Sovereign peoples act accordingly, but, ”When you have no self-respect, you cannot expect anybody else will respect you,” as Rabbi David Bar-Hayim of Machon Shilo noted last year concerning Operation Pillar of Defense.

Why did Israel agree to a cease-fire with Hamas in November? Why did it surrender Joseph’s Tomb in 2000 and destroy Gush Katif in 2005? In present day, why has Israel granted terrorist Samer Issawi early release following a hunger strike?

A common response from supporters of Israel is that these decisions result from pressure by the American government. In response to the Palestinian Authority’s current demand for 120 terrorists to be freed, MK Orit Struck (HaBayit HaYehudi) has made a similar claim.

The assertion of American pressure in these contexts is simultaneously valid, irrelevant, and pernicious. Of course different American governments have pressured Israel—all too successfully—to make decisions that endanger citizens’ lives and betray Judaic duties.

But why has American pressure succeeded? To borrow from the national anthem, it is because Israel does not conduct itself as an am chofshi b’artzenu (free people in our Land). Rabbi Bar-Hayim has described the preoccupation with American pressure as “a remnant of the galut [exile]” and elaborates as follows:

The extent to which the Americans can really influence our actions is in my view almost entirely dependent on ourselves. If we give them the reason to believe…that we can be pressured into doing something, they’ll of course do as they wish to do. If we, however, conduct ourselves in such a way by which we make clear to all and sundry that we’re not about to listen to what anyone has to say about what we should do—but rather we’re going to do what we think we should do—I believe in a very short space of time most of these pressures would cease to exist. (See 1:18:10 here.)

Focus on American pressure is pernicious because it evades from holding Israeli leadership accountable for its failure to protect citizens. This often turns into rationalization by way of “explanation”—the “Bibi’s hands were tied by Obama” sort of mentality. The evasive focus on America then perpetuates a state of affairs where Israelis suffer anxiety about mundane activities like children walking to school and driving in fear of lethal rock attacks.

When Israel decides to be a sovereign country in substance and not just name, these disgusting realities will change. Blaming foreigners, however hostile they may be, yields only further self-delusion and suffering.

Several websites have picked up on a UPI report that the Israeli Air Force attacked a chemical weapons site in the Damascus area on Saturday. (Here’s the original UPI report). The report is unconfirmed by any official source, but it is credible.  There are caveats, however.

The site in question, if it was struck, was probably the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), long known to be a key facility in Assad’s chemical and biological weapons program.  (See here as well.)

The blogger, “Mossomo” at Flopping Aces put together an excellent timeline back in February on the events leading up to a previous unconfirmed report that the IAF had struck the SSRC.  This strike was reportedly conducted on 30 January 2013. Hours later, Israel targeted a truck convoy west of Damascus which was carrying sophisticated new surface-to-air missiles for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

I doubt the convoy’s cargo itself was related to the chemical weapons site; if Israel went after both targets in January, it was because they were close, geographically, and Israeli military authorities wanted to maximize the gain from a rare and dangerous penetration of Syrian air space.

But it’s not actually clear that the SSRC was hit at the end of January.  David Barnett at Long War Journal was among many who picked up a few days afterward on satellite imagery shown by Israel’s Channel 2, which seemed to show the SSRC completely unscathed, after the date of the reported attack.  Barnett concluded that the IAF probably meant to attack only the truck convoy, which was in a parking lot close to the SSRC at the time of the strike.

If the IAF actually attacked the SSRC on 28 April, the urgency of hitting it may relate to the battle being waged in its vicinity at this very moment.  According to the Lebanese Daily Star, Assad’s forces are engaged in an all-out assault to retake the area around the compound from the rebels.  Fighting in the immediate vicinity of the SSRC increases the danger that its inventory will fall into rebel hands – and thence into the hands of Islamist jihadists, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda.

It’s also possible that Israel attacked something near the SSRC on Saturday, but not the SSRC itself.  One factor arguing for that assessment is that attacking the SSRC would be a big job.  There’s a lot of industrial square footage to thump; the IAF would want to put more than a couple of strike fighters over the target.  Ideally, there would be sequential strikes; I would envision two strike-fighter pairs delivering an initial ordnance package, followed by another wave of pairs an hour later delivering a second one.  Additional restrikes could well be necessary – if, that is, the objective is to “k-kill” the installation, or destroy it completely so that it could not be reconstituted within a timeframe useful to the current civil war.

If that’s not the objective, it’s hard to think of one that would justify putting IAF aircraft in Syrian air space in order to strike the SSRC.  Either you go in to take it out for the duration of the civil war, or you don’t hit it at all.

So perhaps the IAF visits have been for other purposes, and the SSRC hasn’t been hit.  Assad’s forces hold the compound itself and they may well be using it to marshal other kinds of military equipment, which, like the truck convoy in January, can from time to time present a lucrative target for the IAF.

It’s hard to say, without any idea of how big the reported attack was on Saturday.  If the Israelis did attack the SSRC, however, it’s a good bet that they did whatever was necessary to achieve a useful effect.  In our brave new world, someone will put out satellite imagery in a few days, and then we’ll have a better idea.

Originally published at the Optimistic Conservative.

A fight that erupted at a meeting in the Public Security Ministry Monday sent one woman to the hospital for injuries suffered by the attacker, who has been ordered to take a two-week “cooling off” vacation.

The head of the firearms department barged into a workers’ committee meeting and protested his not being invited. When the woman who was chairing the meeting asked him to leave, the man allegedly attacker her, and a fight broke out.

The man then filed a complaint with police, apparently against those who hit him, and his superiors told him to leave work for two weeks and then appear at a meeting with the director of the ministry.

By that time, the woman may be out of the hospital, the alleged attacker may have cooled down, and the ministry can get back to taking care of public security instead of its own security.

Jewish thought has never been subtle about life and death, the “blessing” and the “curse.” For Israel, the individual Jew writ large, there exists a fixed and overriding obligation to stay alive.

Although this injunction may hardly come as any sort of surprise, and may hardly seem to merit any claim of significant insight, it does stand in notably stark contrast to the worldview of some of Israel’s principal enemies in the region. More precisely, in order to deal gainfully with a still steadily nuclearizing Iran, and with a determinedly sovereign Palestine, Israel will quickly have to understand certain alien points of view.

The sources of danger for Israel are unambiguous. In a readily decipherable hierarchy of threats, Israel now confronts death and destruction from two increasingly plausible directions: (1) the already-constituted state of Iran, which may ultimately decide to act against Israel in presumed conformance with the end-times expectations of a Shiite apocalypse, and (2) the aspiring state of “Palestine,” which, if shaped by jihadist visions of Sunni Hamas, could decide to make a common war cause with Tehran.

Singly, for Israel, the attack dangers from Iran or Palestine that could derive from any religiously based inversion of life and death, of “blessing” and “curse,” would be considerable and daunting.

Together, perhaps in various unrecognized or even unimagined synergies, the interactive effects of these two particular adversaries could portend very serious and possibly existential concerns for Israel.

These regional enemy inversions of life and death, of “blessing” and “curse,” are rendered more worrisome by (1) the international community’s ritualized unwillingness to remove Iran’s illegal nuclear weapons infrastructure; (2) President Obama’s continuing support for a two-state solution; and, (3) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s grudging but official acceptance of a Palestinian state that has been “demilitarized.”

The Palestinian side (Hamas, Fatah, it makes little real difference) seeks a one-state solution. On all their maps, Israel is drawn as a segment of “Palestine.” As for a demilitarized Palestine, it would never actually happen. This is true, in part, because any post-independence abrogation of earlier pre-state agreements to demilitarize, by a now-sovereign Palestinian state, could be incontestably permissible under authoritative international law.

What shall Israel do in this increasingly confusing regional maelstrom? If Obama’s openly expressed wish for “a world free of nuclear weapons” were ever realized, the survival issue would become moot. Without its nuclear arms, Israel could not endure for very long. Fortunately, this presidential wish is not only foolish but plainly unrealistic. Inevitably, of course, Israel will insist upon retaining the critical deterrence benefits of its essential nuclear forces.

The extent of this particular benefit, however, may vary, inter alia, according to a number of important factors. These include Jerusalem’s observable willingness to take its bomb out of the “basement,” that is, to make certain limited disclosures of the country’s usable and penetration-capable nuclear forces. Also relevant is the extent to which Israel might choose to reveal selected elements of Tel-Aviv’s nuclear targeting doctrine.

From the standpoint of successful deterrence, it will make a major difference if Israel’s nuclear forces are recognizably counter value (targeted on enemy cities), or counterforce (targeted on enemy weapons, and related infrastructures). In turn, Israel’s decisions on targeting policy may be affected, more or less, by ongoing regime transformations still taking place across the Middle East and North Africa.

“For what can be done against force, without force?” inquired the Roman statesman Cicero. The use of force in world politics is not inherently evil. To the contrary, in preventing nuclear and terrorist aggressions, force, though assuredly not a panacea, is almost always indispensable.

All states have a fundamental (“peremptory,” in the language of formal jurisprudence) right of self-defense. This right is explicit in both codified and customary international law. It can be found, in part, at Article 51 of the UN Charter; also, in multiple clarifications of anticipatory self-defense, a doctrine I have discussed often on these pages.

Israel has legal right to forcibly confront the expected and possibly mutually reinforcing harms of Iranian nuclear missile strikes, and Palestinian terror.

Again, Cicero understood. Failure to use force against a murderous evil imprints an indelible stain upon all that is good. A similar point can be found in the Talmud, which asserts that by being merciful to the cruel, one may become cruel to the merciful. Any such “mercy” must be firmly rejected by both individual Jews, and by the Jewish state.

President Barack Obama’s visit to Israel constituted a welcome, long overdue outreach to the Israeli people, who have received him warmly and enthusiastically.

The bond that ties Israelis and Americans is deep, and encompasses shared values, common strategic challenges, and the closest military and intelligence cooperation to date.

The visit’s timing, however, was directly linked to Iran’s continued march towards a nuclear weapon, and Obama’s concern over potential Israeli military action, despite attempts by the U.S. president and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to present a united front on the Iranian threat.

The U.S. President used the visit to speak directly to Israelis, and tried to set up a channel of communication with them over the head of Netanyahu.

This is why he declined to speak at the Israeli Knesset, and urged the Israeli public to pressure Netanyahu to restart the diplomatic process with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

During the visit, Obama and Netanyahu worked hard to generate an image of warmth and friendship among one another, and tried to undo years of public and damaging clashes.

Yet it remains apparent that the two leaders remain out of sync on the most urgent and serious threat to global security: Iran’s nuclear program.

The disagreement does not stem, as it once did, from differences in intelligence assessments of Iran’s nuclear progress. Today, the intelligence communities of both counties agree that Iran is close to a nuclear breakout phase.

A glance at the International Atomic Energy Agency’s February report reveals the disturbing fact that Iran continues to make good progress in its uranium enrichment project, while stalling for time through round after round of fruitless discussions with the international community.

Although sanctions are causing real harm to Iran’s economy, and stirring up resentment among ordinary Iranians, they have not yet managed to cause Tehran to change its mind on its nuclear program.

Iran currently possesses just under 170 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent (medium enriched uranium) according to the IAEA, meaning that it needs between 60 to 90 more kilograms to have enough for its first atomic weapon.

Israeli defense observers note that that final enrichment process, from medium to high enriched uranium, is the easiest and fastest phase.

Meanwhile, Iran has recently installed faster centrifuges at its Natanz uranium facility, a factor that will speed up the enrichment process. IAEA inspectors seeking access to Iran’s classified Parchin military site, where a suspected nuclear trigger is being developed, have been blocked at every turn.

These developments lie at the heart of Obama’s visit. Behind closed doors, it seems reasonable to assume, Obama sought to ascertain how close a potential Israeli strike might be.

He may also have sought to dissuade Netanyahu from acting alone.

Publicly, at least, Netanyahu and Obama agreed on a way to present their differences in a useful way.

During Obama’s three-day visit, both leaders stressed the right of their respective countries to take military action.

Obama acknowledged Israel’s right to “make its own decisions when it comes to the awesome decision to engage in any kind of military action, and Israel is differently situated than the United States.”

Going even further, Obama implicitly recognized that Washington’s red line for action was significantly behind that of Israel’s. “I would not expect that the prime minister would make a decision about his country’s security and defer that to any other country, any more than the United States would defer our decisions about what was important for our national security,” he said.

This, then, is the new public American-Israeli stance. The U.S. will not let Iran go nuclear, but is willing to let its sanctions experiment play out, while Israel, because of its more limited strike capabilities, cannot wait much longer before it loses the ability to act.

Because Israel’s core defense doctrine is based on the principle of never entrusting the Jewish people’s fate to others – even the best of allies – Israel may go it alone, with American approval, if Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei does not freeze his nuclear program soon.

It is far from clear whether these public stances are reflections of the positions privately held by Netanyahu and Obama.

Khamenei, for his part, wasted little time in responding to the messages coming out of Jerusalem, threatening to “annihilate Tel Aviv and Haifa” if Israel attacked his country.

Israel’s border with Egypt [Project Sand Timer] is long (266 kilometers), and has enormous strategic importance given what happens on the far side. Though demarcated by a new steel fence, it constitutes a major headache for those charged with keeping Israel safe and secure.

The part-constructed fence already secures part of the border, but (a) it will be months before it is completed; (b) there is already at least one tunnel that brings ‘smugglers’ under it (see this Arab news report from yesterday); and (c) fences are of modest value against attacks by rocket-equipped terrorists.

We have written numerous times about the growing lawlessness of Egyptian Sinai and the danger of having the terrorists essentially in control is a huge one.

Now the Egyptian police, who do whatever it is they do down there, are on strike.

Egyptian police protest in Sinai, Cairo demanding weapons  | Ahram Online , Tuesday 5 Mar 2013

Dozens of police officers across different directorates in Sinai are on strike for the second day in a row. This includes officers in the directorates of Tour Sinai, Ras Sidr, Taba and Saint Catherine. Security personnel are protesting against what they describe as “inhumane and degrading” working conditions. They also demand that low-ranking officers and employees be armed so that they can defend themselves from the recurring dangers they are exposed to while on duty. The officers claim that their lives are in danger as ministry leaders refuse to allow them access to weapons, urging them to maintain self-restraint. They also demand to be awarded excellence bonuses on a regular basis. The officers said that they would be suspending work until their demands are fulfilled. In Cairo, dozens of police officers from the Old Cairo Police Directorate blocked off Salah Salem Street, a major thoroughfare leading to Cairo International Airport, early on Tuesday, bringing traffic flow to a complete halt. The officers were angry at the death of a fellow officer who died in the line of duty as he attempted to stop a bank robbery. They are demanding more access to live ammunition to defend themselves. Security forces managed to coax protesting officers into reopening the road to traffic.

This is not likely to produce a good result.

Visit This Ongoing War.

From a distance, it’s possible to live with the delusion that the terrorist attacks on Israel’s civilians are at an end or at least in some sort of quiet mode. But as we keep reporting here, the truth is far more dangerous and threatening than that misconception.

Via a statement on the IDF website posted yesterday (Monday), it was reported that at some undisclosed time in the recent past the Shin Bet working with the army exposed the workings of a terror cell in the Hebron area.

Several individuals were arrested, and as in previous such busts it turns out that the ring leader was (a) operating by remote control from far away and (b) had been set free in the unjust and deplorable Shalit Transaction in October/December 2011.

Three terrorist names are given in the IDF bulletin: Manjed Musa Diab Junidi, 23, said to be the leader and recruiter of the cell, released in the 2011 Shalit deal and deported to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip;  Muhammad Hassan Rajab Abu Sahidem, 25, who confessed to preparing pipe bombs and shooting and explosive devices in preparation for an attack on Israelis; Anas Rateb Ahmad Davik, 23, a foot soldier in the cell. The three are charged with membership of an illegal organisation, conspiracy to commit murder, and with firearms and explosives offences.

Junidi was being directed from Gaza by Bassel Hashem Abd al-Fatah al-Haymuni (at AFP, they call him Bassel Haymouni; at Times of Israel, Basel Himouni) who remains free. Al-Haymuni was prisoner number 329 in Phase One of the Shalit Round of released murders and other terrorists. He had been arrested in 2004 and convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 23 years imprisonment, of which he served a mere seven, and now he is well and truly back in business.

Visit This Ongoing War.

The cheering and the hugs exchanged by Israeli and American teams last week at Palmahim Air Force base, south of Tel Aviv, marked a historical turn of events.

For the first time ever, a successful test launch had been carried out of the Arrow 3 missile defense system, designed to stop Iranian long-range ballistic missiles – even those carrying nuclear warheads – in space.

The product of Israeli-American cooperation, and years of research and development led by the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), together with the U.S. Department of Defense’s Missile Defense Agency, the successful test represented a leap forward in missile defense technology, and a key development in the ongoing Israeli-Iranian arms race.

Travelling at twice the speed of a tank shell, the Arrow 3 interceptor is carried into space by a missile, which then falls away. The interceptor is actually a space vehicle that carries out several swift maneuvers as it locks on to its target. It then lunges directly at the incoming projectile, for a head-on collision.

At speeds of up to 4000 meters (13,123 feet) per second, the interceptor relies only on its self-generated kinetic energy to destroy the hostile missile, and does not require its own explosives to get the job done.

The successful trial underscores the fact that despite significant political differences that exist between Jerusalem and Washington, defense cooperation between the two countries is today at an unprecedented level.

The first batch of four Arrow 3 batteries is expected to come into service between 2014 and 2016. Four additional upgraded batteries, carrying more interceptors, could be built later.

Israeli and American companies are working together to get the Arrow 3 operational. The technological breakthroughs that allowed for the Arrow 3 to be tested have been led by IAI, but collaboration with Boeing has been significant.

Iran is amassing hundreds of missiles capable of striking Israel, while taking steps forward in its nuclear program. As the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv has recently noted, Iran has Shihab 3 missiles that put all of Israel in range, as well as the Ghadr-1, which is an upgraded version of the Shihab 3.

Tehran is also developing the Sajjil-2, a two-stage solid fuel missile that can strike targets 2,000 kilometers away. Any of these missiles can be fitted to carry unconventional warheads.

To cope with this ballistic missile challenge, as well as the threat posed by Syrian scuds, some of which have reached Hezbollah, Israel has the Arrow 2 missile defense system in place, which shoots down incoming projectiles in the upper atmosphere.

Once it becomes operational, the Arrow 3 will form another layer of defense over millions of Israelis, thereby giving the Israel Air Force two to three shots at intercepting incoming missile.

“We are in arms race. We hope to be one step ahead, technologically,” said defense source well acquainted with the Arrow 3 program.

As part of the race to protect its civilians, Israel has set up the Iron Dome rocket protection system, which intercepted over 90 percent of rockets from Gaza during last year’s conflict with Hamas .

Other projects under development include the David’s Sling system, designed to stop intermediate rockets and missiles, which are a part of Hezbollah’s arsenal of more than 60,000 rockets.

Despite the progress being made in this field, Israel can never rely solely on defense for its national security. In an unstable region filled with radical non-state actors, collapsing states, and an Iran marching towards nuclear weapons capabilities, defense can only form one part of the plan to keep Israel safe.

The other part involves devastating offensive capabilities, designed to surprise adversaries and throw them off balance, bringing any conflict to a swift conclusion.

Originally published at the Gatestone Institute, under the title, “U.S. Helping Israel’s Defense.”