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December 10, 2016 / 10 Kislev, 5777

Posts Tagged ‘Abba Eban’

Neurologist Oliver Sacks Dies at Age 82 in New York City

Sunday, August 30th, 2015

Dr. Oliver Sacks, one if whose books was turned into an Academy Award-winning movie, died on Sunday in New York City at the age of 82.

He never married. Among his cousins are Nobel Prize Winner Robert Aumann of Israel and the late Abba Eban, former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations.

Sacks – a professor, writer and neurologist – authored more than a dozen books, including “Awakenings.” His book “The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat” helped demystify Tourette’s, Alzheimer’s.

He was professor of neurology and psychiatry at Columbia University between 2007 and 2012 and was on the clinical faculty of Yeshiva University’s Albert Einstein College of Medicine.

Dr. Sacks was born in London, from where he was evacuated during the Blitz. His best-selling books included case studies of people with neurological disorders.

After the war, he learned physiology and biology and later earned his medical degree at The Queen’s College, Oxford.

He later moved to Canada and then to the United States, where he learned neurology] and experimented with various recreational drugs, which he described in an article in The New Yorker three years ago and in his book “Hallucinations.”

Dr. Sacks was diagnosed with cancer this past January and wrote in The New York Times in February that he had “months” left in his life and wrote that he hoped the time he had left would be spent “in in the richest, deepest, most productive way I can”.

Tzvi Ben-Gedalyahu

What Just Happened to the Peace Talks?!

Friday, April 4th, 2014

To anyone who has been through a few rounds of these peace talks over the years, it was kind of obvious that they were going to have to collapse. What wasn’t obvious was how, when or what excuse would be given.

Abba Eban once incorrectly said that the Arabs “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” I say incorrectly because he assumed that the Arabs must have the same desire and goal for peace as he did, and they just keep messing it up.

But that statement is wrong because the underlying assumption is wrong. The Palestinian Authority is not interested in peace. At least not in the way Abba Eban understood it.

The Palestinian Authority was obtaining the release of some very horrible terrorists, a lot of them, and even lots more of them in the future. If the leaks were even partly true, they were, in their salami method, getting some seriously bad concessions from Israel, and they were doing it with the help of the most friendliest, pro-PA, anti-Israel government in US history.

And all they had to do was keep talking.

Yet they threw it all away.


It wasn’t because they weren’t getting major concessions in the talks, they were, and over time they would have gotten even more.

It wasn’t because they were being forced to offer any concessions in return – because they weren’t.

Well, except for one nonnegotiable.

Netanyahu demanded they acknowledge Israel as the Jewish state.

This would mean ending the fight, and recognizing the Jewish right to the land of Israel, and admitting that Israel was making concessions to the PA. But primarily it meant declaring an official end to the war and trying to destroy Israel.

Look at one of the precondition demands the PA made yesterday.

They demanded that 15,000 PA citizens be granted Israeli citizenship. Does that really jive with the narrative that they want their own state for their own people, or does that jive better with the fact that they still want to destroy Israel and overrun it with Arabs? The answer speaks for itself.

The PA collapsed the peace talks, most likely because they were reaching that point, just like they reached that point in the past, where they had to decide, do they want to be a normal, productive country, or do they want to continue to try to destroy Israel.

The answer is clearly the latter, and perhaps partially, because they have no culture to be the former.

But unfortunately, as experience shows, this doesn’t mean the end of the peace talks. It means the end of this round, and at some point they’ll be started up again.

Perhaps after (yet another) unilateral declaration of statehood. Perhaps after a UN vote. Perhaps after another intifada (which Israel will win). Perhaps next week, if the US gives them a big present.

And the game will continue. The talks will restart, and they’ll reach the point near the end, where they’ll collapse again, for only one reason, because a signed peace agreement won’t allow for the destruction of Israel.


Israel, Twenty Years after Oslo

Friday, September 13th, 2013

On September 13 it will be twenty years since the Oslo Agreements were signed.

Today’s political situation in the Middle East is far from the one perceived by Abba Eban when I interviewed him a few months later. He said at the time, “Never have Israelis and Arabs been meeting in so many ways in Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, Ottawa, Rome and our region. Militarily, the Arabs have been very unsuccessful against Israel. Now they want to be free of the traumas of defeat.”

Eban’s interview was one among 16 with prominent Israelis for my book Israel’s New Future, published in early 1994 and recently reissued. It dealt with both internal and external Israeli perspectives after Oslo.

However greatly Israel’s internal situation has changed, the present reality of the outside world is even more different from what it was 20 years ago.

Israel’s current position in the Middle East is more complex than it has been in a long time. For many decades, Israel’s relations were good or at least correct with one or more of the three powers dominating the area – Turkey, Iran and Egypt. This is no longer the case.

Relations with Iran, Israel’s ally under the Shah, have been abysmal since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979. Yet at the time of Oslo, there were no significant signs of the country’s leadership’s genocidal intentions.

In Egypt, hostility to Israel was increasingly evident during the rule of Egyptian President Morsi, who was overthrown two months ago. The situation under Egypt’s current government can best be described as puzzling.

Israel’s relations with previous Turkish governments were usually good. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has for years now aimed to weaken Turkish-Israeli relations.

Already in 2004 he falsely accused Israel of state terrorism. And Steven Merley, who specializes in the study of political extremism, uncovered details implicating the Turkish government in many aspects of the preparation of the 2010 Gaza flotilla.

Another important change since 1993 is that Israel’s standing in European public opinion has greatly eroded. Concessions made by Israel to the Palestinians in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, as well as its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, are long forgotten there.

Studies show that large numbers of Europeans hold a demonic view of Israel. They agree with the statement “Israel is carrying out a war of extermination against the Palestinians.”

In Norway, 38 percent of the adult population believes Israel behaves toward the Palestinians like the Nazis behaved toward the Jews.

In Israel’s New Future, political scientist Dan Segre was already saying – this was nearly two decades ago, remember – that Europe had a real problem with Israel:

“It wants from Israel a point of flash in territorial concessions without paying attention to the damage these may cause to the whole body as far as the defense capabilities of Israel are concerned.”

Segre added that Israel “has shown in the 45 years of its history how an undeveloped country can modernize, whereas many of the foreign European colonies are collapsing.”

Israel’s success, which contrasted so glaringly with Europe’s failures, was frustrating for many Europeans.

Already twenty years ago it was also clear that many of Israel’s political, military, cultural and economic experiences were precursors to what would later take place in the Western world. In other words, to a certain extent Israel was functioning as a “laboratory for the West.”

Looking back twenty years, a major issue unnoticed by the interviewees was that the manner in which the Palestinian Authority educated its children was a key indicator of the PA’s true intentions.

The inability of the prominent Israelis interviewed at the time to foresee the importance of this should be cause for deep concern regarding the accuracy of current “expert” forecasts on important issues.

Yet another decisive development since the book originally appeared is the ongoing incitement against Israel by Palestinian sources. While the PLO and Arafat were in exile they could not promote hate against Israel on the massive scale that both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas have done since. The Palestinians have gained many allies from this incitement.

To be sure, Israel received some benefits from the Oslo Accords, including diplomatic relations with more countries. In the long run however, the damage caused by the massive and ongoing Palestinian and Arab incitement may far exceed whatever benefits it gained from the agreements.

Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld

PA President, Taking Cue from Obama, Demanding State Map

Friday, April 5th, 2013

After decades, perhaps centuries, in which we, Jews, have been able to count on the Arabs to rescue us from the catastrophic errors of our own leaders by committing even worse errors—as the late Abba Eban put it: The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity—we may be up against the first Arab who is a whole lot better than us at using opportunities, and how.

Mahmoud Abbas, whom Arabs and Israelis call by his nom de guerre Abu Mazen, has figured out how to outmaneuver his opponent, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and how to defeat the greatest democracy with the strongest army in the region. Frankly, the only real hope Israel has at the moment is that some Palestinian idiot would assassinate the crafty Abbas, and leave Netanyahu to deal with leaders to whom he can measure up.

Secretary of State John Kerry is coming to town next week, ready to twist Israeli arms, and we might as well face up to it: the Obama and Kerry visits have been planned as a one-two punch, with Abu Mazen being heavily prompted to let America do the job for him.

When Barack Obama was making nice with our children in Jerusalem, he made a statement that, at the time, sounded like a rebuke to the Palestinians, who had been insisting that the precondition to renewing talks on peace with the Israelis is a new settlement freeze.

That one was right out of Abba Eban’s book of missing opportunities. Netanyahu tried a settlement freeze early on in his second term. It didn’t bring the Arabs to the table, but it did create a fervent resentment against him among settlers, who responded by doubling Naftali Bennett’s Jewish Home Knesset faction, all at the expense of Bibi’s Likud party.

Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security are “the core issue,” Obama told Abbas in Ramallah. “If we solve those two problems, the settlement problem will be solved.”

It wasn’t a rebuke, it was golden advise, it was the kind of strategic thinking the Palestinians had not been able to generate, with the glaring exception of the UN assembly statehood vote – which was Abu Mazen’s brainchild, he managed to break the fundamental rules of the Oslo Accords and got away with it relatively unscathed.

Now the PA president has announced that he won’t be asking for settlements freeze as a precondition, he wants to see a map instead. Let Mr. Netanyahu bring to the first meeting of the new round of negotiations his version of where the new Palestinian state should be.

It sounds so harmless. After all, what’s more logical than starting the wheeling and dealing with each side showing where they think the new border should run in the future. One side wants this much, the other side wants only this much – and they’ll reach a compromise.

In reality, this demand robs Netanyahu of his entire arsenal of negotiation moves. In Netanyahu’s play book, you get to map drawing in the distant future, years from now, after a lengthy series of small moves, tweaks, minute gestures, back and forth. If he shows his map at the start, then the future borders become the one and only topic of negotiations, everything else is moot, the battle has been lost before it began.

Meanwhile, AFP reports, President Mahmoud Abbas will temporarily refrain from unilateral action against Israel at the UN and other international arenas, to give U.S.-brokered peace talks a chance to resume.

For a couple of months, the Palestinians will nobly “refrain from taking a case against Israel to the International Criminal Court,” an anonymous Palestinian source told AFP.

But the same official warned that if Israel failed to halt settlement building, the PA would immediately begin working through the international bodies again.

“Settlement building in E1 is a red line and erecting so much as one stone in the area … would destroy the two-state solution,” he said.

Speaking of stones, the PA has been utilizing those very well, along with firebombs, sending bands of angry, unemployed youths to literally get themselves killed by challenging IDF units all across Judea and Samaria. Two Arab teenagers have already been killed, and young Arabs in the Hebron area continued to clash with Israeli troops all day Thursday, protesting the death of Maysara Abu Hamdiyeh, who was serving a long prison sentence for attempted murder, in Israeli custody. Abu Hamdiyeh died from cancer which the Israeli prison system failed to cure.

Yori Yanover

Learning From Mistakes: A Counterintuitive Approach

Wednesday, December 19th, 2012

It was the late Abba Eban who famously said that “the Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” In his time that was for the most part true, and it arguably worked for Israel’s benefit, particularly when Israel found itself in a tight diplomatic squeeze.

More recently, however, Israel’s enemies have learned a few things, most especially how David-and-Goliath warfare plays out in the contemporary world. Without tanks and aircraft to challenge Israel’s dominance in traditional military terms, the quasi-military tactics of intifada, “nuisance” rockets and cease-fires have served the Palestinian and jihadist causes far better than the Egyptian and Syrian armies had in previous decades.

Moreover, of even greater significance for the longer term has been the repeated shellacking taken by Israel through diplomatic means, beginning with Sadat, flourishing with Arafat, and continuing to the present.

For decades there has hardly been a forum, military confrontation or terrorist catastrophe that hasn’t called into question Israeli culpability, no matter the facts. To the so-called international community, the Israeli voice has essentially become inconsequential.

The success of anti-Israel diplomacy and public relations is not due to Israeli ignorance of modern technology. After all, Israel is responsible for a vastly disproportionate percentage of telecommunications and Internet technology. But their effective use in making Israel’s case is something else entirely.

With the important exception of the remarkable achievement(s) of AIPAC in championing Israeli policy to the U.S. Congress, Israeli efforts on the diplomatic and public-relations fronts – for years the ones that truly count – have floundered or failed.

Since the world’s admiration for Israel peaked in 1967, the anti-Israel phenomenon, if that’s what it is, has moved from a consensus for mild condemnation to a growing clamor for delegitimization.

Some may ascribe this to anti-Semitism, but that too easily would explain a lot and yet nothing, with no prospect for improving much of anything.

Simply put, Israel has been outplayed. Only Israel can bloody an enemy whose defeat is then declared a victory. Hasn’t this happened too often – with the PLO, Hizbullah and Hamas – to be dismissed as merely false boasting on the part of Israel’s adversaries? It certainly has, and it’s not trivial.

With Arab recognition that conventional warfare with Israel is a non-starter, terrorist jabs and international pressure now define the war being waged against Israel. The former element, of course, is dealt with daily by Israeli leaders as well as probably any government could – with active intelligence, the security wall, missile shields, etc.

On the battleground of international pressure, however, Israel has been less than smart and repeatedly beaten.

Its most recent loss, that of the UN General Assembly’s vote to grant non-member status to Palestine, may actually prove helpful in finding a way out of the loser’s box. In the face of the inevitable adoption of the Palestine resolution, could Israel have done something to help itself? Yes – it could have voted for the resolution. Not because it favored it but because it could have avoided defeat while shaping the vote.

Briefly, the reality was that the resolution would pass but presumably have no effect “on the ground.” Its immediate consequence would be the perceived defeat of Israeli policy, along with the more significant possibility that non-member status could lead Palestine to initiate legal and other proceedings (such as war crime trials) against Israel. Worse still, down those roads lie the threats of economic and other sanctions from hostile forums.

The UN resolution could not create a state with borders, government, armed forces, controllable resources, etc. Everything it could do, though, was clearly unstoppable by Israel. Yet there was one thing Israel could do to snatch a tie from defeat. In the process, Israel would not have needed to waste diplomatic capital with the U.S., Canada and the few others who also voted against the resolution or abstained. Indeed, a unanimous vote favoring the resolution would have diminished its meaning and serve to spit in the UN’s eye (a not unworthy thing in itself).

Think about it: a vote in favor of the resolution, based on Israeli policy, would have been wise. Before casting its vote, the Israeli ambassador could have explained as follows: that Israel, as Prime Minister Netanyahu has said, favors two states living side by side in peace; that it hopes to negotiate such a long-term arrangement with a Palestinian state capable of entering into and honoring agreements defining borders, control of resources, and non-military police powers, etc; and that while it may dispute certain aspects of the proposed resolution, it seeks to further peace by ignoring the resolution’s flaws and voting for the prospect of a responsible Palestinian state. (Others, no doubt, would have added their voices in like manner, joining Israel.)

Arnold S. Mazur

After the Mendacity Came the Aggression

Wednesday, October 6th, 2010

On Oct. 8, 1973, two days after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban delivered the following address to the UN General Assembly. Of particular interest are the references to Anwar Sadat, whose image had not as yet been transformed into that of a peace-seeking visionary, and to the foresight of Israeli leaders in refusing to relinquish any territory in the absence of a workable and sustainable peace treaty.

There is not a single man or woman in this hall or outside it who does not know, in the depths of his heart, that Egypt and Syria have dealt a heavy and sudden blow to the most cherished of human causes – the cause of international peace.

The premeditated and unprovoked assault which they launched across the cease-fire lines on the Day of Atonement, 6 October 1973, will surely rank in future history as one of the basest and most odious acts for which governments have ever been responsible. It is Israel’s unshakable resolve that this assault shall be frustrated and repelled. If it were to have any success, the hope of peace would die.

Let there be no doubt that this attempt to smash the cease-fire structure is a massive violation of international law. The cease-fire is an international agreement. It was accepted by Egypt, Syria and Israel, in response to a decision of the Security Council, in which all three governments concurred.

The Resolution of the Security Council, S/RES/233 of 6 June 1967, reads: “The Security Council calls upon the governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area.”

Israeli and Egyptian consent was soon expressed, and within thirty hours the cease-fire was formalized on the ground. A few days later, the Security Council decided (S/RES/235) that “the governments of Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council’s demand for a cease-fire” and demanded “that hostilities should cease forthwith.”

This mutual commitment by Syria and Israel has never been repudiated by either government. Indeed, both have invoked it in complaints and demands to the Security Council.

The Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was in force by mutual agreement until 1968. On that date, the Egyptian government announced that it was repudiating the cease-fire. It was later explained that it proposed to wage what it called a “war of attrition.” The “war of attrition” achieved no result except the death of many hundreds; the devastation of large areas near the Suez Canal; and growing involvements of the Middle East in the policies and rivalries of Great Powers.

In the summer of 1970, Egypt and Israel, through the good offices of the United States, renewed the cease-fire, which came into effect on 7 August 1970. It was a moment of high relief for the Middle East and the world. It seemed to illuminate a new vision and a new hope. For, together with the cease-fire, the two governments agreed to solve their remaining disputes by negotiation. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 242, Israel undertook that, on the establishment of peace, it would withdraw its armed forces to the boundaries which would be determined in the peace agreement.

Thus a clear international consensus emerged concerning the method of attaining peace in the Middle East. The stages were clear. First: cease-fire; second: negotiation; third: agreement on the conditions of co-existence, including the territorial settlement; fourth: withdrawal to the agreed boundaries on the establishment of permanent peace.

To this policy of maintaining the cease-fire and offering negotiations on the final settlement I pledged Israel anew in my address to the General Assembly on 3 October. The Syrian representative in the debate pledged his government to a policy of eternal war. The Egyptian foreign minister, probably knowing what lay ahead, merely postponed his address from last week to the next. He knew what he was doing. The treacherous assault was at a high stage of preparation.

* * * * *


Let us recall the situation on the eve of the Egyptian and Syrian aggression. The cease-fire was in general stability. There were occasional encounters between air patrols and other unplanned collisions – but they left the cease-fire and the cease-fire lines intact.

The hope of negotiation was in the air. It drew strength from the success of negotiation in other regions. There were proposals for us to be here again next month to explore the prospect of dialogue. There was a general sentiment about the futility of public polemics, which have never advanced any dispute toward a solution.

Israel, of course, was resolved not to abandon the agreed cease-fire lines before there was a viable peace. This week’s events have shown how right we were. But we were prepared for the dialogue which would bring peace and the negotiation of agreed boundaries together.

Across the horizon, bleak, gray, but not entirely bereft of hope, came the answer from Egypt and Syria. Their answer to the vision of a peaceful, developing Middle East was to fill the region with blood and tears and rancorous passion. Anything except dialogue. Anything rather than negotiation. Anything except the respect of existing engagements and the quest for new agreements. Anything but that.

The deathly drama evolved quickly – but it had its prelude. Six hours before the outbreak [of war], a telegram reached me from Jerusalem telling me that authentic information, as well as the evidence on the ground, indicated that there was going to be a joint Egyptian and Syrian attack later in the day, with the aim of crossing the cease-fire line at the Suez Canal and the cease-fire line at Golan.

Two hours later, diplomatic representatives in Israel, beginning with the envoy of the United States, which had sponsored the cease-fire, were informed of this expectation. The United States Ambassador was informed, several hours before the assault, that Israel would not take any preemptive action, would bear the sacrifice which that renunciation implied, but would, of course, repel any Egyptian or Syrian movement. His government and, later, other governments were invited to inform Cairo and Damascus and others accordingly. Similar exchanges were held here in New York at foreign minister level.

We know the answer. Egypt first invented an imaginary sea battle with imaginary Israeli ships, at an imaginary place, at an imaginary time: the most dramatic nonexistent battle in the history of war. This was alleged to have taken place hours after Egypt’s plan of attack was revealed and communicated by us to other governments. Egypt and Syria have no evidence whatever to show for this falsehood – for the simple reason that it is a falsehood – by which millions of people in this country and others have been insulted.

After the mendacity came the aggression, an attack from north and south, with the cease-fire lines crossed in heavy force.

* * * * *


There are two circumstances here which are deeply impressed on our minds and which will be engraved in our memories whenever we come to consider what our security demands, what kind of adversaries we face. First, there is the choice of the day. There is only one day in the year on which there is a virtual paralysis of internal and external communications, on which [Israel] turns aside from all material concern, unique in the spiritual calendar of mankind, an intense celebration of reflection and of humility.

The logistic effects of the Day of Atonement are that there is no communication between Israel and the outside world on any normal level and not even within the country itself.

This gross mendacity about an Israeli initiative is refuted by the United Nations Observers’ Report (S/7930), which reports to you specifically about Egyptian encroachments across the cease-fire line, about Syrian encroachments across the cease-fire line. Where in that, or in any other document, is there the slightest reference to any Israeli encroachment across the cease-fire line? What is the independent evidence that the foreign ministers of Egypt and Syria are able to bring in support of their invented myth about the non-existent ship passing silently in the non-existent night?

There is also the evidence of normal common sense. Across the world, people must be asking themselves this question: How idiotic would a man have to be to believe that on a day when there were no communications, no activity, no radio, no ability to summon reserves, when the vast majority of our soldiers were in their homes or synagogues, when even forward posts were manned at minimal level – that precisely on that day Israel would launch a war, on the day holiest to all those who cherish Jewish solidarities, in order to invite thousands of Egyptian and Syrian tanks to attack across a relatively undefended and totally quiescent line?

No, there is no doubt: Egypt and Syria exploited the physical vulnerability arising from a spiritual vocation which the Jewish people can never renounce.

Egypt concentrated for this assault more than 3,000 tanks, 2,000 guns, nearly 1,000 aircraft and, according to Egyptian spokesmen, 600,000 men, all armed with weapons of Soviet manufacture of the most modern type, including bombers, ground missiles, missile boats. Against them, on the first day, were regular Israeli garrisons in the most defensive posture that a nation can ever dream of allowing itself in a situation of regional tension.

And on the Syrian side, 1,000 tanks and corresponding numbers of weapons in the air.

Now all that brutal force crashed unprovoked across the cease-fire line.

* * * * *


We have suffered tragic losses of life and blood. Egypt and Syria have suffered much more, as the result of their leaders’ cynical aggression. But President Sadat once told us that he would not care if a million people were killed, provided that he secured his objective.

I admit that the sacrilegious exploitation of the Day of Atonement and Israel’s renunciation, during those critical hours, of preventive action, have cost us dear, but the Egyptian and Syrian advantage has been and will be brief. Israeli forces are now successfully repelling the enemy on both fronts.

It is vital that Egyptian and Syrian forces shall not be allowed to remain anywhere beyond the cease-fire lines. The replacement of cease-fire lines by mutually accepted permanent boundaries must be done by negotiation and peace, not by treacherous, unprovoked, “Pearl Harbor” attacks.

Finally, pending the further elaboration of our position at a meeting, which I understand has been requested, of the Security Council, I want to say something about the lessons of this experience.

First, about the nature of the hostility that we face: The nature of that hostility is such that no security concern can be exaggerated. When President Sadat said in an Egyptian newspaper that he admired Hitler, all the world smiled indulgently. The Soviet Union, which had resisted Hitler heroically but belatedly, went on supplying arms. Other nations shrugged their shoulders. When the Egyptian prime minister praised the murder of pilgrims and tourists at Lod, we were told “it is only propaganda.” Anti-Semitic literature abounds in Cairo, a spiritual heroin, fraught with death and decay.

There is too much international indulgence for that hostility . We really must take Egyptian and Syrian statements of hostility at their face value.

Second, there is one nightmare that will always be in Israeli minds, no matter what the future may bring: Imagine that in a mood of suicidal stupidity we had gone back to the previous armistice lines instead of negotiating boundaries in the framework of peace. If we had performed that folly, then the attacks of 6 October, springing from close at hand at our very throats and hearts, would have done such destruction to our vital security that perhaps Israel and all its people, and all the memories, hopes and visions which have moved our history, might now all be lost – lost, swept away in a fearful massacre.

How right we were to insist on negotiating with the utmost precision the boundaries of a peace settlement! How wrong were those who counseled us otherwise! For there are three things that are vital, not only to Israel’s existence and security, but to the peace of the Middle East: first, peace itself; second, negotiation as the pathway to peace; and third, within the framework of a negotiated peace, the stability of secure boundaries which will give some assurance against the prospect of fatal injury to our nation arising from the kind of sudden assault that took place a few days ago.

There are, of course, other horizons beyond this, but the immediate task, to which we are giving all our mind and heart and sacrifice, is to restore the entire structure of the cease-fire.

The cease-fire consists of two elements: abstention from fighting, and the lines and positions agreed by the parties as the lines and positions of the cease-fire.

At this very solemn and tragic hour, we cannot help but think back upon the waste and the anguish and the avoidable suffering of the past two decades. All our Arab neighbors together, which are developing countries, have spent in this period something like 20,000 million [20 billion] dollars on war. The result: nothing. The achievement: nothing.

If it is said that this war is on behalf and for the sake of [Arab] refugees, the tiniest fraction of that expenditure would have been sufficient to solve all the refugee problems in the Middle East fifty times over. This, then, is the lesson of the uselessness and the waste of hostility.

But at this moment we have a more urgent concern. It is to bring the bloodshed to a halt and the cease-fire back to its integrity by ensuring that no Egyptian or Syrian forces shall remain beyond the legitimate and agreed cease-fire lines.

It is from that point, and only from that point, that we should take our further journey toward the horizons of peace.

Abba Eban was a career Israeli diplomat and politician, serving in a variety of positions including ambassador to the U.S. and the UN, member of Knesset, foreign minister and deputy prime minister. He passed away at age 87 on November 17, 2002.

Abba Eban

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