Originally published at the Gatestone Institute.

There are many signs that the Palestinian Authority is seeking to escalate tensions in the West Bank [Judea and Samaria -ed.] ahead of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to the region next month.

Although the Palestinian Authority probably does not want an all-out confrontation between Palestinians and Israelis at this stage, some Palestinian Authority officials in Ramallah believe that a “mini-intifada” would serve the Palestinians’ interests, especially on the eve of Obama’s visit.

The officials hope that scenes of daily clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians will prompt Obama to exert pressure on the Israeli government to make far-reaching concessions to the Palestinian Authority.

This is why the Palestinian Authority leadership has been encouraging its constituents lately to wage a “popular intifada” against Israel, each time finding another excuse to initiate confrontations between Palestinians and Israel.

Now the Palestinian Authority is using the issue of Palestinian prisoners who are on hunger strike in Israeli prisons as an excuse to call for street protests and clashes with the Israel Defense Forces.

In recent days, dozens of Palestinian protesters have been injured in clashes with IDF soldiers in various parts of Judea and Samaria. The protests are being held in solidarity with four hunger-strikers.

Before that, the Palestinian Authority used the issue of settlements as an accuse to call for widespread protests.

Before that, the Palestinian Authority leadership encouraged Palestinians to protest against Israeli “plans” to destroy the Aqsa Mosque and replace it with the Third Temple.

By encouraging a “popular intifada,” the Palestinian Authority leadership is hoping to bring the Palestinian issue back to the top of the agenda of the U.S. Administration and Israel.

Palestinian Authority officials have in recent months expressed concern over the lack of interest in the Palestinian issue both in the U.S. and Israel.

The Palestinians have been absent from speeches delivered by Obama over the past few months, and the majority of parties that ran in the last Israeli elections did not even mention the Palestinian issue.

But now that all eyes are once again turned toward the Middle East in anticipation of Obama’s planned visit, the Palestinian Authority is working hard to draw the world’s attention to the Palestinian issue, and hoping to achieve its goal by encouraging clashes between Palestinian protesters and the IDF and Jewish settlers.

Although the violence has thus far remained on a low flame, it is expected to intensify as the date of Obama’s visit approaches.

The belief in the Palestinian Authority is that the violence on the ground will push Obama to exert pressure on the Israeli government to comply with the Palestinian conditions for resuming the peace process, namely a full cessation of settlement construction and the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.

There is also talk in Ramallah about organizing demonstrations during Obama’s visit, in which he is scheduled to meet with President Mahmoud Abbas. The demonstrations will be held to protest against U.S. “bias” in favor of Israel.

The Palestinian Authority leadership is hoping that the anti-U.S. protests will scare Obama and force him to exert even more pressure on Israel.

The Palestinian Authority’s message to Obama: You must act quickly against Israel before things get out of hand.

It now remains to be seen whether Obama is aware of this attempt to put pressure on him, or whether he will continue to turn a blind eye to the Palestinian Authority’s new-old tactic of initiating an escalation with the hope of extracting concessions from the U.S. and Israel.

Originally published at the Gatestone Institute, under the title, “Palestinians Plan Violence to Force the US to Extract Concessions from Israel,” February 22, 2013.

Yesterday there were riots in Judea and Samaria, as Arabs protested the death of a prisoner held in Meggido Prison, Arafat Jaradat.

Israeli authorities said that an autopsy, carried out in the presence of a Palestinian doctor, did not show signs of torture. The Palestinian Authority claimed, on the other hand, that there was evidence of bruises and broken ribs. Israel said there were rib fractures but they could be attributed to attempts to resuscitate Jaradat. No cause of death could be determined.

The usual suspects — Amira Hass of Ha’aretz, +972 magazine, etc., — all insist, with zero evidence except their hatred of the Jewish state, that he died as a result of torture. Further tests will be carried out, but the actual facts will not change the opinion of 99% of the people on either side of the issue.

Jaradat, 30, had been arrested after a rock-throwing incident in which an Israeli was hurt. There has been an increase in such attacks on Israelis recently. Khaled Abu Toameh reports,

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas said over the weekend that he was in favor of a peaceful and popular resistance and that he and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal have reached agreement on the need for a peaceful intifada.

The two met in Cairo during a recent conference of Islamic countries.

Speaking during an interview with Al-Arabiya TV, Abbas said that he fully supported demonstrations against the security barrier and settlements, as well as Palestinian attempts to establish outposts in the West Bank, but stressed his opposition to violent measures.

“Armed resistance is banned,” he stressed. “This is a law and it is forbidden. It is also forbidden in the Gaza Strip.”

Let me translate this apparently Gandhian remark: Arabs are encouraged to engage in disturbances in which they will throw rocks and launch them from powerful slings at Jewish soldiers and civilians. They may also try to tear apart any of the unwary that they get their hands on, and they may throw homemade firebombs. They will do their best to place security forces in the position that they must use force to defend themselves.

The use of actual firearms and explosives, if such occurs (it will), will be attributed to members of extremist groups that the P.A. and Hamas do not control. Shootings and bombings will be deplored, but ‘understood.’

It is also important to understand the rationale and the goals of these disturbances. They are currently focusing on the ‘prisoner issue,’ that is, the presence of Palestinian Arabs in Israeli jails for security-related offenses. Although many, including murderers, were released in trade for Gilad Shalit, Palestinians continue to engage in terrorism and continue to get arrested.

From the Arab point of view, this is insufferable: first, because any anti-Jewish activity is considered resistance to occupation and therefore is justified; and second, because they do not recognize the authority of the Israeli ‘colonialist’ government to arrest Arabs, whom they view as the indigenous owners of the land. The release of prisoners is one of the P.A.’s preconditions for negotiation with Israel, along with stopping construction in the territories and eastern Jerusalem.

But why heat things up just now?

Abu Toameh and other commentators have suggested that it is because of the impending visit of Barack Obama to Israel. Although Obama himself hasn’t said much about it, there are indications — particularly from the new Secretary of State, John Kerry — that a new push for an Israel-PA agreement is in the offing.

Kerry is prepared to look reality in the eye and force it to back down:

“We need to try to find a way forward,” Kerry said at his Senate confirmation hearing last month. He said the window to create an independent Palestinian state and to ensure Israeli security soon “could shut on everybody, and that would be disastrous.”

But creating an independent Palestinian state soon would be the worst possible way to “ensure Israeli security!” It’s hard to imagine what logical process went on in Kerry’s head to make this statement possible.

Palestinian Authority violence continued early Wednesday afternoon when approximately 200 Arabs in Samaria rioted and hurled rocks at soldiers who evacuated a small illegal village.

Two of the soldiers were lightly injured and w ere treated on the spot. The IDF shot over the heads of the rioters to disperse them.

To grab as many leftist votes as possible from Shelly Yachimovich, whose campaign focuses on social issues, Tzipi Livni is focusing her campaign on the political process with the Palestinians.  There are two components to her strategy: make the problems with the Palestinians worse, and then blame Netanyahu and his administration for them.

In the first stage, Livni contradicted the official Israeli line abroad that the Palestinians had unilaterally violated the Oslo Accords by going to the UN, announcing instead that the Israeli government was to blame for the move.

Then came Olmert, announcing at the Israel Business Conference that Netanyahu is leading the way to a third “intifada.”

Surely enough, their promise that a lack of progress in negotiations would lead to renewed violence by the Palestinians has already proven effective.  Following their pronouncements, predictions and descriptions of a new “intifada” started to hit the media with exquisite coordination.

Granted, neither Livni nor Olmert wants an “intifada.”  But—how did her advisers  put it?—“Livni has put the political process back on the agenda in Israel.”  The Palestinians aren’t idiots.  They do their reading about Israeli elections, and when someone puts in an order for an “intifada,” they’re eager not to disappoint.  Especially when the one putting in the order is a friend.  This explanation is offered—surprisingly—by Ron Ben Yishai in Yediot Acharonot, who is not known as a great fan of the Netanyahu government.  Further, he says, “Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) has one more clear goal that he is trying to achieve with threats of another “intifada”: strengthening the center and left in Israeli elections.”

Ben Yishai writes that Abu Mazen is planning articles in the Israeli media while taking care to generate tension and violence in the field, as the number of rock- and Molotov cocktail-throwing incidents increase substantially, with lives lost along the way.

As elections come closer, the level of violence increases.

Not convinced that there could be outright or even unspoken coordination between the Palestinians and Israeli politicians?

Unfortunately, this is nothing new.

In 2010, Netanyahu revealed before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Chaim Ramon had been sent by Shimon Peres to meet with Saeb Erekat and other Palestinian officials, and advised them against being overly eager to start negotiations with Netanyahu.  “You’ll get more from us.”  “Don’t compromise.”  “Wait till we’re in power.”

Ramon and Peres denied it.  But then Ayala Chason of Channel 1 broadcast an interview with the very credible source who had happened to overhear the conversation.

More and more, it seems that what we have here is a joint effort to produce an “intifada.”  Perhaps there are no secret meetings.  But there is an overt tango, albeit one in which the dancers are not quite touching.

Granted, you say, Ramon is always making trouble.  But Livni?  She’s ethical.  She’s innocent.  You can’t say such a thing about her without offering solid evidence.

Sorry, but the burden of proof is on her.  Livni should have gone to her good friends in the Palestinian leadership and said, “Don’t even think about starting an ‘intifada’ and expecting me to stay quiet.”  She should then have gone to the media and, just to dispel any doubts, announced that we all stand united with the administration against any and all threats of Palestinian violence.  “There will be no negotiations under conditions of violence.  Quite the opposite: if there is violence, we will call on the government to take punitive measures.”

The deafening silence that Livni and her people are maintaining in response to Palestinian threats is the smoking gun in the moral case against them.  Livni and Olmert’s use of Palestinian threats to affect election results, meanwhile, is less a smoking gun and more a ticking bomb.

Is it realistic to expect responsible leadership from Olmert?  After all, he and his children won’t pay the price of a new “intifada.”  That will be paid by Israelis driving along the roads of Judea and Samaria, such as Tziyona, the wife of musician Itzik Kala.  She was recently injured very severely in the head while driving toward Jerusalem on Beitar Road.

In the meantime, Abu Mazen, Abu Ala, and the rest of the Abus are pretty pleased with themselves.  Every now and then they toss another stick on the bonfire.  Another few rocks.  Another few Molotov cocktails.

Anything for friends.  Anything to keep the conflict in the headlines ahead of Israeli elections.

Yet the leaders of the right also are being too quiet.  They’ve got to expose and attack this cynical pre-election stunt by Livni and her fellow travelers.  They’ve got to tell them: The burden of proof is on you.  You need to go to the Palestinians and make it crystal clear to both them and the Israeli public that Molotov cocktails and rock-throwing are totally unacceptable to you.

It is intolerable that these people use Palestinian threats and terrorist attacks as part of an electoral strategy of intimidating the Israeli public, thus incentivizing further Palestinian violence. They must be told quite clearly and publicly that if they fail to show some civic responsibility now, then they will bear responsibility for the next “intifada” and its victims.

Originally published in Makor Rishon December 21, 2012.  Translated from Hebrew by David B. Greenberg.

By allowing Hamas to celebrate its 25th anniversary in Judea and Samaria, the Palestinian Authority leadership is paving the way for a third intifada against Israel.

In fact, in the past few days, the third intifada has already begun, as violent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers have increased in various parts of Judea and Samaria.

Tens of thousands of Hamas supporters have taken to the streets of Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Tulkarem to celebrate the event, the first of its kind since the Islamist movement expelled the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip in 2007.

Since then, in Judea and Samaria, the Palestinian Authority had been cracking down on Hamas, arresting hundreds of its supporters and members and closing down dozens of institutions belonging to the movement.

In recent weeks, however, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has apparently decided to endorse a new strategy towards Hamas. He now considers Hamas a political ally rather than an enemy.

The change came immediately after the Israeli military offensive against Hamas in mid-November.

The rapprochement between Abbas and Hamas reached its peak before and after the UN General Assembly vote in favor of upgrading the Palestinians’ status to non-member observer state in late November.

Both Abbas and Hamas see the two events — the war in the Gaza Strip and the UN vote — as “historic achievements” and military and political victories over Israel.

Emboldened by the “victories,” Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal recently reached a secret agreement on the need to launch a “popular intifada” against Israel in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, Palestinian sources in Ramallah revealed.

The two men believe that such an intifada at this stage would further isolate Israel and earn the Palestinians even more sympathy in the international arena, the sources said.

Abbas and Mashaal are aware, the sources noted, that the Palestinians are now not ready for another military confrontation with Israel — neither in the West Bank nor in the Gaza Strip.

That is why the two men agreed that the best and only option facing the Palestinians these days is a “popular intifada” that would see Palestinian youths engage in daily confrontations with Israeli soldiers and settlers, especially in Judea and Samaria.

Abbas and Mashaal want an uprising similar to the first intifada, which erupted in 1987, when Palestinians mainly used stones and firebombs against soldiers and settlers, and refrained from launching terror attacks inside Israel.

Yet Abbas and Mashaal seem to disagree on the ultimate goal of the “popular intifada.”

While Abbas is hoping that daily clashes between Palestinian stone-throwers and Israeli soldiers will force Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines, including east Jerusalem, Mashaal and his Hamas movement are hoping that the uprising would lead to the “liberation of all Palestine, from the Jordan river to the sea.”

Abbas and Hamas have decided for now to lay their differences aside and work towards escalating tensions on the ground, particularly in Judea and Samaria. Representatives of the two parties have been holding “reconciliation” talks in Cairo during the past few weeks in a bid to agree on a new strategy against Israel.

Their goal is to drag Israel into a confrontation with Palestinian civilians — one that would embarrass the Israelis among the international community and force them to capitulate.

This article was slightly edited and originally published at the Gatestone Institute. 

Jenin District Governor Kadura Musa died Tuesday night of a heart attack after attackers opened fire on his home, according to a report by Haaretz.

A hail of bullets rained down on Musa’s home Tuesday night by a number of attackers positioned outside his home.  Guards returned fire, and Musa himself came out and shot a weapon in the air.

Later, he complained of feeling unwell, was taken to the hospital, and subsequently died.

The attackers are believed to be members of the family of a Palestinian man killed by Palestinian police on April 15 after failing to turn himself in.  The family had threatened to take revenge.

Musa was believed to be a stabilizing force in Jenin, according to Haaretz, but participated in the January 2011 awarding of a presidential prize from Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas to the family of a terrorist who was killed trying to murder IDF soldiers.

Jenin is known for being a hotbed of terrorist activity prior to the Second Intifada.  A military operation in the first 11 days of April 2002 to root out terrorists resulted in a major battle between Israelis and Arabs in the city.  Arab booby traps and use of residents as human shields resulted in IDF soldiers endangering themselves in order to protect Arab civilians, and caused the IDF to sustain heavy casualties.

When the battle was over, 23 IDF soldiers and 52 people from Jenin, primarily militiamen, had been killed.  International condemnation of Israel poured in, leading to a UN investigation.

Convicted Palestinian terror chief Marwan Barghouti, in comments to the Israel Security Service (Shin Bet) soon after his arrest in 2002, admitted to facilitating terror attacks during the second intifada, and told his interrogators that the Intifada “was supposed to be a popular uprising, but things got out of hand,” as first reported by Haaretz.

The Israeli daily obtained and published transcripts of  interrogation sessions dated April 21-May 14, 2002 at the Russian Compound in Jerusalem, 6 days after his arrest. They were released in the course of legal proceedings against the former Fatah Secretary-General, who was arrested and later convicted on charges of murder during the second intifada, and sentenced to five concurrent life sentences.

On the basis of these recorded partial confessions, he was indicted for three terror attacks: the murder of a Greek Orthodox monk near Ramallah in June 2001; the murder of an Israeli girl near Givat Ze’ev in January 2002; and the shooting attack at the Sea Food Market restaurant in Tel Aviv in March 2002, which left three civilians dead.

Barghouti on the second intifada

Barghouti, who also founded the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade, spoke of the lead-up to the second intifada, and confirmed once again that Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000 was convenient pretext for the “outbreak” of the Intifada – not the reason, “but the straw that broke the camel’s back.”

Barghouti spoke at length of fears within Fatah about being overshadowed on ‘the street’ by the more hardline elements involved in the intifada – Hamas and Islamic Jihad – and how this fear led them to attempt to outbid the other terror groups in proving their fidelity to the Palestinian cause. In essence this meant the use of suicide bombers by Fatah, and the elimination of the distinction between attacks within or over the Green Line.

Barghouti is documented as confirming his role in coordinating operations and activities of terror squads and in financing them as well. He details how, on one occasion, he gave orders to avenge a terrorist’s death, which resulted in the shooting death of an Israeli near Givat Ze’ev, and how he gave money to various individuals that were seeking to perpetrate attacks.

Barghouti on Arafat

Barghouti described Yasser Arafat as the prime mover, his direct commander, and the force behind Fatah’s overall policy. He painted a picture of Arafat as the man who issued only general orders, with the specifics implied, so that the acts perpetrated could not be traced back to him: “When Arafat would call for a cease-fire, he would convene the heads of Tanzim and instruct them, and add that if the cease-fire were to end, they knew what they would have to do, when it was clear to everyone that he was talking about a continuation of military activity.” Barghouti stressed that Arafat was instrumental to the intifada because, in no uncertain terms, he was bankrolling it, he was the “one source” from where all the finances flowed.

The Palestinian street, reflections on the peace process, and funny jokes

Concern over his image on the Palestinian street was preeminent in determining whether and how much to confess to his interrogators. At some point in the interrogation he insisted on meeting with then-Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter, or with his second, Yuval Diskin, before offering his confession: “There are things that a person in my position has to take care of in terms of the future, for my own interests and those of my men.” His request was not granted (at least not in the three and a half weeks that the transcripts cover). At another point, he is recorded as saying that “cooperation with the interrogation will be to his detriment in his future political career among his people.”

Barghouti compared the second intifada to the Yom Kippur War, in that the Palestinians feel they restored their pride, and achieved a type of balance with the terror wave, such that peace between the two peoples was now possible.

Looking back at the peace process, Barghouti blamed its failure on Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination.

Throughout the interrogations, Barghouti seems to vacillate between crafty pragmatist and uncompromising ideologue. At some points he suggests that Fatah’s descent into violence was a strategic mistake, and at others he insists that an independent state could only be achieved through bloodshed. Either way, ‘street cred’ was foremost in his decision-making, and he viewed his participation in terror activity as ensuring “that in the future he could point to himself as someone who worked both for peace when necessary and in war.”

In the three and a half weeks of interrogation revealed in the transcripts, the Shin Bet appeared to have developed a rapport with Barghouti, enough so that one wrote: “It should be noted that the subject has a well-developed sense of humor and provided us with a number of great jokes.”

http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2012/03/will-palestinians-launch-third.html

Is there going to be a “third intifada?” I have no idea. That is a question most likely to be determined by those who set Palestinian strategy, and they will surely differ among themselves. What interests me is the question of on what basis would such a choice be made.

When this issue is discussed publicly it is attributed almost entirely to the idea that frustration will motivate revolt. This is certainly the point made by Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders. The argument is that unless they get their way diplomatically violence will be the logical outcome.

But that’s just a tactic to use violence as leverage, scaring Western countries—because such threats won’t scare Israel—into concessions. Moreover, since Western countries will not hand the PA unilateral independence on its own terms, without any deal with Israel or concessions, violence would ultimately either be useless or talk of violence would turn out to be a bluff.

There are other considerations that will determine Palestinian policy.

Would a “third intifada” actually bring Palestinian gains? I would argue that neither of the first two did, though of course that didn’t stop them from happening. Political profitability is not the only factor involved and Yasir Arafat had his own way of assessing the balance of forces. But whether violence would bring any benefit is going to be an important issue for the PA leadership.

Why would a PA leadership launch a new war if it didn’t expect rationally to gain from it? Ideological enthusiasm and irrational wishful thinking do play some part here. Yet the current leadership has had some lessons in the cost of wrecking their own infrastructure. That kind of thinking in itself is insufficient.

There’s another point that must be raised. Would a “third intifada” and the wrecking of Palestinian infrastructure once again enhance or destroy the PA and Fatah dominance on the West Bank? On the positive side, demagoguery about heroic fighters, martyrdom, and liberating Palestine by fire and sword has proven to be useful for building mass support.

Yet that has usually been true when Fatah, through the PLO, either had a monopoly on violence or Hamas was content to play second fiddle to Arafat. Those conditions no longer apply.

On the other hand, however, wouldn’t Hamas, with its greater degree of specialization in terror and triumphalism be in a better position to benefit? After all, Fatah does rule the West Bank and provoking anarchy and chaos could destroy its standing. By having to cooperate with Hamas, Fatah would legalize its organizations and actions, allowing it to heap new glory on itself by murdering Israeli civilians. That is very risky.

In contrast, Fatah would gain nothing in the Gaza Strip which would stay firmly under Hamas control. Small Fatah groups might be able to operate there but so what? They would have no political influence and be under the thumb of Hamas. A “third intifada” is politically beneficial to Hamas and that is a point that no Fatah or PA leader can easily ignore.

More likely, then, is a situation in which either Hamas forces an outbreak of uprising or some leaders in Fatah do so. The latter’s motivations would include a genuine belief in revolutionary methods, which a significant sector of the Fatah leadership does accept, or the use of an intifada as part of a leadership struggle.

The fact is that Mahmoud Abbas is in the closing phase of his leadership and there is no clear successor. Complicating the situation is the specter of a generational transition. People can put forward in conversation their preferred person to lead the PA, PLO, and Fatah or speculate as to who it might be. But the truth is that nobody has the least idea, even of who are the most likely candidates.

A leader or faction or elements of the “young guard” might well decide that an intifada would suit their purposes. It would distance them from the “failed” policies of Abbas and the current establishment. By focusing on youth, violence, and the security forces, such a strategy could benefit a takeover bid by “military” officials or by young anti-establishment forces.

There is a difference between those two sectors. The PA “military” tends to dislike Hamas, but those who came of political age in the “first intifada” see things differently. They might view a war as the best way to fuse Fatah-Hamas cooperation with they themselves taking a leading role.

Of course, an uprising could take place due to some major or symbolic incident, forcing the leaders to rush to the front of the army. That is also possible. But least likely of all would be Abbas and the current leadership making a calculated decision to launch a war of which they would expect to benefit.

This article was published in “Bitter Lemons.”