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July 22, 2014 / 24 Tammuz, 5774
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Posts Tagged ‘strike’

Unions Threaten To Ground El Al Flights Sunday

Thursday, April 18th, 2013

Unions at El Al, Arkia and Israir Airlines announced Thursday they will ground all planes beginning Sunday if the government carries outs plan to approve the open skies agreement at Sunday’s weekly Cabinet meeting.

El Al workers committee chairman Asher Edry told Globes, “We demand that all the promises made to us before the agreement was signed, i.e. the issuing of slots at key European airports, code-sharing with foreign airlines, which have been blocked, and so forth, be implemented in full.”

Histadrut Transport Workers Union chairman Avi Edry said, “The agreement in its present form will destroy Israeli aviation and cost tens of thousands of jobs in the industry without protecting Israeli aviation and will make Israeli airlines hostages paying for passenger security, landing rights at key airports, and so on.”

El Al also is against the agreement. Its CEO Eliezer Shkedy has stated that the open skies agreement will result in greater competition in the aviation industry and harm the company’s business.

Travelers to and from Israel are advised to follow updates Saturday night before arriving at the airport for flights that might be affected by a strike.

For Israel, What Next In The Matter Of Iran? (2 of 3)

Wednesday, December 5th, 2012

Steadily, Israel is strengthening its plans for ballistic missile defense, most visibly on the Arrow system and also on Iron Dome, a lower-altitude interceptor that is designed to guard against shorter-range rocket attacks from Lebanon and Gaza.

Unavoidably, these defensive systems, including certain others, which are still in the development phase, would have leakage. Because system penetration by even a single enemy missile carrying a nuclear warhead could, by definition, be intolerable, their principal benefit would not lie in supplying added physical protection for Israeli populations. Instead, this still-considerable benefit would have to lie elsewhere – that is, in critical enhancements of Israeli nuclear deterrence.

If still rational, a newly nuclear Iran would require incrementally increasing numbers of offensive missiles. This would be needed to achieve or to maintain a sufficiently destructive first-strike capability against Israel. There could come a time, however, when Iran would become able to deploy substantially more than a small number of nuclear-tipped missiles. Should that happen, all of Israel’s active defenses, already inadequate as ultimate guarantors of physical protection, could cease functioning as critically supportive adjuncts to Israeli nuclear deterrence.

In the case of anticipated Iranian decisional “madness,” a still timely preemption against Iran, even if at very great cost and risk to Israel, could prove indispensable. Yet, at least in itself, this plainly destabilizing scenario is insufficiently plausible to warrant defensive first strikes. Israel would be better served by a bifurcated or two-pronged plan for successful deterrence. Here, one “prong” would be designed for an expectedly rational Iranian adversary, the other for a presumptively irrational one.

In broadest policy contours, we already know what Israel would need to do in order to maintain a stable deterrence posture vis-à-vis a newly nuclear Iran. But what if the leaders of such an adversary did not meet the characteristic expectations of rational behavior in world politics? In short, what if this leadership, from the very start or perhaps more slowly over time, chose not to consistently value Iran’s national survival as a state more highly than any other preference, or combination of preferences?

In such acutely threatening circumstances, Israel’s leaders would need to look closely at two eccentric and more-or-less untried nuclear deterrence strategies, possibly even in tandem with one another. First, these leaders would have to understand that even an irrational Iranian leadership could display distinct preferences, and associated hierarchies or rank-orderings of preferences. Their task, then, would be to determine precisely what these particular preferences might be (most likely, they would have to do with certain presumed religious goals), and, also, how these preferences are apt to be ranked in Tehran.

Second, Israel’s leaders would have to determine, among other things, the likely deterrence benefits of pretended irrationality. An irrational Iranian enemy, if it felt Israel’s decision-makers were irrational themselves, could be determinedly less likely to strike first. Years ago, General Moshe Dayan, then Israel’s minister of defense, declared: “Israel must be seen as a mad dog; too dangerous to bother.” With this warning, Dayan revealed an intuitive awareness of the possible long-term benefits, to Israel, of feigned irrationality.

Of course, pretending irrationality could also be a double-edged sword, frightening the Iranian side to a point where it might actually feel more compelled to strike first itself. This risk of unwittingly encouraging enemy aggression could apply as well to an Iranian adversary that had been deemed rational. In this connection, it is worth noting, Israel could apply the tactic of pretended irrationality to a presumptively rational Iranian leadership, as well as to an expectedly irrational one.

On analytic balance, it may even be more purposeful for Israel to use this tactic in those cases where Iran had first been judged to be rational.

The dialectics of such multi-factorial calculations are enormously complex, and also potentially bewildering. Still, they must be studied and worked through meticulously, and by all seriously concerned strategists and decision-makers. For Israel, there is no rational alternative.

There is, however, a relevant prior point. Before Israel’s leaders could proceed gainfully with any plans for deterring an irrational Iranian nuclear adversary, they would first need to be convinced that this adversary was, in fact, genuinely irrational, and not simply pretending irrationality.

The importance of an early sequencing for this vital judgment cannot be overstated. Because all specific Israeli deterrence policies must be founded upon the presumed rationality or irrationality of prospective nuclear enemies, accurately determining precise enemy preferences and preference-orderings will have to become the very first core phase of strategic planning in Tel Aviv.

Lame Terrorist Videos Make Tel-Avivians Less Worried About Being “Oudroub”ed.

Sunday, November 18th, 2012

Two videos meant to strike fear in the hearts of Israelis have been met with snickering and mockery, with YouTube followers eager for an up-cropping of spoofs in response.

According to a report by Haaretz, two videos – one produced specifically for the Israeli public and the other a song celebrating the potential destruction of Tel Aviv – have gotten the attention of Israelis, but have not managed to have their intended effect.

In the first video, produced in Hebrew, the highly dramatic nature of the video, coupled with grammar and spelling mistakes and a low production value made the attempt to convince Israelis that they should abort a mission in Gaza a “bomb”.

The second, music underscoring a single image of singers, includes air raid siren, machine guns,  bombing sounds, and repeats Oudroub, Oudroub Tel Aviv (flatten, flatten Tel Aviv), and even includes boasting that Hamas shot down an Israeli fighter plane.

“Fajr! Fajr!”, the singers exclaim, naming the advanced missile Hamas is currently using to target Tel Aviv.  The song also mentions Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman, and Kadima party chairman Shaul Mofaz.

IAF Aborts Air Strikes to Protect Gaza Civilians

Sunday, November 18th, 2012

As it does in all its operations, the IDF has taken the utmost care to protect uninvolved civilians during Operation Pillar of Defense, even while rockets have continued to fall on Israel. In addition to the large number of flyers the IDF has dropped prior to striking an area, air strikes are often aborted when civilians are found in the area.

Yesterday saw one such occurrence—an air strike on an underground launch site was aborted due to the discovery of civilians in the area.

Since Wednesday (November 14th) afternoon, the IAF has struck ammunitions warehouses and rocket launch sites used by terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, all in response to the incessant rocket fire directed at Israel. Yesterday, in the early hours of the morning, a squadron of intelligence collecting aircraft took the sky. Through sophisticated observation equipment and cameras the pilots were able to identify a rocket launch, and Air Force aircraft were sent to strike the area. But things didn’t go as planned. “We saw that innocent civilians were approaching the area of the underground launch site,” said Lt. Omer, a source within the intelligence squadron who took part in the operation. “We immediately contacted the forces and instructed them to abort the strike.”

The strike was aborted immediately, thanks to the experience of IDF forces. This is one of many similar stories from Operation Pillar of Defense. It has long been one of the IDF’s top priorities to minimize civilian casualties during IDF operations.

The task is not an easy one, as Hamas has intentionally used the civilian areas of Gaza as staging grounds for their attacks on Israel. Knowing that the IDF wishes to avoid civilian casualties, Hamas places its own civilians in the line of fire in order to hide and protect its own operations. Women and children, victims of the Hamas human shield tactics, usually ignore warning signals to evacuate buildings prior to an IDF strike. The victims remain in the house with Hamas members, knowing ahead of time that the IDF will not target civilians. Many innocent bystanders are killed as a result of Hamas’ abuse of its own civilians. Instead of keeping its citizens out of harm’s way, Hamas encourages and even forces its population to join the violent resistance against Israel.

Four More Terrorists Meet Their Virgins

Thursday, November 15th, 2012

Israel’s Channel 10 is reporting that late Thursday evening, November 16, the Israel Defense Force was able to eliminate an additional four members of Gaza’s senior terrorist leadership in a targeted strike.

New Head of Hamas Military Wing Takes Jabari’s Place

Thursday, November 15th, 2012

Marwan Issa has been named the new commander of Hamas’s military wing. Issa was the deputy of Ahmed Jabari who was killed yesterday in an Israeli air strike and buried after public mourning rituals in Gaza.

Issa headed  the Hamas military delegation that traveled to Tehran and Beirut last September and signed secret mutual defense pacts with Iran and Hizbollah.

4th Israeli Dies in Kiryat Malachi Attack

Thursday, November 15th, 2012

A fourth Israeli died that had been injured in the strike on the Kiryat Malachi apartment.

Printed from: http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/4th-israeli-dies-in-kiryat-melachi/2012/11/15/

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