Worse still, all parties involved would justifiably expect that since the government of Israel went to such lengths in a deal for Shalit, it would build upon these benchmarks in future deals.
6. Israel will suffer a further erosion of deterrence. Israel’s continued willingness to capitulate to increasingly outrageous demands exposes a serious weakness, one that terror groups are quick to seize upon. Hizbullah’s success in freeing child-murderer Samir Kuntar greatly emboldened Hamas; its spokesman stated unabashedly that the Kuntar exchange “prove[d] that a useful way to liberate prisoners from the jails of the occupation is to capture Zionist soldiers.” Should Israel capitulate to Hamas, it will vindicate the notion that kidnappings are profitable enterprises, which yield not only staggering returns, but also serves terrorism’s core purpose of bringing Israel to its knees. Simply put, Palestinian “success” undermines Israel’s efforts to establish deterrence by becoming bolder and more costly every time.
7. Releasing terrorist prisoners perverts justice. From the Hamas “politician” to the cold-blooded child-killer, releasing individuals in an extra-judicial manner undermines not only Israel’s criminal justice system, but also the normative concept of justice itself, so important in a democratic society. It sends a message that justice is conditional and eliminates the disincentive effect of punishment.
Arguably, early release has the added effect of heartening would-be terrorists, as they are encouraged by the prospect of early release. Further, soldiers put their lives at risk, suffering injury and on occasion death, trying to capture these terrorists and bring them to justice. These wholesale exchanges turn their missions into dangerous Sisyphean tasks. Beyond this, families whose loved ones were maimed or killed at the hands of prisoners have to suffer the further trauma of watching the perpetrator released, to a hero’s welcome no less.
8. As Israel’s morality is reaffirmed, its morale suffers. Though comforted by the return of their countrymen, Israelis recognize the heavy costs of such an ordeal. A somber sense of helplessness sets in, softened only by their noble commitment to bringing the boys home. What’s more, the drawn-out process typically causes disillusionment and breeds divisiveness, with people campaigning against the government of Israel instead of the perpetrators of the kidnappings.
9. Consummating a prisoner exchange greatly enhances the status of terrorist groups. It was Hizbullah, not the Lebanese government, that secured the release of Kuntar, at the time the longest-serving Lebanese prisoner in Israel. Incidentally, Hassan Nasrallah dubbed the capture of Goldwasser and Regev “Operation True Promise,” the objective of which was to use the soldiers as ransom for Kuntar’s release. In accomplishing this objective, Hizbullah cemented its status on the Arab street as the force most capable of staring down the “Zionist enemy.”
Western governments have begun to reassess their policies toward Hizbullah, in recognition of its emergence as the prime mover in Lebanese politics. Thus Israel, albeit unintentionally, confers legitimacy on the extremists. Should Israel consummate an exchange with Hamas, the Gaza-based group would undoubtedly reap similar benefits.
10. A consummated deal would reaffirm the painful cost of not having an established policy on hostages. In the aftermath of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the Winograd Commission of Inquiry identified the vital importance of a hostage policy. The lack of some, or any, coherent policy is the source of the weakness, vacillation, and divisiveness that characterizes Israel’s response. Terror groups deftly exploit this deficiency.
Nasrallah himself stated: “At first [the Israelis] say no, but then they accept. This may take place after a week, a month or a year, but finally they will let us negotiate.” With no established policy the government’s “red lines” are continually redrawn and thereafter entirely abandoned. Indeed the very term ‘red lines’ is stripped of any meaning, and government proclamations ring hollow.
In light of the above considerations, entering into negotiations with Hamas clearly places the Israeli government in a lose-lose situation: by refusing to submit to the terrorist demands it causes a loss of faith and morale; by repatriating captives, it endangers many more citizens, soldiers and civilians alike. Israel needs to formulate a policy by which it will be guided and restrained. It needs to equalize the asymmetrical negotiating positions so that terror groups are not dictating conditions and controlling outcomes. Rather than being at the mercy of terrorists, Israel needs to take the initiative.