What is your name?

Salam al-Zaghal.

Tell me about yourself.

Wait, is my lawyer almost here?

No, and you’re not going to see him for a few days yet either.  Now—three years in jail wasn’t enough for you?

It’s not so bad there.  We get 1,600 shekels every month from the Palestinian Authority to buy stuff at the canteen.  Also a salary.  We watch TV.  Get family visits.  Play with sports equipment the Red Cross brings.  Great food.  We’re treated as prisoners of war.

I tried throwing rocks to kill, I didn’t manage, I got just three years.  I got out of jail, went back to killing, and this time I did it.

But now you’ll serve much longer.

Give me a break.  Do you actually believe that?  Either Hamas will get another soldier, or Abbas will put me on a list of prisoners he demands be freed.  And if not this time, then next time around.

We at the ISA would oppose any such move.

Look, are you for real, or did you come to laugh at me while I’m lying in the hospital?  You opposed the Schalit Deal too.  We won.

Everyone’s learned the lesson.  It won’t happen again.

I think you should take a look at Haaretz, boss.  You remember Samir Issawi, the prisoner who went on a hunger strike?  One of the ones who were freed in the Schalit Deal?  He went back to the “resistance.”  Because of pressure from you at the ISA and Almagor at the Supreme Court, a condition was attached to the release, that if there would be any sort of minor violation, a prisoner would go back and serve his whole sentence—in his case, ten years.

So what?  He went on a hunger strike.  Your journalists stuck up for him, and Netanyahu decided to free him in another eight months.  You didn’t see the letter they wrote for him in Haaretz?  They were practically fawning over him.

Maybe I’ll go on my own hunger strike …

Cut out the political lectures.  I want to know who’s behind you.

The whole Palestinian people.  The radio stations—

No, no.  Who sent you?

Listen to the radio!  Look at the schools’ syllabuses praising the shuhada (martyrs)!

You people don’t even listen to Abbas and Jibril Rajoub!  They hold us up as national heroes.  They’re the ones who sent me.

Let’s talk about what happened at the time of the attack.

I saw that your bus stops are total chaos so much of the time.  You have soldiers there, but they stand off on the side, and they don’t give us any problems getting to the hitchhiking stations.  There haven’t been roadblocks in ages.  If there were a red line around the station saying we can’t go past, then granted, the soldiers would notice I’d gone over there.  But there isn’t any.

I bought a big knife.  I stood there with a bunch of laborers, walked around as if going to the hitchhiking station, went over to my target, and stabbed him a few times.  Simple as can be.

But didn’t he have a pistol?  Weren’t there armed soldiers?

Yeah, but the Zionists don’t walk around with their guns ready—even the settlers.  They’re bashful.  I love it.  Obviously if I saw settlers with guns drawn every day, I wouldn’t think about coming near them.

Nah, I wasn’t afraid I’d get killed.  The soldiers weren’t going to shoot to kill as long as I was done killing.  It’s such a game.  You put your hands up, you go to the slammer.

But what did you get out of it?  You killed a man with five children.

We got plenty out of it.  Today Netanyahu said that the solution is two states for two peoples.  Why do you think he said that?  Because of the armed struggle.

* * *

The members of the Bat Ayin underground, the only Jewish terrorist group serving time in prison, received sentences of 13 to 15 years.  For Palestinians, attempted murder carries a sentence of eight years or less.  We discovered this factoid when we obtained lists of prisoners who stand to be released: the most recent ones received eight years or less for unsuccessful gunfire.  For rock throwing they receive two to three years.  One military judge saw fit to determine that since rocks do not always hit their target, it is fallacious to assume that those who throw them intend to murder.  The message is simple: First kill a Jew.  Then we’ll figure out your intent based on the results.

We investigated the 120 prisoners Mahmoud Abbas is demanding Israel release because they are “long-time prisoners,” “old,” or “sick,” and it turns out that nearly all of them are serving life sentences (or two, or three … or 17).  Almagor (The Jewish Terror Victims Association) now has in its possession the names of all those terrorists, as well as descriptions of what they did, and is waiting for a brave journalist who is prepared to expose this information to the public through the media, the bulk of which is under the thumb of Jibril Rajoub, the lead Palestinian propagandist on this issue.

Here are a few of the terrorists’ names:  Mustafa Kalib Asrar, murderer of Tzvi Klein of Ofra.  Abu Harabish Salam Saliman Mahmoud, murderer of David de la Roza and the Weiss family.  Issa Mousa Issa Mahmoud, murderer of Nissim Toledano.  Abd a-Rabba Namer Jibril Issa, murderer of Revital Sari and Ron Levi.

The murder victims have families that expect justice to be done, just as they were promised.  They expect that justice will not cancelled due to pressures that are not germane, with a wink that yes, we promised at the graveside that our long arm would catch them, but we didn’t promise they would serve out their sentences …

Originally published at Mekor Rishon. Translated from Hebrew by David B. Greenberg. The above does not represent an actual interrogation transcript.

The politicians are threatening us with more of their faux “peace.” Some of the recent headlines:

PM: Israel will become bi-national without peace

Olmert hails Arab peace proposal as ‘historic opportunity’

Labor: We would join coalition for peace treaty

The Borovsky family is still sitting shiva, in the first week of mourning for Evyatar Borovsky  who was stabbed and shot to death by an Arab terrorist just the other day, and our politicians refuse to understand that it’s all these “peace gestures” and agreements which encourage and enable Arab terrorism.

Yesterday I took some American friends who had never been in my neck of the woods, aka the “west bank” [sic] to visit my daughter in Ofra.  Ofra is about a twenty minute drive north of Jerusalem’s “city line.”  They had lots of questions and comments.

First of all when we passed the Jerusalem lightrail, I made sure to explain the route which goes through Arab neighborhoods.  They were pretty surprised when they saw all of the empty land along the way.

“What about Jews destroying Arab homes to build theirs?”

“It’s not true; just look at how empty the land is here.  There is definitely room for all to leave in true peace.”

When you’re going to Ofra, Shiloh, Eli, or even Sha’ar Binyamin, which is much closer to Jerusalem there is only one tricky junction.  I explained that we must take the “middle road” of the roundabout/traffic circle, even though it may be easy to miss.  If you go to the right, it’s ok, you’ll go to Adam and just exit and turn right, but if you go to the left, you’ll go to Ramallah.

“What’s the problem in going to Ramallah?”

“You may be murdered.”

“Why?”

“Arabs are encouraged to be angry and justify the murder of Jews, so it’s not safe.  On most of the roads here, both Jews and Arabs travel, but there are some only for Arabs.  That’s Israeli apartheid.”

They noticed the difference in housing.

“What large gorgeous homes there are here.  Who lives in  them?”

“Arabs”

“What?  We always hear that the Arabs are poor and suffering.”

“The Arabs don’t need permits and building engineer inspections. They build what they want.”

As we passed Givat Asaf they asked:

“And what are those poor tiny structures?”

“Those are cardboard homes, aka caravans.  Jews live there.”

“Why should anyone want to live like that?”

And so it went, the questions and my almost incomprehensible answers during the short ride to Ofra.  They discovered that real life here is nothing like the news reports and the politicians’ speeches. One of them had been in Israel for a period of months over thirty years ago, and she does remember the days, pre-peace when Jews could visit, shop, etc., freely and safely in Arab towns, cities and neighborhoods.

This “peace” the politicians and media are touting only causes more death and destruction for Jews.

Visit Shiloh Musings.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s list of “Ten Most Wanted” fugitives dates back to 1950 but the list of “Most Wanted Terrorists” dates back to just after 9/11 and a sense that terrorism had become a strategic threat. Today, the list includes 31 individuals, all of them male and with a single exception (Daniel Andreas San Diego, an animal rights extremist), all of them Muslim:

* Abd al Aziz Awda – 1950, Palestinian, Palestinian Islamic Jihad * Abdelkarim Hussein Mohamed Al-Nasser – ca. 1947, Saudi, Saudi Hizbullah * Abdul Rahman Yasin – 1960, American, World Trade Center bombing in 1993 * Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah – 1963, Egyptian, Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings in 1998 * Adam Yahiye Gadahn – 1978, American, Al-Qaeda * Adnan G. El Shukrijumah – 1975, Guyanese, Al-Qaeda * Ahmad Ibrahim Al-Mughassil – 1967, Saudi, Saudi Hizballah * Ali Atwa – ca. 1960, Lebanese, TWA hijacking in 1985 * Ali Saed Bin Ali El-Hoorie – 1965, Saudi, Saudi Hizballah * Anas Al-Liby – 1964, Libyan, Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings in 1998 * Ayman Al-Zawahiri – 1951, Egyptian, Al-Qaeda * Faouzi Mohamad Ayoub – 1966, Lebanese, Lebanese Hizballah * Hakimullah Mehsud – ca. 1980, Pakistani, Pakistani Taliban * Hasan Izz-Al-Din – 1963, Lebanese, TWA hijacking in 1985 * Husayn Muhammad Al-Umari – 1936, Lebanese, 15 May Organization * Ibrahim Salih Mohammed Al-Yacoub – 1966, Saudi, Saudi Hizballah * Isnilon Totoni Hapilon – 1966, Filipino, Abu Sayyaf Group Jaber A. Elbaneh – 1966, Yemeni, Al-Qaeda Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim – 1965, Palestinian, Pan Am hijacking in 1986 * Jamel Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi – 1960, Yemeni, USS Cole bombing in 2000 * Jehad Serwan Mostafa – 1981, American, Al-Shabaab * Mohammed Ali Hamadei – 1964, Lebanese, Lebanese Hizballah * Muhammad Abdullah Khalil Hussain Ar-Rahayyal – 1965, Palestinian, Pan Am hijacking in 1986 * Muhammad Ahmed Al-Munawar – 1965, Palestinian, Abu Nidal Organization * Omar Shafik Hammami – 1984, American, Al-Shabaab * Raddulan Sahiron – ca. 1936, Filipino, Abu Sayyaf Group * Ramadan Abdullah Mohammad Shallah – 1958, Palestinian, Palestinian Islamic Jihad * Saif Al-Adel – ca. 1960, Egyptian, Al-Qaeda * Wadoud Muhammad Hafiz Al-Turki – 1955, Palestinian, Pan Am hijacking in 1986 * Zulkifli Abdhir – 1966, Malaysian, Kumpulun Mujahidin Malaysia

Comments:

(1) Muslims make up 30 out of 31 most wanted terrorists, or about 97 percent of them. That’s a pretty good indication of what Bernard Lewis’ 1990 article famously called “Muslim rage” and why Islam-related issues have such prominence.

(2). Islamists make up 27 out of those 30; only the three perpetrators of the Pan Am 73 hijacking in 1986 (Rahayyal, Munawar, Turki), all connected to the Abu Nidal Organization, are not Islamists (or at least were not in 1986). This predominance of jihad reflects the Islamist hegemony among politically extreme Muslims.

(3) Ethnic Arabs make up 25 of the 30 terrorists. The largest numbers are 4 each of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Saudis, 3 each of Americans and Egyptians. Non-ethnic Arabs include 2 Filipinos, 1 Malaysian, 1 Pakistani, and 1 American convert. This high percentage confirms the sense that Arabic-speakers have the most pent-up hostility toward Americans.

(4) Most attacks by these most wanted fugitives date from the 1980s and 1990s – Khobar, TWA 847, East African embassies, WTC bombing. Symbolically of this relative antiquity, the only American airlines attacked by them were Pan American and TWA, both long defunct. This points to the greater success since 9/11 in both foiling and tracking terrorism, thanks to greater resources and more diligence.

(5) Also reflecting the long-ago quality of this most wanted list, note the striking pattern of their decadal birthdates:

1930s – 2 1940s – 1 1950s – 4 1960s – 18 1970s – 2 1980s – 3 1990s – 0

The average age is close to 50 – not exactly the prime time of life for terrorism. The youngest listee, Hammami, will be 29 years old in less than a week. The eldest two, Umari and Sahiron, are approaching 80.

Originally published at DanielPipes.org and The National Review Online, The Corner, April 30, 2013.

Several websites have picked up on a UPI report that the Israeli Air Force attacked a chemical weapons site in the Damascus area on Saturday. (Here’s the original UPI report). The report is unconfirmed by any official source, but it is credible.  There are caveats, however.

The site in question, if it was struck, was probably the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), long known to be a key facility in Assad’s chemical and biological weapons program.  (See here as well.)

The blogger, “Mossomo” at Flopping Aces put together an excellent timeline back in February on the events leading up to a previous unconfirmed report that the IAF had struck the SSRC.  This strike was reportedly conducted on 30 January 2013. Hours later, Israel targeted a truck convoy west of Damascus which was carrying sophisticated new surface-to-air missiles for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

I doubt the convoy’s cargo itself was related to the chemical weapons site; if Israel went after both targets in January, it was because they were close, geographically, and Israeli military authorities wanted to maximize the gain from a rare and dangerous penetration of Syrian air space.

But it’s not actually clear that the SSRC was hit at the end of January.  David Barnett at Long War Journal was among many who picked up a few days afterward on satellite imagery shown by Israel’s Channel 2, which seemed to show the SSRC completely unscathed, after the date of the reported attack.  Barnett concluded that the IAF probably meant to attack only the truck convoy, which was in a parking lot close to the SSRC at the time of the strike.

If the IAF actually attacked the SSRC on 28 April, the urgency of hitting it may relate to the battle being waged in its vicinity at this very moment.  According to the Lebanese Daily Star, Assad’s forces are engaged in an all-out assault to retake the area around the compound from the rebels.  Fighting in the immediate vicinity of the SSRC increases the danger that its inventory will fall into rebel hands – and thence into the hands of Islamist jihadists, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda.

It’s also possible that Israel attacked something near the SSRC on Saturday, but not the SSRC itself.  One factor arguing for that assessment is that attacking the SSRC would be a big job.  There’s a lot of industrial square footage to thump; the IAF would want to put more than a couple of strike fighters over the target.  Ideally, there would be sequential strikes; I would envision two strike-fighter pairs delivering an initial ordnance package, followed by another wave of pairs an hour later delivering a second one.  Additional restrikes could well be necessary – if, that is, the objective is to “k-kill” the installation, or destroy it completely so that it could not be reconstituted within a timeframe useful to the current civil war.

If that’s not the objective, it’s hard to think of one that would justify putting IAF aircraft in Syrian air space in order to strike the SSRC.  Either you go in to take it out for the duration of the civil war, or you don’t hit it at all.

So perhaps the IAF visits have been for other purposes, and the SSRC hasn’t been hit.  Assad’s forces hold the compound itself and they may well be using it to marshal other kinds of military equipment, which, like the truck convoy in January, can from time to time present a lucrative target for the IAF.

It’s hard to say, without any idea of how big the reported attack was on Saturday.  If the Israelis did attack the SSRC, however, it’s a good bet that they did whatever was necessary to achieve a useful effect.  In our brave new world, someone will put out satellite imagery in a few days, and then we’ll have a better idea.

Originally published at the Optimistic Conservative.

Egypt is urging Palestinian Authority PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to postpone elections while trying to convince the rival Hamas terrorist organization to drop demands for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.

Holding elections at this time, which already is four years after Abbas’ mandate has expired, would torpedo efforts for a unity government, sauces told the Egyptian Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper.

The possibility of holding elections in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is virtually non-existent, according to the report. Sources also said that merging the Fatah and Hamas armies, both of which include terrorist units, would harm the process of reconciliation.

Hamas and Fatah underwent a bloody separation during a terrorist militia war in Gaza six years ago in which Fatah suffered heavy losses, leaving Abbas in charge of Judea and Samaria and Ismail Haniyeh as de facto Gaza Prime Minister of Gaza.

Since Hamas took over the Gaza strip in 2006, Gazans have been subjected to corruption and oppression at the hands of their Islamist rulers. Recently, several reports and testimonies have confirmed that Hamas rule has also meant Hamas involvement and control in a drug trade in Gaza.

Let’s examine the facts.

The Palestinian News Agency, WAFA, reported that Hamas leaders’ involvement in the drug trade and corruption has turned 680 Hamas leaders into Millionaires (that is 80 millionaires more than the 600 reported by the London-based Al-Sharq Al-Awsat) newspaper.

WAFA reported that the wealth came from controlling the smuggling of good through the tunnels with Egypt, including “alcohol and drugs,” describing Hamas leaders as “Gaza’s drug lords”.

In addition, the prominent Egyptian newspaper, al-Mesryoon, quoted Egyptian writer and academic Abdul Munim Saeed as saying that Hamas was the main importer and exporter of drugs into Gaza.

Egyptian security sources told the Al-Dostory Al-Asly newspaper that Hamas was charging tunnel smugglers ten percent of their proceedings, including those coming from drug trafficking.

The Islamic News Agency also published a report on Hamas’s drug trade in Gaza. In the report, Gazan public figures and intellectuals complained that Hamas let drug dealers out of jail within two or three days of their arrest, as Hamas’s judges “were very lenient on drug dealers” at the same time they were jailing Hamas’s political opponents.

A doctor who visited Gaza recently and who agreed to speak to me on the condition of anonymity, said he believed that Hamas controlled the drug trade in Gaza through importing and selling mood-altering drugs, particularly Tramadol, a drug used to treat pain, similar to codeine.  The doctor said he witnessed wide-spread use of the drug by Hamas fighters and that many Gazans use the drug to comfort themselves from their daily suffering under Hamas. “Only a government can import such huge amount of Tramadol,” he said. “Hamas must be directly involved in this matter.”

Even pro-Hamas writer Fayez Abu Shamaleh admitted that Tramadol has become a common-use drug in Gaza under Hamas.  He noted average street prices for drugs have dropped 80 percent in the last few years, making drugs accessible even by Gaza’s school children.

A Palestinian news website, Yabous Press reported that the drug trade in Gaza was controlled by Hamas’s Police Counter-Drug Unit, which is supposed to fight drugs. Yabous Press reported Hamas police would arrest drug dealers who don’t work for them, confiscating their drug supplies, and then selling it in the market for themselves.

In October 2012, several Palestinian news websites have been circulating the names of 66 Hamas government members known in Gaza for controlling the drug trade in Gaza including a son of a Hamas government minister.  As of now, Hamas has not commented or denied these reports.

Hamas has brought misery, pain and destruction to Gaza, so Hamas’s alleged involvement in narcotics trafficking should not come as a shock to anyone.

The recent re-election of Khaled Mashaal as Hamas leader has been interpreted by some Arab and Western analysts as a sign of the radical Islamist’s desire to march toward “moderation and pragmatism.”

Hamas, according to political analyst Ahmed Rafik Awad, chose the “moderate” Mashaal in order to avoid internal differences.

According to Awad, Mashal is known for his “balanced personality and centrist positions, making him an extremely acceptable figure in the Arab and international arena.”

Another analyst, Walid al-Mudalal, said that the re-election of Mashaal for another four years “would give him a chance to continue his effort to rearrange Hamas’s relations with the West and convince the West that Hamas is not its enemy.”

Some Western analysts have been quick to endorse this theory by pointing out that under Mashaal Hamas would adopt a new and moderate strategy, including accepting Israel’s right to exist.

Their argument is apparently based on remarks made by Mashaal [in English, of course, but not in Arabic] to the effect that Hamas is prepared to accept the two-state solution.

What the optimists are ignoring, however, is Mashaal’s assertion that acceptance of the two-state solution does not mean recognizing Israel’s right to exist.

Mashaal is, in fact, saying that Hamas will accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank [Judea and Samaria -.ed], Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem without giving up its struggle to eliminate Israel.

Hamas re-elected Mashaal not because he has become a pragmatist and a moderate. He was re-elected because Hamas believes that he has the skills to change the West’s attitude toward Hamas. There is, after all, nothing better than a leader who can appear on CNN and try to market Hamas as a peace-loving liberation movement.

Mashaal may be a charismatic and pragmatic man, but at the end of the day he will not be able to change Hamas’s charter calling for the destruction of Israel.

Nor will Mashaal be able to rein in Hamas’s armed wing, Izaddin al-Kassam, which is responsible for hundreds of suicide bombings and thousands of rocket attacks against Israel.

Al-Kassam has many commanders in the Gaza Strip who do not share Mashaal’s ostensible pragmatism and moderation. One of them is Mahmoud Zahar, an influential Hamas figure in the Gaza Strip.

Over the past two years, Mashaal has repeatedly failed to convince his rivals in Hamas to agree to unity with Fatah. When Mashaal signed the last Doha “reconciliation” agreement with Mahmoud Abbas in Qatar last year, most Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip came out against him.

So if Mashaal has been unable to convince his own movement to accept reconciliation with Fatah, he is less likely to persuade other Hamas figures and followers to abandon their radical ideology — let alone accept Israel’s right to exist.

Further evidence of the challenges facing the new-old leader of Hamas was provided this week when leaders of the Islamist movement in the Gaza Strip repeated their commitment to violence.

In response to statements made by U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland to the effect that Washington would not conduct any dialogue with Hamas, leaders of the movement reiterated their refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist or their own willingness to renounce violence.

“We categorically reject these statements,” said Hamas spokesman Ezat al-Risheq. “Hamas refuses to recognize the Zionist entity and the legitimacy of its occupation of Palestine,” he said. “Palestinian resistance is not terrorism, but a legitimate project in line with international laws.”

Hamas Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, also reaffirmed his movement’s refusal to recognize Israel and renounce terrorism.

Those who expect real changes in Hamas following the re-election of Mashaal are living in an illusion. Even if Mashaal himself changes, Hamas will always remain the same Hamas.

Originally published at the Gatestone Institute.

Authorities lifted a gag order Tuesday on the arrest and indictment of two Palestinian Authority terrorists, both in their 20s,  for stabbings of Jews in Samaria and in eastern Jerusalem.

One of the terrorists is student from a village in Samaria who stabbed a man at the Tapuach junction, causing moderate wounds. The attacker, Mistafa Aadel Barghouti confessed to the attack and also to involvement in attacks on soldiers as well. He said he acted alone and was not part of a terrorist cell.

The second terrorist was a member of Hamas and lives southwest of Hevron. Identified as Samer Ahmed Mahmoud Matar, he tried to murder a Jew in Jerusalem and confessed to searching for a Haredi Jew or settler as his victim.

He also considered planting a bomb on a public bus in Beit Shemesh, located 10 miles southwest of Jerusalem.