course, each reader will choose to assess the author’s selection of case studies differently according to his or her own personal hierarchy of concerns. But the connections between Operation Opera and the current threat of a nuclear Iran are unambiguously of the very highest urgency. Jurisprudentially, the attack on the Iraqi reactor was treated by Israel as a permissible expression of “anticipatory self-defense.” One may surmise that any future Israeli preemption against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures would have to be cast in very similar legal terms.

140,000 US-Made Teargas Canisters to Morsi’s Egypt

Monday, April 15th, 2013

The Egyptian publication Al-Masry Al-Youm reports that the U.S. government has supplied five containers carrying 140,000 teargas canisters to Egypt’s Interior Ministry. It further reports that this shipment left Wilmington, Delaware, on Mar. 14 aboard the SS Jamestown and that it has just arrived the port of Suez. They cost the Egyptian government just under US$2.5 million. According to ministry spokesperson Hani Abdel Latif, the ministry imported the grenades in order to protect state facilities.

Although shocking, this should not come as a surprise: On Feb. 25, 2013, the State Department spokesman confirmed that “we have approved an export license for the shipment of U.S.-manufactured nonlethal riot control agents to the Egyptian Government.” He added that “No U.S. security assistance funds have been used for the purchase of these products” and “we condemn any misuse of these products, of teargas that can result in injury or unlawful death, and any such misuse would jeopardize future exports.”

Comments: (1) I have waited six days to see if either government would deny that 140,000 canisters were delivered but neither has, suggesting this is an accurate number. (2) The transfer of this arsenal of crowd-control weapons reveals the depth of the Obama administration’s collusion with the wretched Morsi regime. (3) This idiocy alone justifies the title of my lecture in Washington on Apr. 16, “Amateur Hour: The Obama Administration’s Middle East Policy.”

Originally published at DanielPipes.org and The National Review Online, The Corner, April 14, 2013.

Iran’s Unhidden Plan For Genocide: Israel’s Decision (Third of Three Parts)

Thursday, April 4th, 2013

Published in the print edition under the title, “Iran’s Unhidden Plan For Genocide: A Legal Assessment (Third of Three Parts).” Click here for part one and here for part two.

In the post-Holocaust and post-Nuremberg international system, the right of individual states to defend themselves against genocide is overriding, and thoroughly beyond legal question.

This right does not stem directly from the language of the Genocide Convention, which does not explicitly link genocide to aggressive war, but it can still be extrapolated from (1) the precise legal language of anticipatory self-defense, including an 1837 case known as The Caroline; and (2) all subsequent authoritative reaffirmations of law identifiable at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The right of anticipatory self-defense to prevent genocide can also be deduced from certain basic principles of self-protection codified at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and, more generally, from the confluence of persistently anarchic international relations with now-obligatory norms of basic human rights.

Should Israeli decision-makers finally determine they do have a compelling right to act first against Iran to prevent genocidal aggression, any resultant Israeli resorts to preemptive force would still have to be consistent with the laws of war of international law, or the law of armed conflict. In detail, this would mean, for Israel, respecting the always indisputable primary belligerent requirements of “distinction” (avoiding injury to noncombatants), “proportionality,” and “military necessity.”

What about the future? What happens next concerning a steadily nuclearizing Iran? What about anticipatory self-defense in this particular case?

International custom is one of several proper sources of international law listed at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Where it is understood as anticipatory self-defense, the customary right to preempt has its modern origins in an incident known in appropriate jurisprudence as The Caroline. During the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada against British rule, The Caroline had established that even a serious threat of armed attack may justify militarily defensive action.

In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for self‑defense which did not require a prior attack. Here, military response to a threat was judged permissible, but only so long as the danger posed was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.”

Strategic circumstances and the consequences of strategic surprise have changed a great deal since The Caroline, thereby greatly (and sensibly) expanding legal grounds for anticipatory self-defense. Today, in an age of chemical/biological/nuclear weaponry, the time available to any vulnerable state under attack could be only a matter of minutes. From the special standpoint of Israel, soon to face an Iran armed with nuclear weapons, an appropriately hard-target resort to anticipatory self-defense could be both lawful and law-enforcing.

Before the start of the Atomic Age, any justification of anticipatory self-defense would have to have been limited to expected threats of aggression from other states, not genocide. Today, however, the conceivable fusion of nuclear weapons capacity with aggression could transform war into genocide. Although there are no true precedents of resorting to preemption as a law-enforcing means of preventing genocide or “conspiracy to commit genocide” by one state against another, the pertinent right to such pre-attack self-defense is rooted, inter alia, in The Caroline.

After all, if it was already legal, long before nuclear weapons, to strike preemptively in order to prevent entirely conventional aggressions, how much more permissible must it be to strike preemptively to defend against a potentially genocidal nuclear war?

Nonetheless, some legal scholars argue that the right of anticipatory self‑defense expressed by The Caroline has been overridden by the more limiting language of the United Nations Charter. In this view, Article 51 of the Charter offers a far more restrictive statement on self‑defense, one that relies on the strict qualification of a prior armed attack. This very narrowly technical interpretation ignores the larger antecedent point, that international law is never a suicide pact.

Sensibly, law can never compel a state to wait until it has absorbed a devastating or even genocidal first strike before acting to protect itself. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly correctly refused to condemn Israel for its 1967 preemptive attacks. Incorrectly, however, whether or not it had then accepted the existence of a formal state of war between Israel and Iraq – a condition of belligerency openly insisted on by Baghdad – the UN did condemn Israel for Operation Opera in 1981. Of course, this legally incorrect condemnation was the direct result of regionally recurrent circumstances, conditions wherein an exterminatory power politics or geopolitics trumps law.

Betrayal: Republicans Who Voted for Hagel

Wednesday, February 27th, 2013

All of Israel’s enemies are doing the hora. As for all of those conservatives who are shocked, shocked I tell ya, over Rand Paul’s vote for Hagel, are you serious? You expected him to stand against Hagel? Rand and his father are notoriously anti-Israel (anti-Semitic).

GOP Sens. Rand Paul of Kentucky, Thad Cochran of Mississippi, Mike Johanns of Nebraska, and Richard C. Shelby of Alabama voted for Hagel’s Jew-hatred. Shelby’s constituents are not happy with him.

(Recommended blog article: Chuck Hagel — a litmus test for Republican weakness and stupidity).

The Right Scoop had the roll call vote:

FOX NEWS – The Senate approved Chuck Hagel’s nomination for Defense secretaryTuesday, ending a contentious battle that exposed deep divisions over the president’s Pentagon pick.

After Republicans blocked the nomination earlier this month, they ultimately allowed for an up-or-down vote on Tuesday. The margin was historically close, with 58 senators supporting him and 41 opposing in the end.

Though Hagel is himself a former Republican senator, the resistance to his nomination showed an unusual level of distrust among many senators toward the man chosen to lead the Defense Department — at a time when the country is trying to wind down the Afghanistan war, while assessing emerging threats from Iran, Syria and elsewhere in the turbulent Middle East and North Africa.

READ MORE…
Here’s the Roll Call Vote:

YEAs —
58
Baldwin (D-WI)
Baucus (D-MT)
Begich (D-AK)
Bennet (D-CO)
Blumenthal (D-CT)
Boxer (D-CA)
Brown (D-OH)
Cantwell (D-WA)
Cardin (D-MD)
Carper (D-DE)
Casey (D-PA)
Cochran (R-MS)
Coons (D-DE)
Cowan (D-MA)
Donnelly (D-IN)
Durbin (D-IL)
Feinstein (D-CA)
Franken (D-MN)
Gillibrand (D-NY)
Hagan (D-NC)
Harkin (D-IA)
Heinrich (D-NM)
Heitkamp (D-ND)
Hirono (D-HI)
Johanns (R-NE)
Johnson (D-SD)
Kaine (D-VA)
King (I-ME)
Klobuchar (D-MN)
Landrieu (D-LA)
Leahy (D-VT)
Levin (D-MI)
Manchin (D-WV)
McCaskill (D-MO)
Menendez (D-NJ)
Merkley (D-OR)
Mikulski (D-MD)
Murphy (D-CT)
Murray (D-WA)
Nelson (D-FL)
Paul (R-KY)
Pryor (D-AR)
Reed (D-RI)
Reid (D-NV)
Rockefeller (D-WV)
Sanders (I-VT)
Schatz (D-HI)
Schumer (D-NY)
Shaheen (D-NH)
Shelby (R-AL)
Stabenow (D-MI)
Tester (D-MT)
Udall (D-CO)
Udall (D-NM)
Warner (D-VA)
Warren (D-MA)
Whitehouse (D-RI)
Wyden (D-OR)
NAYs —41
Alexander (R-TN)
Ayotte (R-NH)
Barrasso (R-WY)
Blunt (R-MO)
Boozman (R-AR)
Burr (R-NC)
Chambliss (R-GA)
Coats (R-IN)
Coburn (R-OK)
Collins (R-ME)
Corker (R-TN)
Cornyn (R-TX)
Crapo (R-ID)
Cruz (R-TX)
Enzi (R-WY)
Fischer (R-NE)
Flake (R-AZ)
Graham (R-SC)
Grassley (R-IA)
Hatch (R-UT)
Heller (R-NV)
Hoeven (R-ND)
Inhofe (R-OK)
Isakson (R-GA)
Johnson (R-WI)
Kirk (R-IL)
Lee (R-UT)
McCain (R-AZ)
McConnell (R-KY)
Moran (R-KS)
Murkowski (R-AK)
Portman (R-OH)
Risch (R-ID)
Roberts (R-KS)
Rubio (R-FL)
Scott (R-SC)
Sessions (R-AL)
Thune (R-SD)
Toomey (R-PA)
Vitter (R-LA)
Wicker (R-MS)

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Futile Israeli Efforts to Win Ankara Back

Tuesday, February 19th, 2013

The Government of Israel, we learned yesterday from a Turkish source, has delivered Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) equipment by ELTA, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries, that gives military aircraft protection from electronic attacks. Not only will the AWACS planes, in the wording of the Today’s Zaman article, “greatly increase [the Turkish air force’s] dominance over Turkey’s own airspace” but they will also be useful to it in the Syrian civil war and vis-à-vis “tensions with Israel and Greek Cyprus over the issue of gas drilling.”

Israel Defense continues: “There are voices within the Israeli defense establishment calling for the end of the Marmara crisis vis-à-vis Turkey, by finding a formula of apology, in order to return to the Israeli-Turkish alliance against Syria and Iran.” Ankara ordered the systems years ago but the Israelis held them back following the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. In part, the Israeli decision to deliver them resulted from pressure from Boeing, manufacturer of the AWACS planes. But in part, it has to do with a hope in Israel that the Turks will again become friendly; this move comes in the context of back-channel talks between the two governments and the decision last week, by Maj. Gen. Eitan Dangot, Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, in the words of Israel Defense, to “allow the entry of Turkish experts and construction materials for the largest Turkish hospital building in the Gaza Strip, ahead the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan in Gaza.”

Comments: (1) As the Turkish newspaper itself notes, the AWACS will potentially be used against Israel in the Mediterranean Sea. (2) This move fits into a larger pattern of an Israeli and more broadly a Western reluctance to recognize the AKP-dominated government of Turkey as hostile. Neither appeasement nor seduction will work. The time has come to come to see Erdoğan & Co. as the opponents they are.

Originally published at DanielPipes.org and National Review Online, The Corner, February 18, 2013.

War on Everything But Islamic Terror

Tuesday, February 19th, 2013

Over a decade after thousands of New Yorkers were murdered by Muslim terrorists, the city’s mayor is declaring victory in the War on Salt. Next up he plans to wage a spring offensive on Styrofoam cups. After that, who knows?

We live in surreal times. In the Middle Ages, cats and rats were put on trial. In this modern age, we began by waging wars on poverty and drugs, both of which we lost, and have now retreated to fighting wars on food ingredients, the bags we carry them in and the containers out of which we eat and drink them.

There’s no telling what surreal enemy our wise and brilliant leaders will declare war on next. Shoes? Pepper? Umbrellas? Mathematics? The color blue?

There’s just no way to know anymore.

The United States has lost the War in Afghanistan, a minor matter that no news outlet can find the time to report on because they’re too busy covering a breaking story about a Republican Senator taking a sip of a water. Maybe a War on Water can be next. Was there a Styrofoam cup involved? It’s time for one of those hard-hitting investigations that reminds us what a tragedy it will be when the last newspaper is strangled with the entrails of the last news network and the media’s commitment to serious journalism is finally replaced by pictures of cats, wardrobe malfunctions and mutual accusations of racism. (And we won’t even notice when it finally happens.)

But who can find the time to fight a war against Islamic terrorists, when there are more pressing wars to be fought? Like a war on being fat.

Michelle Obama declared that obesity was a national security threat. And the Pentagon, which now exists only to ratify the latest leftist social experiment from the White House, whether it’s Green Energy, Gay Marriage or bombing the fattest state in the country (Michigan), issued a report agreeing that snack foods posed the greatest threat to the military since Global Warming and the lack of transgender toilets on submarines.

The military has been unable to identify the Fort Hood Massacre as a terrorist attack and fires any instructor who talks about Islam as anything other than a wonderful religion of peace practiced by our closest allies in Saudi Arabia and on board a plane headed for the Pentagon, but the political generals are always ready, willing and able to jump on any truly serious national security threat. If only Iran began developing the world’s biggest chocolate bar, then the bombing raids would begin as soon as the chocolate enrichment process reached the caramel-nougat line.

Faced with a seemingly unwinnable conflict against the Soviet Union, American leaders began to retreat into smaller social wars that were actually far more unwinnable. Those wars have also gone the way of the dodo. The War on Poverty is one with the ages and the War on Drugs is usually only mentioned in a pejorative context.

But the same government that couldn’t get a small percentage of the population to stop doing cocaine and heroin imagines that it will somehow be able to compel 11-year-old boys to stop eating candy and drawing guns. A heroin addict is nothing compared to a normal growing boy seeking a sweet sugar rush before playing a game of cops and robbers. The authorities would have better luck getting Obama’s campaign staff to Say No to Drugs.

The government that couldn’t stop drug use or defeat Islamic terrorism has set its sights on something easier. Taking candy from a baby.

During his State of the Union Address, in between promising to create hubs full of 3D printers and drag every three-year-old to a preschool so he can get a head start on being indoctrinated in important knowledge skills, like recycling and understanding white privilege, Zero Hussein announced that the mission in Afghanistan had been completed because Al Qaeda was defeated. Then he explained that while the war was over, American soldiers would have to go on staying in Afghanistan to continue fighting the already defeated Al Qaeda in a war that was no longer a war, but an extended vacation with shooting.

Since Al Qaeda did not have a significant presence in Afghanistan at any time during his maladministration, defeating it was fairly easy, and true to form it only cost thousands of lives. But somehow it still isn’t defeated. Still if fighting things that don’t exist gets applause, put your hands together for the War on Global Warming, which has recently been scaled down to Climate Change, which means that any time the weather changes, it’s probably due to people using the wrong kinds of light bulbs, driving the wrong kinds of cars and not paying enough attention to Al Gore’s latest plan to fill up the pockets of his cheap over sized suit and those of his Wall Street buddies who care almost as much about the environment as they do about feminism, racism and wiping out entire economies.

Printed from: http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/columns/daniel-greenfield/war-on-everything-but-islamic-terror/2013/02/19/

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